

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

VOLUME 21

TAB AC

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

**VOLUME 2
SUMMARY OF FACTS**

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

COPY

15

OF

14

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	i
1. Authority and Purpose	1
a. Authority	1
b. Purpose	2
c. Circumstances	2
2. Summary of Facts	3
a. Mission	3
(1) Command and Control Structure	5
(2) E-3B AWACS Mission	8
(3) F-15C Mission	10
(4) UH-60 Black Hawk Mission	10
b. Summary of Events	10
(1) Command and Control	10
(2) E-3B AWACS	13
(3) F-15C	19
(4) UH-60 Black Hawk	23
c. Search and Rescue	27
d. Maintenance	28
(1) E-3B AWACS	28
(2) F-15C	29
(3) UH-60 Black Hawk	32
e. Summary of AAI and IFF Anamolies	34
f. Crew Qualifications	35
(1) AWACS Crew Qualifications	35
(2) F-15C Crew Qualifications	39
(3) UH-60 Black Hawk Crew Qualifications	40

g. Medical	40
(1) AWACS	40
(2) F-15C	41
(3) UH-60 Black Hawk	41
h. Human Factors	42
(1) E-3B AWACS	42
(2) F-15C	42
(3) UH-60	43
i. Nav aids and Facilities	43
j. Weather	43
k. News media	44
l. Directives and Publications	44
(1) Command and Control Directives and Publications	44
(2) AWACS Directives and Publications	45
(3) F-15 Directives and Publications	45
(4) Black Hawk Directives and Publications	45
3. Statement of Opinion	46

27 May 1994

AFR 110-14
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE.

a. **Authority:** On 14 April 1994, the Secretary of Defense directed the United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances of the 14 April 1994 crash of two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in northern Iraq, and the possible involvement of United States Air Force F-15C aircraft. Accordingly, USCINCEUR directed the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) to order the investigation. Under this delegated authority, and in accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14, CINCUSAFE appointed Major General James G. Andrus and other accident board members to conduct the investigation. The appointments were made by HQ USAFE memorandum dated 15 April 1994 and HQ USAFE special order M-02 dated 20 May 94.¹ The individuals appointed were:

BOARD PRESIDENT

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES G. ANDRUS

Board President

BOARD MEMBERS

COLONEL PATRICK J. BENNETT
COLONEL MICHAEL E. FAIN
LT COL WAYNE I. MUDGE
LT COL RAY B. SHEPHERD
MAJOR AARON D. BYAS
MAJOR CHRISTOPHER J. LISANTI
MAJOR JEFFREY M. SNYDER
1LT GREG A. BROWN
CW5 STEVE A. MELINE
CW4 DOUGLAS C. SOUSA

Deputy Board President
Chief Investigator
F-15 Pilot
Public Affairs
AWACS Crew Member
Flight Surgeon
F-15 Maintenance
Board Recorder
UH-60 Pilot
UH-60 Maintenance

ASSOCIATE BOARD MEMBERS

COLONEL REMZI ARMEN
GROUP CAPTAIN BARRY P. DOGGETT
LT COL CHRISTIAN VELLUZ

Associate Member (Turkey)
Associate Member (United Kingdom)
Associate Member (France)

LEGAL ADVISORS

COLONEL WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR.
COLONEL CHARLES H. WILCOX, II
LTC SCOTT C. BLACK
LT COL BRYAN T. LAWLER

Legal Advisor
Legal Advisor
Legal Advisor
Legal Advisor

TECHNICAL ADVISORS

GS-15 DONALD NORRIS
LT COL BERTRAM H. PRYOR, JR.
LTC LENEAR ROYER III
LT COL JOYCE E. TETERS
MAJOR JAMES R. LITTLE
CAPT MICHAEL E. TURNER
1LT KELLY J. SCOTT
CW5 DANIEL W. MEDINA
CW2 JOHN B. HALL
SSG FREDDIE L. HOLMES
GS-11 CAROLE M. PYLES
GS-11 GERALD D. SILVIUS
MR DAVID BRUMMELL

Declassifier
AWACS Systems
Helicopter Systems
Medical
Medical
AWACS Data Analysis
AWACS Maintenance
Helicopter Systems
Helicopter Aircraft Survivability
UH-60 Avionics
Foreign Disclosure
F-15 Maintenance
Legal (United Kingdom)

b. Purpose: This was an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the 14 April 1994 accidental shoot-down of two United States Army Black Hawk helicopters in northern Iraq, by two United States Air Force F-15 fighter aircraft, participating in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The accident occurred at approximately 0730Z hours while the aircraft were engaged in missions to protect the Kurdish population in the area of Iraq designated as a security zone (SZ). The purpose of the investigation was to determine the relevant facts and circumstances of the accident and, if possible, to determine the cause or causes. The investigation obtained and preserved evidence for claims, litigation, disciplinary and administrative action, and for all other purposes deemed appropriate by competent authority.

c. Circumstances: Since the beginning of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, coalition aircrews have flown daily missions over active Iraqi air defenses to guard the 500,000 Kurdish refugees within the United Nations-designated security zone. Iraqi forces have tested coalition resolve by probing the no-fly zone with Iraqi aircraft, illuminating coalition aircraft with "fire control" radars, and firing on friendly forces. Coalition forces have responded by shooting down an Iraqi Mig-23 and bombing of Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air-missile sites. Kurdish refugees within the security zone have been harassed and UN relief trucks have been sabotaged by Iraqis. On 21 December 1993, a small contingent of coalition personnel were attacked within the security zone. Coalition liaison personnel were fired upon as they left their support base in Zakhu, Iraq. In March 1994, Saddam Hussein publicly stated that he would be "forced to take other means" in response to renewed United Nations sanctions. Non-government organization personnel have had bounties placed on their heads.² On 3 April 1994, a female civilian journalist employed by a French news agency was murdered in northern Iraq by unknown assailants.³ Iraqi forces have maintained a capability to attack coalition personnel and the local Kurdish population. Tensions have remained strong in the area and coalition aircrews and ground personnel have operated at a high state of readiness.⁴

On 14 April 1994, the Turkish and US co-commanders of the Military Coordination Center (MCC), a component of the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task Forces (CTF) and

other staff officers were scheduled to meet with UN representatives and officials of the Kurdish Democratic Party. Two Black Hawk helicopters transporting the group from MCC (Forward) headquarters in Zakhu, to Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, were shot down by US F-15C fighter aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone. All individuals on board the two helicopters were killed. The individuals who died in the accident are listed below:⁵


<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>POSITION/REASON</u>
COL HIKMET ALP	TURKISH	MCC CO-COMMANDER
MR ABDULSATUR ARAB	KURDISH	MISSION SECURITY
SSGT PAUL N. BARCLAY	US	COMMUNICATIONS NCO
SPC CORNELIUS A. BASS	US	UH-60 CREW CHIEF
1LT CEYHUN CIVAS	TURKISH	TU LIAISON OFFICER
SPC JEFFREY C. COLBERT	US	UH-60 CREW CHIEF
LT COL GUY DEMETZ	FRENCH	SENIOR FRENCH REP
PFC MARK A. ELLNER	US	UH-60 CREW CHIEF
W01 JOHN W. GARRETT, JR.	US	UH-60 PILOT
1LT M. BARLAS GULTEPE	TURKISH	TU LIAISON OFFICER
CW2 MICHAEL A. HALL	US	UH-60 PILOT
SFC BENJAMIN T. HODGE	US	TRANSLATOR
MR GHANDI HUSSEIN	KURDISH	MISSION SECURITY
CPT PATRICK M. MCKENNA	US	UH-60 PILOT
MR BADER MIKHO	KURDISH	MISSION SECURITY
MR AHMAD MOHAMMAD	KURDISH	MISSION SECURITY
W01 ERIK S. MOUNSEY	US	UH-60 PILOT
COL RICHARD A. MULHERN	US	NEW MCC CO-COMMANDER
1LT LAURA A. PIPER	US	IRAQI AIR ANALYST C2
SPC MICHAEL S. ROBINSON	US	U-60 CREW CHIEF
SSGT RICKY L. ROBINSON	US	MEDIC
MR SALID SAID	KURDISH	INTERPRETER
MS BARBARA L. SCHELL	US	POLITICAL ADVISOR
MAJ HARRY C. SHAPLAND	BRITISH	SECURITY OFFICER
LT COL JONATHAN C. SWANN	BRITISH	SENIOR UK REPRESENTATIVE
COL JERALD L. THOMPSON	US	MCC CO-COMMANDER

2. SUMMARY OF FACTS.

a. **Mission:** In April 1991, the US National Command Authority directed US forces to conduct Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Under his authority, the USCINCEUR directed the creation of a Combined Task Forces to conduct operations in northern Iraq. Coalition air forces from Turkey, France, the United Kingdom and the United States were assembled to conduct frequent air operations, including reconnaissance and surveillance, in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) north of 36 degrees north latitude in Iraq. These air operations served as a symbol of coalition resolve and as a deterrent to Iraqi military encroachment into the United Nations-established security zone (SZ) in northern Iraq. CTF ground forces included a Battalion Task Force consisting of a reinforced coalition infantry battalion, a lift helicopter task force, an

attack helicopter battalion, and a Military Coordination Center. The coalition ground forces were tasked to monitor Iraqi compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 that established the SZ and to maintain contact and coordination with Kurdish civil and military authorities in the area.⁶

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT Tactical Area of Responsibility



(Figure 1 - Map)

In order to satisfy the requirements of the CTF mission, specific organizations and aircraft were tasked as follows:

(1) **Command and Control Structure:** USCINCEUR Operations Orders (OPORDs) 002 and 003 defined the command and control of the CTF forces, as exercised by USCINCEUR, through the Commanding General of the CTF (CTF CG). USCINCEUR delegated operational control (OPCON) of the assigned US Army ground and air units to the CTF CG.⁷ (OPCON is the authority to command subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.)⁸ OPCON of other coalition nations' forces was retained by their respective parent commands. The CTF CG was given tactical control (TACON) of participating US Navy, Turkish, French and British forces.⁹ (TACON is the detailed, and usually local, direction and control of movements and maneuvers necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. TACON also provides the authority to direct military operations and control designated forces.)¹⁰ Tactical aircraft and US Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) helicopters were co-located with CTF Headquarters at Incirlik Air Base (AB), Turkey. Other US Army helicopters and coalition ground forces established operations at sites in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq.¹¹ The CTF CG retained authority for all cross-border operations, both air and ground, into Iraq.¹²

USCINCEUR OPORD 003 directed the CTF CG to develop an operation plan (OPLAN) to govern the conduct of the OPC mission.¹³ OPLAN 91-7, dated 20 July 1991, was developed and implemented to delineate the command relationships and organizational responsibilities within CTF PROVIDE COMFORT.¹⁴ USCINCEUR OPORD 004, 14 September 1991, directed the withdrawal of the OPC Battalion Task Force. OPORD 004 further directed an increase in the size of CTF air forces and the retention of the JSOTF at Incirlik AB. The MCC and its supporting helicopter assets remained under the OPCON of the CTF and consolidated operations at Diyarbakir, Turkey.¹⁵ The MCC later established a forward operating location at Zakhu, in the extreme northwestern corner of Iraq. OPLAN 91-7 provided comprehensive guidance for the OPC mission as it existed in July 1991. With the redeployment of the Battalion Task Force beginning in September 1991, the MCC and its supporting helicopter detachment were all that remained of the original CTF ground component.¹⁶ OPORD 004 requested the CTF provide a supporting plan to implement provisions of OPORD 004.¹⁷ However, although an effort was begun in 1991 to revise OPLAN 91-7, no evidence could be found to indicate that OPLAN 91-7 was actually updated to reflect the change in command and control relationships and responsibilities that resulted from the departure of the previously designated CTF Ground Component Commander and his forces.¹⁸ OPLAN 91-7 remained in effect at the time of the accident.¹⁹

Under OPLAN 91-7, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT was organized using a modified joint task force (JTF) structure. (A CTF is a JTF which incorporates forces of other nations).²⁰ The OPC CTF organizational structure consists of a command element (US and Turkish co-commanders), a staff, a Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC), the JSOTF, and the MCC.²¹ The CTF Chief of Staff serves as the CTF CGs' deputy and is responsible for supervising the functions of the staff. The CTF staff includes personnel (C1), intelligence (C2), operations (C3), logistics (C4), and communications (C6).²² (The planning responsibilities normally executed by the plans staff

officer (C5) had been absorbed by the CTF C3.)²³ JSOTF forces provide special operations support and search and rescue.²⁴ The CFAC Commander (CFACC) is responsible for coordinating the employment of air forces to accomplish the OPC mission. He is delegated OPCON of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), USAF airlift, and fighter forces, and has TACON of the MCC, JSOTF, and US Navy, Turkish, French, and British fixed-wing and helicopter assets.²⁵

CFAC responsibilities are assigned to personnel in the 39th Wing (USAF) at Incirlik AB, augmented with temporary duty personnel. The 39th Wing Commander also functions as both the Commander, 7440th Composite Wing (Provisional) and as the CFACC.²⁶ As the Commander of the 7440th Composite Wing, he exercises OPCON of US forces deployed to Incirlik AB, through the individual units' detachment commanders (DETCOs).²⁷ As the CFACC, he exercises TACON over forces participating in the daily OPC flying operation through a ground-based mission director, positioned in the command post at Incirlik AB and an airborne command element (ACE) on board the AWACS.²⁸

The 39th Wing Operations Group Commander serves as the 7440th Composite Wing Deputy Commander for Operations (DO) and as the CFAC DO.²⁹ The CFAC DO is responsible for ensuring aircrews are informed of all unique aspects of the OPC mission upon their arrival in theater.³⁰ He is also responsible for publishing an Aircrew Read File (ARF).³¹ The ARF includes the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for OPC and is mandatory reading for each assigned aircrew member.³²

ROE are policies and procedures developed by National Command Authority (NCA) and subordinate military commanders, governing actions of US military forces to protect themselves, the United States, its possessions, bases and other property and personnel, against attack or hostile incursion. They are based upon legal, political and military considerations and are intended to provide for adequate self defense and to ensure that military activities are consistent with current national objectives. Unified combatant commanders establish ROE for their areas of responsibilities that are consistent with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidelines. These may be modified for specified operations and for changing conditions. ROE are not designed to be specific operational orders; they are intended to describe clear circumstances and limitations under which US forces--from senior commanders to individual airman--may take necessary actions, consistent with legal, political and military requirements.³³ The OPC ROE are the peacetime ROE for the United States European Command, with modifications approved by National Command Authority for OPC.³⁴

In addition to his responsibilities to incoming crew members, the CFAC DO is also responsible for publishing an Airspace Control Order (ACO), a daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) and mission-related special instructions (SPINS).³⁵ The ACO provides general guidance regarding the conduct of OPC missions, and is directive to all OPC aircrews. It provides rules and procedures that govern OPC flight operations.³⁶

The ATO includes the daily flight schedule and provides authority for over-flight of northern Iraq.³⁷ All flights, both rotary and fixed-wing, will be in accordance with the CTF Air Component

Commander's ATO, as approved and promulgated by Headquarters, 2d Turkish Air Force.³⁸ The ATO lists radio frequencies, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes, and other information pertinent to each day's mission.³⁹ Both the ACO and ATO are developed with consideration given to inputs from other CTF organizations. The CTF C2 is responsible for providing reconnaissance targeting information. Individual flying units input data such as aircraft availability and special training requests.⁴⁰ OPLAN 91-7 directs that the Combined Forces Ground Component Commander will coordinate rotary wing sorties in Iraq within the fighter flying window.⁴¹ With the departure of the Combined Forces Ground Component Commander, no individual was assigned to coordinate rotary wing sorties.⁴² OPLAN 91-7 specifies that the CTF C3, through the CFAC scheduling office, is the focal point for coordination of Army rotary wing flights with available fighter assets.⁴³

The Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC), responsible to the C3, provides a 24 hour point of contact for communications within the CTF. When tasked, the JOIC receives, delivers, and transmits communications up, down, and across the CTF command and control structure. An Army Liaison Officer is available to provide liaison between the MCC helicopter detachment and its parent unit. He is not assigned to the JOIC, but is available to provide liaison between the MCC helicopter detachment and the CTF staff, on request.⁴⁴

OPC daily flight operations are scheduled as mission packages. A typical package consists of a wide variety of aircraft with specific mission capabilities. When combined, these aircraft form a complex package capable of meeting OPC tactical objectives. A mission AWACS aircraft provides the airborne force with flight following, to and from the TAOR, as well as threat warning and fighter control within the TAOR. Six to seven air refueling aircraft [KC-135, F-135 (French Air Force), VC-10 (Royal Air Force)] provide inflight refueling for the AWACS and fighter aircraft. As many as 30 to 40 fighter aircraft [F-15, F-16, F-4G, F-15E, EF-111, Jaguar (FAF), Harrier (RAF)], flying two-ship and four-ship formations, provide visual and sensor reconnaissance of military targets, defensive counter air (DCA) capability, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capability, and an on-call precision-guided munitions (PGM) capability. In addition, MCC Black Hawk helicopters maintain a visible presence in the security zone through air patrols and visits to Kurdish villages, and conduct transport and search and rescue (SAR) missions.⁴⁵

The OPC aircraft normally remain on station in the TAOR 6 to 8 hours daily.⁴⁶ The flying "window" is randomly selected to avoid predictability.⁴⁷ The AWACS typically takes off from Incirlik AB approximately 2 hours before the first air-refueling and fighter aircraft.⁴⁸ Once the AWACS is airborne, the AWACS' systems are brought on-line and a Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) link is established with a Turkish Sector Operations Center (radar site). After the JTIDS link is confirmed, the CFAC airborne command element (ACE) initiates the planned launch sequence for the rest of the force.⁴⁹ Normally, within a one hour period, tanker and fighter aircraft takeoff and proceed to the TAOR in a carefully orchestrated flow.⁵⁰ Fighters may not cross the political border into Iraq without AWACS coverage.⁵¹ No aircraft may enter the TAOR until fighters with airborne intercept (AI) radars have searched the TAOR for Iraqi aircraft.⁵² Once the AI radar equipped fighters have "sanitized" the TAOR, they establish an orbit and continue their search for Iraqi aircraft.⁵³

Additional fighters and tankers flow to and from the TAOR throughout the flying period. Air-to-air fighters fly combat air patrol. "Wild Weasels" and EF-111 electronic jamming aircraft maintain a watch for Iraqi surface-to-air missile activity, and the remaining aircraft conduct aerial reconnaissance of Iraqi military activity and provide a visible presence in the area. The MCC Black Hawk helicopters fly between their main base at Diyarbakir, Turkey, and Zakhu, Iraq, to resupply the MCC (Forward) operating location and to stage for missions into the TAOR. At the end of the flying window, the OPC aircraft return to their home bases, as scheduled. Air-to-air fighter aircraft equipped with AI radars leave the TAOR last to protect the package from Iraqi fighters.⁵⁴

(2) E-3B AWACS Mission. The AWACS OPC mission is to control aircraft enroute to the TAOR, coordinate air refueling, and provide airborne threat warning and control for all OPC aircraft operating inside the TAOR. The AWACS also provides surveillance, detection and identification of all unknown aircraft.⁵⁵

In order to fulfill its mission, the AWACS carries a large component consisting of a flight crew and a mission crew. The flight crew (a pilot, copilot, navigator and flight engineer) is responsible for the safe ground and flight operation of the aircraft. The mission crew has overall responsibility for command, control, surveillance, communications and sensor systems of the AWACS. The mission crew is made up of approximately 19 personnel and is divided into weapons and surveillance sections. The mission crew commander has overall responsibility for the AWACS mission. He is responsible for the management, supervision and training of the mission crew. The senior director (SD) supervises and directs the activities of the assigned weapons directors (WDs) and conducts the air battle.⁵⁶

The WDs are responsible for locating, identifying, tracking and controlling all friendly aircraft, and regulating air traffic in the AWACS' area of responsibility. In addition to their normal duties, each WD has specific responsibilities for OPC aircraft. One WD acts as an enroute controller, responsible for controlling the flow of aircraft to and from the TAOR. This person also conducts IFF and radio checks on all OPC aircraft.⁵⁷ A second WD, the tanker controller, is responsible for controlling air-refueling operations.⁵⁸ A third WD, the TAOR controller, is assigned to provide threat warning, and tactical control for all OPC aircraft operating in the TAOR.⁵⁹ The Air Surveillance Officer (ASO) and up to four technicians are responsible for the detection, tracking, and identification of non-OPC aircraft.⁶⁰

The airborne command element (ACE) is also on board. He is the CFACC's representative and works directly with the mission crew commander and SD. CTF PROVIDE COMFORT OPLAN 91-7 provides that, "An airborne command element (ACE) will be aboard [AWACS] to serve as the representative of the CFACC for time critical decisions."⁶¹ CFAC operating instructions for the ACE provide that the ACE will act as the "eyes and ears" of the CFAC DO in the execution of the combat operations. They provide that the ACE has primary responsibility for the mission outside of a 50 NM circle of Incirlik, but emphasize that reference should be made to the CFAC DO. They imply that actions required for emergency or unsafe conditions can be taken by the ACE, who would then contact the CFAC DO as soon as possible.⁶² The CFACC, in his testimony, stated that the ACE had no decision-making authority.⁶³

E-3B AWACS




Figure 2 (AWACS Layout)

On 14 April 1994, an AWACS aircraft was tasked to provide airborne threat warning, command, control and communication in the TAOR from 0730Z to 1330Z for a mission package of 52 OPC aircraft, of which 28 were to be airborne by 0800Z.⁶⁴ After takeoff from Incirlik AB, the AWACS proceeded to an orbit area located 50 miles north of Incirlik, in order to allow its systems to "warm up" before beginning its task. After completion of system checks (radar, IFF and data link), AWACS proceeded to its assigned orbit area in a restricted operating area north of the TAOR.⁶⁵

(3) F-15C Mission. As a part of the OPC coalition air forces, USAF F-15C fighter aircraft operating from Incirlik AB conduct missions in the TAOR in accordance with the standing ACO, SPINS and daily ATO.⁶⁶ The F-15s are tasked to protect friendly forces from enemy attack.⁶⁷ When the F-15s first enter the TAOR, they conduct a thorough radar search of the area to ensure the TAOR is clear of hostile aircraft ("sanitize" the airspace.)⁶⁸ After "sanitizing" the airspace, the F-15Cs fly an orbit, designed to provide Defensive Counter Air (DCA) cover. When necessary, they intercept, identify, and take appropriate action, as prescribed by the ROE.⁶⁹ On 14 April 1994, the two F-15Cs involved in the accident were tasked to depart from Incirlik AB at 0635Z to conduct a DCA combat air patrol (CAP) mission in the TAOR.⁷⁰

(4) UH-60 Black Hawk Mission. US Army Black Hawk helicopters provide air transportation for the MCC liaison team and conduct resupply missions as required. The helicopters also have a secondary search and rescue (SAR) mission.⁷¹ On 14 April 1994, the two accident helicopters were tasked to support the MCC by transporting passengers and cargo from the Turkish Air Base at Diyarbakir to the MCC Headquarters at Zakhu. From Zakhu, their mission was to transport the co-commanders of the MCC and other staff officers to the Kurdish towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, and return.⁷²

b. Summary of Events:

(1) Command and Control.

Aircrew Preparation. Aircrews flying OPC missions are responsible for understanding the directives governing the air operations. These directives include the ACO, ATO, SPINS, and ARF. The CFAC DO is responsible for ensuring arriving aircrews are briefed on all aspects of the OPC flying mission. Prior to the time of the accident, the CFAC DO provided ROE briefings for change-outs of complete flying units. However, there was no arrangement to ensure that individual replacement pilots coming to OPC were centrally briefed. Briefings for these personnel were left as an individual squadron responsibility.⁷³ The two F-15 accident pilots came to OPC on temporary duty assignment rotations. They had both read the ARF and had received a squadron briefing on the ROE.⁷⁴

The ROE as provided by USEUCOM were reduced, in briefings and in individual crew members' understandings, to a simplified form.⁷⁵ This simplification of the ROE resulted in some crew members not being aware of specific considerations required prior to engagement. These considerations included identification difficulties, the need to give defectors safe conduct, and the possibility of an aircraft being in distress and the crew being unaware of their position.⁷⁶

[Classified portion deleted 145 words-ROE]^{77 78}

Directives. Contents of the ACO, dated 12 December 1993, largely reflect the guidance given in the OPC Operations Orders and OPLAN 91-7. However, key CTF personnel at the time of the 14 April 1994 accident were either unaware of the existence of OPLAN 91-7 or considered it too outdated to be applicable.⁷⁹ No updated supporting plan or comprehensive alternative guidance regarding component responsibilities was issued by CTF.⁸⁰ Most key personnel within the CFAC and the CTF staff did not consider coordination of MCC helicopter activities to be part of their respective CFAC/CTF responsibilities.⁸¹ The last CTF staff member who appears to have actively coordinated rotary-wing flying activities with the CFAC organization departed in January 1994.⁸² No representative of the MCC was specifically assigned to the CFAC for coordination purposes.⁸³ Since December 1993, no MCC helicopter detachment representative had attended the CFAC weekly DETCO scheduling meetings.⁸⁴ The Army Liaison Officer (LNO), attached to the MCC helicopter detachment at Zakhu and assigned to Incirlik AB, was new on station (arrived April 1994) and was not fully aware of the relationship of the MCC to the OPC mission.⁸⁵ The CFACC, through the CFAC DO, did not, in fact, exercise TACON of MCC helicopter operations with respect to planning and scheduling.⁸⁶ Specific helicopter flight information was not included in the daily ATO, and no helicopter data was provided to OPC aircrews on the scheduling flow sheet, their principal planning tool.⁸⁷ Although the ACE had primary responsibility for the OPC mission outside of a 50 NM circle of Incirlik,⁸⁸ his knowledge of MCC helicopter flight activity was dependent on AWACS radar, IFF, and radio contacts, as the helicopters entered and worked within the TAOR.⁸⁹

CTF CG policy letter (Subject: UH-60 Flight Policy), September 1993, implemented the following policy for UH-60 helicopter flights supporting the MCC: "All UH-60 flights into Iraq outside of the security zone require AWACS coverage."⁹⁰ Helicopter flights had routinely been flown within the TAOR security zone without AWACS or fighter coverage and CTF personnel at various levels were aware of this.⁹¹ MCC personnel were aware of the requirement to have AWACS coverage for flights outside the security zone and complied with that requirement.⁹² However, the accident F-15C pilots, relying on the written guidance in the ACO, believed that no OPC aircraft, fixed or rotary wing, were allowed to enter the TAOR prior to a fighter sweep.⁹³

Scheduling. Since the MCC daily mission requirements were generally based on the events of the previous day, the MCC exercised flexibility in scheduling supporting helicopter flights. A weekly flight schedule was developed and provided to CTF C3, but a firm itinerary was usually not available until after the next day's ATO was published.⁹⁴ The weekly schedule was briefed in both the C3 and CTF CG staff meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; however, the information was neither detailed nor firm enough for effective rotary-wing and fixed-wing coordination and scheduling purposes.⁹⁵

The MCC provided a SITREP to the JOIC each evening that listed the helicopter flights for the following day, but the information was usually general in nature. Information in the SITREP

was received too late to be included in the daily ATO.⁹⁶ Each daily ATO was published showing several Black Hawk helicopter lines. Of these, two helicopter lines (two flights of two helicopters each) were listed with call signs (Eagle 01/02, and Eagle 03/04), mission numbers, IFF Mode II codes, and a route of flight described only as LLTC (the identifier for Diyarbakir) to TAOR to LLTC. No information regarding route or duration of flight within the TAOR was given on the ATO. Information concerning takeoff time and entry time into the TAOR was listed as "A/R" (as required).⁹⁷ The MCC would call the JOIC the night prior to the scheduled mission to "activate" the ATO line.⁹⁸ The takeoff times and the times the helicopters would enter northern Iraq ("gate" times) were passed by the JOIC duty officer to the Turkish C3 for approval. No procedures existed for passing this information from the JOIC to the CFAC who had TACON responsibility for the helicopters.⁹⁹

A CTF C2 representative obtained available MCC helicopter information from the JOIC. This information, consisting of the MCC weekly schedule and the daily MCC SITREP, was passed from the C2 to individual units at Incirlik AB through a mail pickup point in the command post.¹⁰⁰

On 8 April 1994, the MCC weekly schedule was provided to CTF C3 through the JOIC. That schedule showed a two-ship, MCC helicopter "administrative flight" on 14 April.¹⁰¹ On 12 April, the MCC Commander requested approval for a 14 April flight outside the SZ. The requested flight of two helicopters was to proceed from Zakhu to the towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq. The CTF CG approved the written request on 13 April, and the JOIC transmitted the approval to the MCC.¹⁰² The 13 April MCC SITREP listed the 14 April flight as "mission support", but contained no other details. The MCC weekly schedule update, received by the JOIC on the evening of 13 April with the MCC SITREP, gave the destinations for the mission as Salah ad Din and Irbil.¹⁰³ This information was not passed to the CFAC.¹⁰⁴ At 1538Z on 13 April, the MCC contacted the JOIC duty officer and activated the ATO line for the accident mission. A takeoff time from Diyarbakir of 0520Z and a "gate" time of 0635Z were requested. No takeoff time or route of flight beyond Zakhu was specified. The 13 April SITREP, weekly flying schedule update, and ATO line-activation request were received by the JOIC too late to be briefed during the Wednesday (13 April) C3 and CTF CG staff meetings. None of the information was passed to the CFAC scheduling shop, the ground-based mission director, or the ACE on board the AWACS.¹⁰⁵

An MCC schedule giving some information regarding the MCC helicopter flight, received through the C2 channels, was posted on the intelligence briefing board at the F-15 squadron operation center, but the information was not briefed to the air crews.¹⁰⁶ When the F-15 pilots departed Incirlik AB at 0635Z on 14 April, they were unaware that the MCC helicopters would be operating east of Zakhu in the TAOR.¹⁰⁷

Control. When the F-15s arrived on station in the TAOR at 0720Z, they were not informed that the Black Hawk helicopters had already entered the TAOR, by either the AWACS controllers or the ACE on board the AWACS. The ACE did not consider it his responsibility to monitor the helicopters.¹⁰⁸ Neither the ACE nor the AWACS controllers gave any direction to either the helicopters or the fighters throughout the intercept and engagement.¹⁰⁹

(2) E-3B AWACS

AWACS Flight Authorization: The AWACS detachment at Incirlik AB was tasked by the CFAC DO through the ATO (ATO, PC1103, 14 April 1994) to provide airborne warning and control in the TAOR on 14 April 1994.¹¹⁰ The accident flight was the AWACS crew's first OPC mission as a crew.¹¹¹ The AWACS DETCO authorized the crew to fly the tasked mission in accordance with appropriate directives.¹¹²

AWACS Flight Plan. The OPC ACO, the ATO for 14 April 1994, and one change to the daily ATO, Battle Staff Directive (BSD) #1, provided direction and guidance for the flight.¹¹³ The planned route of flight was from Incirlik AB to an orbit in Restricted Operations Zone 1 (ROZ 1) near the northern border of Iraq. The aircraft was to remain in orbit from 0730Z to 1330Z in support of aircraft operations in the TAOR, and return to Incirlik AB.¹¹⁴ In accordance with established Air Force procedures, each crew member initialed the flight authorization form, accepting responsibility for executing the ATO-tasked mission.¹¹⁵

AWACS Communications. The crew did not encounter any communication equipment malfunctions during the flight.¹¹⁶ The only communication limitation which may have been experienced by the crew was a problem in maintaining line-of-sight with the helicopters.¹¹⁷ The effect may have been intermittent loss of radio contact with the helicopters. This was a regularly encountered situation with low flying aircraft.¹¹⁸ The AWACS crew monitored the prebriefed aircraft radio control frequencies. These included VHF and UHF guard, enroute control, TAOR "Have Quick II" (jamming resistant radio), and TAOR clear (non-secure tactical radio) frequencies.¹¹⁹ The enroute controller received check-in calls on the enroute frequency.¹²⁰ The ACO required aircraft in the TAOR to monitor the TAOR tactical frequency;¹²¹ however, the normal practice by the OPC helicopter crews was to remain on the enroute frequency and report to the enroute controller, unless directed to change frequencies by the enroute controller.¹²² The last radio transmission received from the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters was at 0654Z when they reported departing Zakhu for Irbil. This transmission was made on the enroute controller's frequency. There is no indication that communications equipment serviceability was related to the accident.¹²³

AWACS Navigation. No navigational difficulties were encountered by the aircrew during the flight. There is no indication that navigation was a factor in the accident. The weather was clear.¹²⁴

AWACS Briefing and Preflight: The crew conducted the required briefings and pre-mission planning on 12 April 1994 in preparation for the mission on 14 April 1994.¹²⁵ On the afternoon of 13 April 1994, the mission crew commander, and the surveillance section and weapons section personnel conducted additional specialized mission planning.¹²⁶ Pre-mission and specialized mission planning items required by regulations and directives were covered.¹²⁷

The crew members went to bed on 13 April between approximately 1700Z and 2000Z and awoke between approximately 0100Z and 0230Z on 14 April 1994.¹²⁸ All crew-rest requirements

as specified by Air Force regulations were met.¹²⁹ The flight and mission crews arrived at the AWACS squadron operations building at approximately 0310Z.¹³⁰

The aircrew, including the ACE and a Turkish controller, attended a preflight briefing at AWACS operations at approximately 0330Z.¹³¹ The aircraft commander and mission crew commander conducted the briefing, addressing their respective mission areas.¹³² The detachment staff mission crew commander and the staff weapons director attended the entire briefing.¹³³ The Detachment Commander attended the portion of the briefing covering flight operations.¹³⁴ The briefing was conducted using the standard squadron briefing guide for the OPC theater of operations.¹³⁵

The aircraft commander briefed the forecast weather, crew manifest, aircraft status, mission timing, safety considerations, emergency procedures, elements of basic airmanship, and the wing operations security policy.¹³⁶

The AWACS staff intelligence representative briefed escape and evasion procedures, the previous day's Iraqi air activity, and threat capabilities. He also briefed a United Nations support mission scheduled to take place on 14 April.¹³⁷ There is no evidence that the briefing included any mention of the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter mission. AWACS technician topics were briefed which included the JTIDS and maintenance debriefing requirements.¹³⁸

After the aircraft commander, intelligence, and technician briefings were completed, the AWACS technicians and flight engineer departed for the aircraft to begin preflight inspections.¹³⁹ The mission crew commander then briefed mission crew topics which included the weapons plan for the mission and the activity flow sheet provided by the CTF.¹⁴⁰ The activity flow sheet, which is derived from the ATO, listed the F-15C flight (call sign Tiger). The MCC helicopter flight (call sign Eagle) was not listed on the flow sheet. The preflight briefing did not address the OPC Air Tasking Order.¹⁴¹ The mission crew commander also covered lessons learned from previous missions and special notes for the mission.¹⁴²

Technician and flight engineer preflight checks were accomplished and indicated no previously undocumented equipment discrepancies.¹⁴³

AWACS Sequence of Flight Events. At 0436Z, the AWACS took off from Incirlik AB, Turkey.¹⁴⁴ The AWACS established an initial orbit approximately 50 miles north of Incirlik AB.¹⁴⁵ While holding in the initial orbit, the mission crew began conducting mission systems (communications, computers, radar, IFF) "power-up" checks and establishing the required JTIDS communication and data link with the Turkish ground radar sites.¹⁴⁶

At 0545Z, the mission crew commander declared "on station,"¹⁴⁷ indicating the AWACS' mission systems were powered up, required checks with ground stations had been accomplished, and the AWACS was ready and prepared to accomplish its assigned missions.¹⁴⁸ At this time, the AWACS departed the initial orbit and proceeded to its operational orbit in ROZ 1, at 32,000 feet pressure altitude.¹⁴⁹ The AWACS scheduled time for arrival at the operational orbit in ROZ 1 was 0730Z.¹⁵⁰

Shortly after 0545Z, the AWACS surveillance section began tracking aircraft in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq.¹⁵¹ (The AWACS tracks aircraft by radar returns and/or Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder returns.)

NOTE: The IFF system is an electronic means of identifying friendly aircraft. Each friendly aircraft is equipped with an electronic device (transponder) that transmits a coded reply when the transponder is electronically "queried" by an aircraft or ground-based interrogator. Specific codes are listed in the ATO to be set into each OPC aircraft's transponder. AWACS and F-15 aircraft have the capability to electronically interrogate transponder systems of other aircraft to detect correct, friendly codes. Mode I codes are used tactically to confirm the friendly status of aircraft. Different Mode I codes are listed for OPC fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating outside the TAOR. A single Mode I code is listed in the ATO for all OPC aircraft flying inside the TAOR. Mode II codes are used to determine the identity of a known friendly aircraft. Each OPC aircraft is assigned its own distinct Mode II code for each mission. Mode II is used by AWACS to identify and flight follow individual, friendly aircraft, but is not practical for tactical use by F-15s to differentiate between "friend and foe." Mode III is an air traffic control mode that is turned off when entering the TAOR, in order to avoid detection by Iraqi radar. Mode IV is used to differentiate between friend and foe. Mode IV uses an encrypted code that is changed daily and requires special equipment, encrypting codes, and loading procedures for both the IFF transponders and the AWACS and F-15 interrogation systems. IFF signals are not continuously transmitted by aircraft transponders. Each mode/code must be specifically interrogated to activate and identify the signal.¹⁵²

The MCC Black Hawk helicopters, which were enroute from Diyarbakir, Turkey, to Zakhu, Iraq, were detected by the AWACS shortly after the AWACS onboard systems reached operational status. The surveillance section assigned the Black Hawk flight a "friendly general" track symbology and a track designator of "TY06."¹⁵³ At 0613Z, the senior director requested display of a track tabular display (TD) on track "TY06."¹⁵⁴ The track TD included IFF Mode II, and III codes.¹⁵⁵ At 0616Z, an "H" character was programmed to appear at the Black Hawk flight's location on the senior director's radar scope whenever any IFF Mode I, Code 42 reply (squawk) from the helicopters was detected by the AWACS.¹⁵⁶

At 0621Z, AWACS received a "check-in" radio call on the enroute UHF radio frequency from the MCC Black Hawk helicopters.¹⁵⁷ This call was made just prior to the helicopters entering the TAOR entry point (Gate 1).¹⁵⁸ The enroute controller acknowledged the helicopters' entry into the TAOR, and observed their Mode I and Mode II IFF codes.¹⁵⁹ The senior director changed the Black Hawk helicopter "friendly general" symbology to a "friendly helicopter" symbology.¹⁶⁰ The enroute controller changed the helicopter track designator from "TY06" to "EE01" (call sign Eagle 01).¹⁶¹ There is no evidence to indicate that the enroute controller attempted to perform a Mode IV check on the Black Hawk helicopters.¹⁶² The AWACS Mode IV interrogator was functioning correctly.¹⁶³ The ACO implies that the AWACS

crew will conduct a Mode IV check on each aircraft but does not direct that it be accomplished. The ACO states that, "On initial check-in with AWACS, ...Mode IV is 'sweet' (operational) unless AWACS tells you otherwise."¹⁶⁴ The enroute controller monitored the Black Hawk helicopters until the IFF returns faded from AWACS coverage at approximately 0624Z.¹⁶⁵ The helicopters landed at Zakhu shortly thereafter.¹⁶⁶ The helicopters' symbology was then suspended, an action that maintained the symbology in the vicinity of Zakhu.¹⁶⁷

At 0635Z, the F-15Cs launched from Incirlik AB.¹⁶⁸ The AWACS enroute controller identified the F-15Cs and maintained radar contact with them as they proceeded to the TAOR.¹⁶⁹

The Black Hawk helicopters contacted AWACS at 0654Z and reported that they were enroute from "Whiskey to Lima" (Whiskey was a codeword for Zakhu and Lima was a codeword for Irbil). The AWACS enroute controller received their call.¹⁷⁰ He was not familiar with the location of "Lima" and did not look it up, although materials to do so were available.¹⁷¹ At that time, the AWACS enroute controller reinitiated the helicopter track designator (EE01).¹⁷²

The enroute controller was responsible for controlling OPC aircraft in Turkish airspace west of Gate 1.¹⁷³ The TAOR controller was responsible for controlling aircraft inside the TAOR, east of Gate 1.¹⁷⁴ Neither the enroute controller nor the senior director instructed the Black Hawk helicopters to change from the enroute radio frequency to the TAOR clear frequency that was being monitored by the TAOR controller.¹⁷⁵ However, the TAOR controller had the capability to monitor the enroute frequency.¹⁷⁶ The Black Hawks were squawking the wrong Mode I code; there is no evidence that either the enroute controller or the senior director told the helicopters that they were still "squawking" the Mode I code for outside the TAOR.¹⁷⁷

From 0655Z until 0711Z, the "H" character assigned to the Black Hawk flight was regularly displayed on the senior director's radar scope.¹⁷⁸ At 0711Z, the F-15Cs were heading east, approximately 100 NM west of the Black Hawk helicopters.¹⁷⁹ At that same time, the helicopter flight entered mountainous terrain at low altitude and faded from AWACS radar and IFF coverage.¹⁸⁰ After losing IFF and radar contact with the Black Hawk helicopters at 0712Z, no AWACS controller suspended (stopped at one location) the helicopters' track symbology.¹⁸¹ As a result, the AWACS computer continued to move the symbology based on the last available heading and airspeed information from the helicopters.¹⁸² The enroute controller, who had not transferred control of the Black Hawk flight to the TAOR controller, did not note the heading and speed the helicopters were flying to get to point Lima, nor did he identify the flight path the helicopters reported they would follow.¹⁸³

At 0713Z, the air surveillance officer designated the Black Hawk flight's last known location on the senior director's radar scope, by placing a computer-generated "attention arrow" (used to point out an area of interest.) The attention arrow is accompanied by a blinking alert light.¹⁸⁴ The senior director did not acknowledge the arrow or the blinking alert light on his console.¹⁸⁵ The arrow and light were automatically dropped after 60 seconds.¹⁸⁶ At 0715Z, the air surveillance officer directed that the AWACS radar be adjusted to low velocity detection settings which improved the capability of the radar to detect slow-moving targets.¹⁸⁷ At

approximately the same time, the F-15s checked in with the ACE and received "...negative words," (indicating no changes in previously briefed information).¹⁸⁸

At 0720Z, the F-15C flight arrived at Gate 1 and entered the TAOR to "sanitize" the area.¹⁸⁹ They contacted the AWACS TAOR controller on the "Have Quick II" TAOR frequency.¹⁹⁰ The TAOR controller did not pass a "picture" call (situation update giving air activity) to the F-15C flight when they entered the TAOR.¹⁹¹ At this time, the AWACS mission crew did not have radar or IFF contact with the Black Hawk helicopters, although the Black Hawk track symbology continued to appear on the AWACS radar scopes moving on a computer-generated southeasterly path.¹⁹² No one on board the AWACS informed the F-15 pilots of the friendly Black Hawk helicopters in the TAOR, their last known position, or their route of flight.¹⁹³

At 0721Z, the enroute controller dropped the symbology for the Black Hawk helicopters from the radar scopes.¹⁹⁴ The track symbology was the only visual reminder to the AWACS crew that the helicopters were inside the TAOR, after the radar contact and IFF signals had faded.¹⁹⁵

At approximately 0722Z, the F-15 flight lead reported to the TAOR controller that he had a radar contact approximately 40 NM to the southeast, in the TAOR.¹⁹⁶ The TAOR controller reported, "Clean there," meaning AWACS had no radar returns or IFF replies from that location. (AWACS magnetic tapes indicate there were none at that time.)¹⁹⁷ When the F-15C flight lead made his first "contact" call, the mission crew commander and senior director did not take any action to direct the weapons or surveillance sections to locate and identify the F-15C's reported contact.¹⁹⁸

At approximately 0723Z, intermittent IFF signals were received by the AWACS from the helicopters, in the area where the F-15 pilot had called his contact.¹⁹⁹ These IFF signals would have appeared on every AWACS radar scope that had the "IFF feature select switch" turned on, except seat 10, which was inoperative and not manned.²⁰⁰ All six radar and IFF/SIF switches at each weapons section's manned positions should have been on, in accordance with AWACS training guides.²⁰¹ Testimony by the senior director, the enroute controller, the air surveillance officer and technicians, and the tanker controller indicates that they had both radar and IFF switches on.²⁰² The TAOR controller and the mission crew commander declined to testify, through counsel, and the position of their switches could not be confirmed by other means.

The "H" character also reappeared on the senior director's radar scope at approximately 0723Z.²⁰³ The Black Hawk helicopters were squawking the same IFF Mode I and II codes that they were squawking before the AWACS lost IFF and radar contact at 0712Z.²⁰⁴ No radio calls regarding the IFF returns were made from AWACS to the fighters.²⁰⁵ The intermittent IFF returns, which had begun at 0723Z, increased in frequency until 0726Z.²⁰⁶ They then remained on display, without interruption, from 0726Z to just before 0728Z.²⁰⁷

At approximately 0725Z, the F-15 flight lead made another "contact" call at about 20 NM range from the helicopters. The TAOR controller acknowledged the radio call and responded that he had "Hits there," which implied that he had radar returns on his radar scope corresponding to the F-15Cs' contact.²⁰⁸ However, the AWACS magnetic tape recordings (replayed through a

radar console with a "IFF feature select switch" in the on position), clearly show "IFF paints" at the reported location. (A "hit" is a term to describe a radar return. A "paint" is a term to describe an IFF reply.)²⁰⁹

At 0726Z, the Black Hawk helicopters' IFF returns were clearly visible, along with intermittent radar returns, on the AWACS radar scopes. The returns were at the same location as the radar contact identified by the F-15 flight.²¹⁰ The AWACS crew did not advise the F-15C flight of the presence of IFF data in the target area.²¹¹

NOTE: The AWACS crew had some confusion regarding tracking responsibilities of unknown aircraft in the TAOR. The air surveillance technicians believed their tracking responsibility was south of the 36th parallel and the weapons section was responsible for tracking all aircraft north of the 36th parallel. In contrast, the weapons section believed the surveillance section was responsible for tracking and identifying all unknown aircraft, regardless of location.²¹² The applicable Air Force regulations state the surveillance section had tracking responsibility for unknown and unidentified tracks throughout the TAOR.²¹³ The mission crew commander is tasked with coordinating and directing the activities of both the surveillance and the weapons sections.²¹⁴ The Black Hawk helicopters were initially identified and tracked by the enroute controller, a member of the weapons section.²¹⁵ At approximately 0642Z, a member of the surveillance section asked the identity of the Eagle Flight track, and the senior director said it was Eagle Flight; a member of the weapons section said they were tracking it.²¹⁶

At 0727Z, the enroute controller initiated an "Unknown, Pending, Unevaluated" track symbology in the area of the helicopters' radar and IFF returns and attempted an IFF identification.²¹⁷ During the F-15 flight's intercept of the helicopters, no one else on board the AWACS attempted to determine specific IFF aircraft identification, or to do a Mode IV check on the helicopters.²¹⁸ The "H" character previously attached to the helicopters' IFF return was still present on the senior director's radar scope.²¹⁹

At approximately 0728Z, the F-15 flight lead transmitted to the TAOR controller that he saw "...a Hind" (NATO designation) followed by "no, Hip" (NATO designation). He then made a correction and reported a Hind helicopter.²²⁰ At this time, the AWACS track symbology for the F-15s and the Black Hawk helicopters' radar and IFF data were too close together for the AWACS crew to identify the Black Hawk helicopters.²²¹ (Analysis of an AWACS audio tape indicates that, at approximately this time (0728Z), the ACE said, "Eagle One," on internal AWACS intercom; but, there is no further information available because of a blocking radio transmission.)²²² The F-15 flight lead again reported "...two Hinds" and the TAOR controller responded, "Copy Hinds."²²³ The F-15 flight lead reported that he was "Engaged".²²⁴ At 0730Z the F-15 flight lead reported they had "splashed" (shot down) two Hind helicopters.²²⁵ There is no indication that the AWACS senior director, the mission crew commander, and/or the ACE made any radio calls throughout the intercept, or that they issued any guidance to either the AWACS crew or the F-15 pilots.²²⁶

AWACS flight activity following the accident: At approximately 0831Z, the CFAC ground-based mission director called the ACE and indicated that the Black Hawk helicopters were unaccounted for.²²⁷ At 0914Z, the CFAC ground-based mission director instructed the ACE to find the Black Hawk helicopters and confirm good radar contact with them.²²⁸ Attempts by AWACS crew members and the ACE to locate the Black Hawk helicopters by radar and/or radio, to include calls on UHF and VHF "guard" were unsuccessful. At 0926Z, AWACS placed its radar and IFF sensors to stand-by in preparation for air refueling.²²⁹ At approximately 1010Z, the AWACS resumed actions to locate the Black Hawk helicopters.²³⁰ The AWACS continued to support search and rescue/crash-response activities until reaching fuel minimums. The aircraft departed the TAOR at 1520Z and landed at Incirlik AB at 1615Z.²³¹ A second AWACS supported the remainder of the search and rescue activity.²³²

(3) F-15C

F-15C Flight Authorization: On 14 April 1994, the F-15C fighter squadron was tasked to provide a flight of two F-15Cs to fly a DCA mission in the TAOR.²³³ The squadron commander authorized the F-15 pilots to fly the tasked mission.²³⁴

F-15C Flight Plan: The ACO, the ATO for 14 Apr 94 and one change to the daily ATO, (Battle Staff Directive #1), provided the operating instructions and procedures for the F-15C flight (call signs Tiger 1 and Tiger 2).²³⁵ The F-15s were the first OPC aircraft scheduled into the TAOR by the ATO.²³⁶ Their planned route of flight was to proceed from Incirlik AB to the TAOR, and return.²³⁷ In accordance with established Air Force procedures, the F-15 pilots signed a flight authorization form accepting responsibility for executing the ATO-tasked mission.²³⁸

F-15C Communications: The main and auxiliary radios, "Have Quick II" and the secure voice communications systems in the aircraft flown by the two F-15 pilots operated normally throughout the flight. No communications equipment serviceability difficulties with any ground or airborne agencies were experienced by either aircraft.²³⁹

F-15C Navigation: No navigation difficulties were experienced by either F-15C aircraft during the flight.²⁴⁰

F-15C Briefing and Preflight: The two F-15 pilots involved in the accident, call signs Tiger 1 (flight lead) and Tiger 2 (wingman), left the Squadron Operations Building (SOC I) before 1230Z on 13 April and went to bed at approximately 2030Z.²⁴¹ They awoke at approximately 0330Z on 14 April,²⁴² departed their quarters at 0420Z and arrived at SOC I at approximately 0430Z.²⁴³ All crew rest requirements specified by Air Force regulations, were met.²⁴⁴

The F-15 flight lead prepared the flight briefing materials while the wingman checked the forecast weather and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS). The squadron duty supervisor and the flight lead then reviewed the flight's tasking in the ATO. They modified the mission flow sheet and the flight's line-up cards to reflect a change to the ATO made by BSD #1.²⁴⁵ (The BSD

changed the number of KC-135 air-refueling tanker aircraft available for the day's mission). Both pilots completed the flight authorization form and received a briefing from the squadron intelligence officer.²⁴⁶ The briefing included a summary of the previous day's Iraqi air activity, information concerning the movement of an Iraqi surface-to-air missile site, search and rescue procedures, and current intelligence regarding the situation in Rwanda.²⁴⁷ The intelligence officer made no reference to either friendly or Iraqi helicopter activity in or near the TAOR.²⁴⁸ The intelligence officer had posted the limited available information about Eagle 01 and 02 on the intelligence situation map in SOC I. Based on the MCC (Forward) SITREP he received from CTF C-2, the intelligence officer had posted the Black Hawk helicopters' mission as "two-ship admin" which was understood to mean the helicopters would fly from Diyarbakir to Zakhu and return.²⁴⁹

The F-15 flight lead started the mission briefing at 0445Z using the standard squadron briefing guide.²⁵⁰ All briefing items required by regulations and directives were covered.²⁵¹ During the tactical portion of the mission briefing, the flight lead discussed the OPC ROE, radar search responsibilities, intercept and visual identification procedures.²⁵² The flight lead briefed electronic identification (EID) procedures that could be used on the mission. This included a discussion on the use of the Air-to-Air Interrogation (AAI) systems to attempt to identify any unknown aircraft. The flight lead specified that IFF Modes I and IV codes would both be interrogated in the identification process.²⁵³ He also briefed that the aircraft video tape recorder (VTR) would be turned on when the decision was made to "commit" (to engage or intercept.)²⁵⁴

Following the mission briefing, the F-15 pilots picked up their required flying equipment and inflight publications. At 0540Z, the pilots signed for their weapons, ammunition, and other controlled combat equipment and departed SOC I for their assigned aircraft.²⁵⁵ Both pilots conducted standard aircraft preflights of their respective aircraft, which included a review of the aircraft's maintenance history forms.²⁵⁶ The aircraft forms reflected that the correct Mode IV codes had been loaded into the aircraft transponders.²⁵⁷ No discrepancies were recorded in the aircraft maintenance forms that would have apparently affected either aircraft's capability to perform the tasked mission.²⁵⁸ During the preflight inspections, the pilots confirmed that the AAI system switches in the nose of each aircraft (inaccessible in flight) were set to allow continuous Mode IV interrogation when the cockpit AAI switches were activated in the Auto position.²⁵⁹ No aircraft discrepancies were noted during the preflights.²⁶⁰

F-15C Sequence of Flight Events: At 0600Z the F-15 pilots started their aircraft engines. After engine start, the flight lead called the ground-based CFAC mission director to get any additional information pertaining to the mission. The mission director informed the F-15 flight lead that there were no changes to the tasking, or to the ATO. The mission director made no mention of any helicopter flight activity.²⁶¹ The pilots completed their normal ground checks as prescribed in the F-15 preflight checklist. This included accomplishing built-in-tests (BIT) of the AAI system and the IFF system. The AAI and IFF systems on both aircraft were checked and determined to be operational.²⁶² The F-15s took off at 0635Z.²⁶³

Both pilots reported conducting successful weapons systems checks after takeoff. These included checks of each aircraft's capability to respond to Mode I, II and Mode IV IFF

interrogations, and each aircraft's AAI system's ability to detect correct responses from other aircraft.²⁶⁴

The F-15s checked in with the AWACS enroute controller on the enroute frequency at the first checkpoint (K-Town) and proceeded toward the second checkpoint (Derik) at Flight Level (FL) 270 (27,000 feet above mean sea level). While enroute to Derik, the F-15 pilots checked their "Have Quick II" and the secure voice radio systems (KY-58) with AWACS. At the third enroute checkpoint (Jump), the F-15 flight checked in with the ACE on board the AWACS aircraft who did not report any changes to their tasking or to the ATO. The ACE made no mention of any helicopter flights, friendly traffic, or Iraqi threats in the TAOR. At 0720Z, the F-15 pilots checked in with the TAOR controller on the TAOR "Have Quick II" frequency, as they entered the TAOR. The TAOR controller acknowledged the radio call from the F-15s and made no mention of any other aircraft in the TAOR.²⁶⁵

The F-15s remained at FL 270 and headed southeast. The flight lead used his radar to search the airspace from ground elevation to 25,000 feet. The wingman set his radar to search the airspace above 20,000 feet.²⁶⁶ Shortly after entering the TAOR, the flight lead detected a radar contact in the TAOR approximately 52 NM north of the 36th degree latitude. The contact was 40 NM to the southeast of his position. The flight lead relayed this information to his wingman on the auxiliary radio.²⁶⁷ The flight lead then selected a radar mode that electronically captured ("locked on") and evaluated the radar contact to provide detailed flight information. The radar contact was heading approximately east (100 degrees) at 130 knots, very close to the ground. After "locking-on" to the radar contact, the flight lead attempted an electronic identification of the aircraft. He used the AAI system to interrogate IFF Mode I, code 52, (the correct Mode I code for OPC aircraft operating in the TAOR) and Mode IV. The flight lead received no response to the Mode I interrogation. He did receive a momentary Mode IV response.²⁶⁸ The flight lead continued to interrogate the contact's IFF Mode IV for another 4 to 5 seconds, but received no further responses. The flight lead believed the momentary Mode IV positive response was due to a possible anomaly in the F-15 AAI system.²⁶⁹

At approximately 0722Z, the F-15 flight lead relayed to the TAOR controller the contact's position in relation to a predetermined, common point.²⁷⁰ The TAOR controller acknowledged the call, transmitting, "Clean there," meaning AWACS had no radar returns or IFF replies from that location.²⁷¹ The F-15 flight lead then switched his radar to a search mode and began looking for additional aircraft. The flight lead thought his radar might have detected road vehicle traffic due to the proximity of the radar contact to a road. Using his AAI system, with his radar in the search mode, the flight lead again interrogated the radar contact for IFF Mode I and Mode IV codes. No response was received.²⁷² Simultaneously, the wingman lowered his radar search pattern to locate the radar contact that his flight lead had reported. The wingman detected the contact at the reported location and initiated a radar lock-on. He then interrogated the radar contact for IFF Mode I and Mode IV codes, with no response. The wingman informed the flight lead that the contact he had locked-on to was traveling at 130 knots. The wingman returned his radar to a search mode and began looking for other aircraft in the TAOR.²⁷³

At a range of approximately 20 NM from the radar contact, the flight lead began to descend from FL 270, locked-on to the radar contact, and reported the contact to AWACS on the TAOR "Have Quick II" frequency (not being used by the Black Hawk helicopter flight).²⁷⁴ At approximately 0725Z, the TAOR controller acknowledged the call and transmitted, "Hits there", indicating that AWACS had a radar contact at the same location.²⁷⁵ During the descent, the F-15 wingman maneuvered to a position approximately 3 NM behind the flight lead. The wingman at this time observed two radar contacts displayed on his radar scope. The contacts were his flight lead and an unidentified radar contact in front of the lead F-15. The wingman again initiated an AAI Mode I interrogation and received a reply from his flight lead, indicating the flight lead's IFF Mode I was set to Code 52 and that his IFF transponder was replying correctly. The wingman received no Mode I reply from the unidentified radar contact. (The Black Hawks' Mode I code was set on 42 - the code for OPC aircraft operating outside of the TAOR).²⁷⁶ Because the flight lead had not been able to get an IFF Mode I or a Mode IV reply from the radar contact, he closed to conduct a visual identification (VID) pass.²⁷⁷

At approximately 0727Z, as the flight lead approached within 5 NM of the unidentified aircraft, he saw a single helicopter flying at a very low altitude. The flight lead began his VID pass at approximately 450 knots indicated airspeed. The helicopter was flying down the middle of a valley, approximately 120 to 200 feet above the ground.²⁷⁸ The valley was oriented northwest-southeast and was approximately 2.5 NM wide at the elevation and position where the flight lead approached the helicopter.²⁷⁹ The hills on either side of the valley were between 1,500 and 3,000 feet above the valley floor. Additionally, the valley narrowed from approximately 2.5 NM wide where the VID pass was made to approximately 1 NM at the eastern end (4 to 5 NM to the east).²⁸⁰ In an attempt to make a visual identification, the flight lead descended below the tops of the hills and flew to a position reported by the pilot to be 1000 feet left and 500 feet above the helicopter's flight path. At approximately 0728Z, the flight lead observed what he thought was a helicopter with a sloped vertical tail, sponsons (wings) on the fuselage, ordnance, and a dark green camouflage paint scheme.²⁸¹ He transmitted on the "Have Quick II" radio frequency that he saw a "Hind" (NATO designation). He then changed the call to "No, Hip" (NATO designation).²⁸² As the flight lead started a right hand climbing turn to set up an oval racetrack pattern behind the helicopter, he saw a second helicopter in trail. As the flight lead passed above the helicopter in the climbing right turn, he referred to his inflight visual recognition guide and determined that the helicopters were "Hinds," as he had first reported. He transmitted "VID Hind, Tally Two, lead-trail."²⁸³ The flight lead then transmitted, "Tiger 2, confirm Hinds?" The F-15 wingman replied, "Standby."²⁸⁴ The wingman conducted a VID pass (approximately 2000 ft right) of the trailing helicopter, but did not confirm the identification. In response to the flight lead's radio call, the wingman responded "Tally 2." The wingman testified that he intended this call to indicate he saw two helicopters.²⁸⁵ The F-15 flight lead understood his wingman's transmission to mean that he confirmed the identification.²⁸⁶ The AWACS TAOR controller said, "Copy Hinds."²⁸⁷

The F-15 flight lead flew to a position approximately 5-10 NM behind the helicopters and called, "Engaged" to AWACS, indicating he intended to attack the helicopters. He also told his wingman to "Arm hot" (arm the missiles in preparation for launch). The F-15 flight lead advised his wingman that he, the flight lead, would shoot the trailing helicopter and that the wingman was

to shoot the lead helicopter.²⁸⁸ At approximately 0730Z, the flight lead turned to the southeast, locked his radar on to the trailing helicopter, and attempted a final Mode I interrogation of the helicopter's transponder and received no reply. When the flight lead had closed to approximately 4 NM behind the trailing helicopter, he fired an AIM-120, radar-guided missile.²⁸⁹ Fragments from the missile's warhead hit the helicopter approximately 7 seconds later. The helicopter burst into flames and crashed.²⁹⁰ Moments later, the F-15 wingman, having flown to a position approximately 2 NM behind the flight lead, locked-on to the remaining helicopter, selected an AIM-9 heat-seeking missile, and fired at a range of approximately 9,000 feet. The missile hit the helicopter and detonated. The helicopter burst into flames and crashed.²⁹¹

Although the flight lead had briefed that the flight would turn on the aircraft VTR system at the "commit" point, he testified that he forgot to turn on his VTR system.²⁹² The wingman turned his VTR system on as he turned to engage the helicopters after the VID pass.²⁹³

The F-15 pilots flew two visual reconnaissance passes over the helicopter crash sites. One pass was flown from west to east, and one pass was flown from east to west.²⁹⁴ The pilots could not identify anything other than burning debris.²⁹⁵ The F-15 flight then climbed back to altitude and began searching the TAOR airspace for Iraqi aircraft. The F-15 flight refueled with a KC-135 tanker aircraft and resumed the tasked defensive counter air mission for approximately another 1.5 hours.²⁹⁶ During this time, both the F-15 flight lead and the wingman had numerous radar contacts that they interrogated with their AAI systems. Both reported receiving Mode I and Mode IV responses from those contacts.²⁹⁷ The F-15 pilots completed their mission and landed at Incirlik AB at 1000Z.²⁹⁸

(4) UH-60 Black Hawk

UH-60 Flight Authorization: On 13 April 1994, the Military Coordination Center Commander tasked the Black Hawk helicopter detachment at Diyarbakir AB to provide two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to fly a support mission in the TAOR on 14 April 1994.²⁹⁹ This mission had been specifically authorized by the CTF CG, since the mission involved flight outside the security zone to the Kurdish cities of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq.³⁰⁰

UH-60 Flight Plans: A flight plan for the flight of two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, (call signs Eagle 1 and Eagle 2) was completed using a joint, preprinted Turkish/US form. The flight plan was filed with Diyarbakir AB Base Operations Section. From Base Operations, the flight plan was sent to Diyarbakir AB Sector Operations (equivalent to US departure control). Sector Operations relayed the flight plan information to Turkish air defense radar installations.³⁰¹ The flight plan listed the published Low Level Transit Routes from Diyarbakir AB to Zakhu, Iraq, continuing on into the TAOR. Departure and return times at Zakhu and route of flight and destinations within the TAOR were not listed.³⁰² The return leg of the flight from Zakhu listed the Low Level Transit Route to Diyarbakir AB.³⁰³ The flight plan was signed by the pilot in command and filed in accordance with Turkish regulations, flight information publications, and the OPC Airspace Control Order (ACO).³⁰⁴

UH-60 Communications: The Black Hawk helicopter crews reported no radio communications discrepancies to helicopter maintenance personnel, prior to takeoff from Diyarbakir AB.³⁰⁵ All required radio transmissions to Eagle Operations, AWACS, and the MCC (Forward) were accomplished. No indications of any radio malfunctions were noted.³⁰⁶ All helicopter radios received extensive damage from the crash and post-crash fires, precluding conclusive analysis of their operational status.³⁰⁷

NOTE: One Black Hawk helicopter was equipped with a "Have Quick I" (HQI), UHF radio; the other was equipped with a "Have Quick II" radio. The radios provide UHF air-to-air and air-to-ground radio communications capability. The "Have Quick" Mode provides anti-jam capabilities using a frequency hopping method which changes the frequency many times a second.³⁰⁸ The F-15C's are equipped with an ARC-164 "Have Quick II" UHF radio, and the AWACS is equipped with an ARC-204 "Have Quick II" UHF radio.³⁰⁹ The "Have Quick II" radios are an updated version of the "Have Quick I" radio. "Have Quick I" operation is not compatible with "Have Quick II" operation. "Have Quick II" radios can, with difficulty, be set up to communicate with "Have Quick I" radios. The Black Hawks therefore would be limited to flight operations on "Have Quick I," if they used it at all. There is no evidence that "Have Quick" was used by the unit, generally, or by this flight.³¹⁰

There is no indication that communication equipment serviceability was related to the accident.

UH-60 Navigation: Interviews with other pilots and maintenance personnel from the Black Hawk unit revealed no known problems or discrepancies with the navigation equipment on board the two accident Black Hawk helicopters.³¹¹ All navigation equipment received extensive damage from the crash and post-crash fires, precluding conclusive analysis of their operational status.³¹² There is no evidence that navigation was a factor in the accident. There is no evidence that weather hampered navigation or was a factor in the accident.³¹³

UH-60 Black Hawk Briefing and Preflight. On 13 April, the helicopter flight assistant operations officer confirmed the next day's mission with the operations officer at MCC (Forward) at Zaku.³¹⁴ The helicopter flight assistant operations officer prepared the mission schedule, requested the weather briefing, and called the CTF Joint Operations Intelligence Center (JOIC) at Incirlik AB, activating the ATO line numbers. (Activating the ATO line number identified what type of mission would be conducted and started a process to notify Turkish controllers for the portions of the flight to occur in Turkey.)³¹⁵ The noncommissioned officer in charge also assembled required mission documents and survival gear for the crew members.³¹⁶

The helicopter aircrews, call signs Eagle 1 (flight lead) and Eagle 2 (wingman), completed their assigned duties at approximately 1430Z on 13 April and went to bed at approximately 1830Z.³¹⁷ On 14 April, the aircrews awoke at approximately 0215Z and departed their quarters at 0310Z, arriving at the Black Hawk helicopter flight operations building at 0315Z.³¹⁸ All crew rest requirements specified by Army regulations were met.³¹⁹

On 14 April, the air mission commander (the Black Hawk flight lead) conducted the flight mission briefing using the preprinted mission briefing form from Army regulations.³²⁰ All required briefing items were covered. The Eagle Flight Detachment Aircrew Mission Briefing form requires Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) to be briefed.³²¹ All published unencrypted IFF codes and radio frequencies were photocopied from the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and were provided to the Pilot in Command of each aircraft in accordance with the Black Hawk detachment procedures.³²² Encrypted IFF codes were loaded by operations personnel in the KYK 13 encoding device, which was then given to the helicopter crews to load each aircraft's IFF transponder.³²³

Helicopter pilots assigned to the Black Hawk unit were not aware that the ATO specified separate transponder Mode I codes for operating inside and outside of the TAOR. The unit had routinely flown in the TAOR using the Mode I code designated for use outside the TAOR. On previous missions, AWACS had not pointed out the incorrect Mode I code to the helicopter crews. There is nothing to indicate that the pilots who flew the 14 April mission were briefed on, or were aware of, the correct Mode I code specified for use in the TAOR.³²⁴ AWACS interrogation of the accident helicopters' Mode I IFF codes showed that the helicopters' transponders were transmitting on Mode I, Code 42 (the code for operations outside the TAOR.)³²⁵

After the mission briefing, the helicopter aircrews began their mission planning. They received intelligence and weather briefings, and completed their flight plan. The pilots signed for and were issued the ATO, night vision goggles, survival radios, authentication tables, and weapons.³²⁶

The helicopter crews departed Pirinlik AB, Turkey at approximately 0335Z, arrived at Diyarbakir base operations at approximately 0400Z, and passed their flight plan to the Turkish Air Traffic Control Section.³²⁷ The aircrews then departed Diyarbakir base operations and drove to the US flight line area.³²⁸

The helicopter crews conducted preflight checks of the Black Hawk helicopters. (Aircraft serial numbers 87-26000 and 87-26001). The helicopter detachment's standard practice was to conduct all aircraft preflight checks in accordance with the aircraft operator's manual, the aircraft checklist and Army regulations.³²⁹ When the lead aircrew performed their aircraft run-up checks on aircraft 87-26001, they discovered an electrical problem which required an aircraft change.³³⁰ The lead aircrew changed to aircraft 88-26060, and after a normal preflight and engine run-up, both Black Hawk helicopters departed as a flight of two at 0522Z for Zakhu, Iraq.³³¹ No maintenance discrepancies on the two accident aircraft were reported to maintenance personnel at Diyarbakir AB.³³² As they entered the TAOR, the helicopter flight contacted AWACS at 0621Z and landed at Zakhu shortly thereafter.³³³

NOTE: The initial plan for the next flight had been for the helicopters to fly to a village which was just within the security zone to wait until AWACS was on station, before proceeding outside the security zone.³³⁴ The US co-commander had requested permission from the CTF CG for an early departure from Zakhu. The proposed departure time would

have meant that the helicopters would have flown outside the SZ before the AWACS was scheduled to be on station. The CTF CG had denied the request.³³⁵ There is no indication that any of the MCC or helicopter personnel were aware of the ACO requirement for fighter aircraft to "sanitize" the TAOR before any OPC aircraft could enter the area.³³⁶

At 0536Z, the radio operator at MCC (Forward) received word that AWACS was flying and JTIDS was operational.³³⁷ When the helicopters arrived at Zakhu, the air mission commander confirmed AWACS was airborne and operational.³³⁸ The MCC (Forward) operations officer conducted a mission briefing for the helicopter aircrews, MCC co-commanders, and the accompanying staff officers. The briefing covered the passenger manifest, seating, and the route of flight from Zakhu to Irbil to Salah ad Din, and return to Zakhu.³³⁹ Army procedures require an aircraft thru-flight inspection (check that the aircraft is functioning properly) be performed prior to each takeoff.³⁴⁰ Although there is no evidence to indicate whether or not the required inspection was complied with on this flight, normal practice by the unit's helicopter pilots was to conduct a thorough thru-flight in accordance with the aircraft operator's checklist.³⁴¹ At 0650Z, following the briefing, the helicopters were loaded and prepared to depart from Zakhu.³⁴²

UH-60 Sequence of Flight Events: The Black Hawk helicopters departed Zakhu, and at 0654Z, the pilots contacted the AWACS enroute controller and reported that they had departed Zakhu and were enroute to Irbil, using code words for the locations.³⁴³ They proceeded at low altitude to the southeast through a valley between mountainous ridge lines.³⁴⁴ The Airspace Coordination Order requires helicopters to remain below 400 feet above ground level (AGL) to provide deconfliction from jet aircraft.³⁴⁵ An April 1993 helicopter detachment memorandum for flight crews states that flights in the TAOR will be straight line from point to point.³⁴⁶ However, helicopter routes of flight within the TAOR were selected to use the most favorable terrain to avoid Iraqi air defense locations.³⁴⁷ The route from Zakhu to Irbil which avoided the Iraqi air defenses took the helicopters on a dogleg approximately 26 NM to the northeast of the straight line route.³⁴⁸

The helicopters' transponders were operational and transmitting Mode I, code 42 after departing Zakhu, inside the TAOR.³⁴⁹ This was the Mode I code for operations outside the TAOR. Mode I, code 52 was specified in the ATO for all aircraft operating inside the TAOR.³⁵⁰ Additionally, the lead helicopter's transponder transmitted Mode II, code 5530 and the wingman's transponder transmitted Mode II, code 5531, both as specified in the ATO.³⁵¹ A Mode III code was not required in the TAOR.³⁵² There is no evidence to indicate that AWACS attempted to interrogate either of the helicopters' Mode IV codes on this flight either.³⁵³

The Black Hawk helicopters were engaged by the F-15 flight at a location 71 NM southeast of Zakhu.³⁵⁴ They were between 120 feet and 200 feet above the ground in a staggered left trail formation.³⁵⁵

At approximately 0730Z, the trail Black Hawk, (serial number 87-26000) was flying approximately 120 feet above the ground on a heading between 100 and 120 degrees, when it was hit in the left rear fuselage by warhead fragments from the AIM-120, radar-guided missile.³⁵⁶

Kurdish witnesses reported fire behind the rotor mast and on top of the aircraft (in the area of the auxiliary power unit) following warhead detonation. Fire was also reported inside the cabin area.³⁵⁷ The Black Hawk began to break up in the air, with pieces of the aircraft landing approximately 1,320 feet short of the main impact point. The helicopter impacted on the valley floor. Impact was estimated to be at an angle of 8 degrees nose low at approximately 72 knots airspeed.³⁵⁸ The aircraft was destroyed by fire after impact with the ground.³⁵⁹

The lead Black Hawk, (serial number 88-26060) continued flying up the valley on a heading of approximately 100 degrees at an undetermined airspeed and at a low altitude.³⁶⁰ Just after the trailing Black Hawk crashed, the lead helicopter made a series of rapid left and right banking maneuvers, finally turning left and entering a narrow, steep valley running generally on a heading of 040 degrees.³⁶¹ The lead Black Hawk was struck by the heat-seeking AIM 9 missile.³⁶² Kurdish witnesses reported an explosion with a fireball after missile impact.³⁶³ The Black Hawk began to break up in the air with pieces of wreckage landing 2,118 feet short of the main impact point. At least one main rotor blade and one tail rotor paddle landed 900 feet short of the main impact point.³⁶⁴ At approximately 0730Z, the helicopter impacted on a 45 degree mountain slope. Impact was estimated to be at an angle of 56 degrees nose low at an undetermined airspeed.³⁶⁵ The aircraft was destroyed by fire after impact with the ground.³⁶⁶

c. Search and Rescue:

Each of the two cockpit doors on the Black Hawk helicopters was equipped with a jettison system for emergency release of the door assembly. The two windows on each helicopter cabin door (a total of four door windows per aircraft) were equipped with a jettison system.³⁶⁷ Aircraft emergency equipment consisted of two hand-held fire extinguishers, one crash axe, and three first aid kits.³⁶⁸ Black Hawk helicopters are not equipped with inflight emergency ejection/egress systems. No evidence was found to indicate that egress was attempted from either aircraft or that any emergency equipment was used.³⁶⁹

Each Black Hawk crew member had been issued and was wearing the approved flight uniform, combat boots, flight gear, and survival vest (SRU 21P) with standard issue survival gear.³⁷⁰ The US military passengers were all wearing the standard battle dress uniform (BDU) and combat boots. Civilian passengers wore appropriate civilian clothing. The civilian Kurdish guards wore civilian clothing and flak vests.³⁷¹ Minor discrepancies in aircrew member aviation and life support equipment were noted, but were not related to the accident.³⁷² There is no indication that any survival equipment was used.³⁷³

At 0806Z, the JSOTF operations office at Incirlik AB received initial notification from CTF C2 of an accident allegedly involving Hind helicopters and that the location of the Black Hawk helicopter flight was unknown.³⁷⁴ At 0915Z, the JSOTF directed their response force at the MCC (Forward), to prepare to dispatch a ground search and rescue (SAR) team.³⁷⁵

At 1015Z, Kurdish civilians notified MCC (Forward) that two US helicopters had been shot down and gave them the location of the crash sites.³⁷⁶ At 1052Z, the CTF gave authorization to launch the SAR force from Incirlik AB.³⁷⁷ The SAR team that was assembled included an

AWACS aircraft for command and control, fighters for air cover, MH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters to carry the SAR force, and HC-130 Hercules aircraft to provide inflight refueling for the helicopters.³⁷⁸ The MH-60 helicopter crews prepared the aircraft for the mission while the Turkish liaison officers were notified and clearance from the Turkish authorities was obtained.³⁷⁹ JSOTF SAR forces departed Incirlik AB in MH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters at approximately 1200Z, and the HC-130 departed Incirlik AB at 1302Z. The AWACS and supporting fighters were already airborne. At 1315Z, a team of Special Forces personnel and civilian interpreters departed MCC (Forward) at Zakhu, by ground transportation, enroute to the crash site.³⁸⁰

The Pave Hawk helicopters arrived at the two crash sites at approximately 1615Z.³⁸¹ At approximately 1650Z, the MCC (Forward) ground team arrived at the crash sites.³⁸² At 1715Z, the JSOTF on-scene commander reported to the CTF commander that the helicopter wreckage was from the two US Black Hawk helicopters. He confirmed that there were 26 casualties, and no survivors.³⁸³ Recovery and transport of the remains began immediately and continued throughout the night.

A medical/mortuary affairs team from Incirlik AB set up operations at Diyarbakir AB to receive and prepare the remains for transport to Rhein Main AB, Germany. Several helicopter flights were required to transport the remains and SAR personnel, first to Zakhu and then on to Diyarbakir AB. The last helicopter flight landed at Diyarbakir AB at approximately 0330Z, 15 April 1994.³⁸⁴ At 1831Z, on 15 April 1994, a C-141 carrying the remains departed Diyarbakir AB for Rhein Main AB.³⁸⁵

d. Maintenance:

(1) E-3B AWACS.

Maintenance Documentation. Aircraft maintenance records, airborne radar technician logs, sortie debrief reports, maintenance log books, and the equipment review report for aircraft 77-0351 were reviewed. There were no documented maintenance discrepancies which appeared to be related to the accident.

Maintenance Personnel and Supervision. The aircraft was serviced for flight in accordance with Air Force directives, and the appropriate documentation was accomplished.³⁸⁶ Squadron maintenance personnel were experienced, and were trained in accordance with Air Force standards to maintain the aircraft and mission systems.³⁸⁷

Engine, Fuel, Hydraulic, and Oil Inspection Analysis. With the exception of minor engine discrepancies which were unrelated to the accident, all engine, flight control, and aircraft accessory systems functioned normally during the mission. Post-flight fuel, oil, and hydraulic samples and a post-flight engine inspection were not required.³⁸⁸

Airframe and Aircraft Systems. Aircraft airframe and systems, including hydraulic, electric, mechanical, avionics, and power plant, were reviewed. Two AWACS aircraft systems, the mission crew commander's console monitor and one Magnetic Tape Transport, had

discrepancies which were reviewed during the accident investigation. Additionally, the aircraft was equipped with a commercial VHS video camera to record video/audio from a specific scope display. The video camera recorded information related to the accident, and was the only device on board which had audio recording capability.

Video Camera. The onboard VHS video camera was installed to provide an additional record of any flight safety problems or significant events in flight.³⁸⁹ It recorded the scope display from a spare monitor during the F-15C intercept of the Black Hawk helicopters. According to crew members' testimony, the tape was rewound so a crew member could view the intercept. It was turned back on, after it was rewound, to record Iraqi air activity south of the no-fly zone after the accident, and a portion of the tape was recorded over. Approximately four minutes were lost--from 0728Z to 0732Z.³⁹⁰ Extensive reconstruction efforts on the audio segment did not recover any of the lost data. However, expert analysis of the portions of the tape that were not recorded over disclosed audio material not otherwise available.³⁹¹

Magnetic Tape Transports. One of the three Magnetic Tape Transports (MTT) was inoperable. The unit is used to record mission data or load mission programs. With one Magnetic Tape Transport (MTT) inoperable, the onboard computer technician was required to manually rewind and reload the magnetic recording tapes. Although this caused three to five minute gaps in the recorded data, video recording capability during the F-15 intercept was not affected.³⁹²

Mission Crew Commander Radar Scope. The mission crew commander's radar scope experienced "ballooning" problems during the mission. Every five to ten minutes, displayed images would expand, then blank out for about 20 seconds. The inflight technician assessed the problem as not serious. A fully functional spare monitor was available; however, the mission crew commander did not deem it necessary to change monitors.³⁹³

(2) F-15C.

Maintenance Documentation. Aircraft maintenance records, maintenance forms, sortie debrief reports, and the equipment review report for 84-0025 (lead's aircraft) and 79-0025 (wingman's aircraft) were reviewed.

Serial number 84-0025. The aircraft (84-0025) had no grounding discrepancies or overdue Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO), (aircraft/engine modifications) or engine inspections in the aircraft status, maintenance and inspection records. Additionally, the aircraft had no abnormal trends in either engine's oil analysis records. The aircraft's historical flight records indicated no recurring maintenance problems with engine, airframe, or avionics systems (except as noted below.) Aircraft maintenance records showed that the aircraft had experienced four Air-to-Air Interrogation (AAI) system discrepancies in the 90 days prior to the accident. All four discrepancies had been documented as corrected by maintenance personnel.³⁹⁴ It cannot be determined if they were related to the accident.

Serial number 79-0025. The aircraft (79-0025) had no grounding discrepancies or overdue TCTOs (aircraft/engine modifications) or engine inspections in the aircraft status, maintenance and inspection records. Additionally, the aircraft had no abnormal trends in either engine's oil analysis records. The aircraft's historical flight records indicated no recurring maintenance problems with engine, airframe, or avionics systems. The aircraft had not experienced any AAI system discrepancies since 28 February 1994.³⁹⁵

Maintenance Personnel and Supervision. Both aircraft were serviced for flight on 13 April in accordance with applicable technical directives and the appropriate documentation was accomplished. On the morning of 14 April, a qualified squadron avionics technician loaded the Mode IV codes for 14 April (Mode IVA) and 15 April (Mode IVB) into both aircraft's IFF and AAI systems. Both accident aircraft's IFF systems were electronically checked prior to flight, by a second avionics technician using an IFF ground test set. Both aircraft passed this check confirming that valid Mode IV codes were loaded in each aircraft. The training records of the second avionics technician did not reflect that he had completed training on the use of the test set. He was subsequently tested and found qualified to perform the task.³⁹⁶ Other squadron maintenance personnel records were not reviewed.

Engine, Fuel, Hydraulic, and Oil Inspection Analysis. All engine, flight control, and aircraft accessory systems functioned normally during the accident sortie.³⁹⁷ Post-flight fuel and hydraulic samples and post-flight engine inspections were not required.

Airframe and Aircraft Systems. The status of aircraft airframe and aircraft systems, including hydraulic, electrical, mechanical, avionics and power plant, was reviewed. Aircraft canopy and windscreen condition and the AAI/IFF systems for both F-15C aircraft were identified as components/systems requiring detailed evaluation.

Canopy and windscreen. Both aircrafts' (79-0025 and 84-0025) canopies and windscreens were inspected and met all technical data requirements for optical clarity.³⁹⁸

Serial number 84-0025.

The aircraft's AAI system was reported to have been successfully checked against airborne targets by the accident pilot and by the pilots on the sorties immediately prior to and after the accident sortie.³⁹⁹ The aircraft had experienced no AAI malfunctions between 1 December 1993 and 9 March 1994. Since 9 March 1994, the aircraft had experienced four problems with its AAI/interference blanking systems. One of these problems involved an AAI Built In Test (BIT) light illuminating in flight. On another flight, the AAI was inoperative in all modes. The two other problems involved the interference blanking system. In addition, there was one interference blanking system discrepancy on the sortie following the accident flight.⁴⁰⁰

NOTE: AAI/IFF System. When interrogated, the F-15 aircraft IFF system transmits a coded response to identify itself as a "friendly" aircraft. The F-15 aircraft AAI system transmits interrogation signals, evaluates coded IFF replies, and displays symbology in the cockpit to tell the pilot if the interrogated IFF signal

is from a friendly aircraft. The F-15 aircraft interference blanking system prevents interference between an aircraft's own internal systems that use radio frequency transmitters and receivers. For example, when an F-15 aircraft's AAI system interrogates a target, the interference blanker prevents that same interrogation from being received by the F-15's own IFF system. Without the interference blanker, the interrogating aircraft's own IFF system would reply. That reply would be picked up by the F-15's own AAI system and displayed as an erroneous target on the cockpit display. (See paragraph 2i of this report for a discussion of AAI/IFF anomalies, and Tab O4b for additional discussion of the interference blanker.)

The aircraft's AAI system was ground-tested on 21/22 April 1994 by an F-15 technical advisor using an AAI ground test set and the applicable F-15 technical data. The test indicated the aircraft's AAI system was capable of interrogating, receiving replies, evaluating, and displaying Mode I, II, III, and IV targets generated by the ground test set. However, the aircraft failed the Mode IV loop check, an internal self-test of the Mode IV system. In the loop test, the aircraft's interference blanking system is disabled, allowing the AAI transmitter to send a signal to the aircraft's own IFF transponder. The IFF transponder's reply to that interrogation is received by the AAI system's receiver. Failure of the loop test indicated that the continuity of the internal test circuit was not complete. The technical advisor suspected, but was unable to positively confirm, that the interference blanking system problems and the failure of the Mode IV loop check were related. Even though the AAI had been unable to interrogate the F-15's own IFF during the loop test, it had successfully interrogated the external AAI ground test set in the previously mentioned test. The wiring between the interference blanker, IFF system, and AAI system was tested for continuity with no defects noted.⁴⁰¹

The IFF reply evaluator and AAI receiver/transmitter from the aircraft's AAI system were then sent to Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, Georgia, for tear-down analysis. The interrogator computer was also sent to the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, Kelly AFB, Texas, for tear-down analysis. The tear-down analysis revealed no discrepancies in any of the components that would have adversely affected system performance on the aircraft. The interference blanker and AAI cockpit control panel from aircraft 84-0025 were sent to Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, Georgia, for tear-down analysis. The analysis revealed each component passed all test requirements.⁴⁰² The successful AAI interrogations by pilots on sorties before, during and after the accident, and the lack of deficiencies noted during the tear-down analysis indicate the AAI system was functioning normally. However, because the AAI failed the Mode IV loop check and had a history of AAI write ups, the possibility of intermittent failure of the AAI system could not be ruled out. A malfunction of the F-15 interference blanking system normally does not interfere with the receipt of another aircraft's IFF transponder reply.⁴⁰³

Serial number 79-0025.

The aircraft's AAI system was reported to have been successfully checked against airborne targets by the pilots on the sorties before, during, and after the accident sortie.⁴⁰⁴ The aircraft had experienced two AAI malfunctions in the last 90 days. Both malfunctions (December 1993 and

January 1994) involved the Mode IV portion of the AAI system. There were no pilot-reported AAI discrepancies in the 45 days prior to the accident.⁴⁰⁵

The aircraft's AAI system was ground-tested on 21/22 April 1994 by an F-15 technical advisor, using an AAI ground test set and the applicable F-15 technical data. The aircraft passed all of the test, except the Mode IV portion. When the aircraft's AAI system interrogated the test set, it failed to display Mode IV returns in the cockpit, indicating it had not successfully received/evaluated the reply from the test set. The test set indicated it had received an interrogation from the aircraft and had sent a reply. The test set had been used on aircraft 84-0025 just prior to being used on aircraft 79-0025 and the Mode IV portion of the test had worked correctly. The test set also passed a built-in self-test prior to the test on aircraft 79-0025.⁴⁰⁶

The IFF reply evaluator and the AAI receiver/transmitter from the aircraft's AAI system were then sent to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, Georgia, for tear-down analysis. The interrogator computer from the aircraft was sent to the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, Kelly AFB, Texas, for tear-down analysis. The tear-down analysis revealed no discrepancies in any of the components that would have adversely affected system performance on the aircraft. The interference blanker and AAI cockpit control panel from 79-0025 were sent to the test facilities at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins AFB, Georgia, for tear-down analysis. Each of these components passed all test requirements.⁴⁰⁷ The lack of a history of AAI write ups, the reported successful AAI interrogations by the pilots on the sorties before, during, and after the accident sortie, and the lack of deficiencies noted during the tear-down analysis indicate the AAI system was functioning normally. However, because the AAI failed the Mode IV portion of the ground test, the possibility of an intermittent failure of the AAI system in flight could not be ruled out.

(3) UH-60 Black Hawks.

Maintenance Documentation. Historical aircraft maintenance records and forms for helicopters 88-26060 and 87-26000 were reviewed. Available documentation indicates that maintenance procedures and practices were in accordance with applicable directives. Daily maintenance forms carried on board the accident helicopters in accordance with Army directives, could not be reviewed. The documents were destroyed when the helicopters crashed and burned. There were no known, uncorrected maintenance discrepancies on either helicopter that appear to have been related to the accident.⁴⁰⁸

Serial number 88-26060. Historical maintenance records revealed that all aircraft modification work orders had been completed.⁴⁰⁹ There were no abnormal trends in the oil analysis records. No oil samples were overdue.⁴¹⁰ The records showed that the aircraft had 17 non-grounding discrepancies that would have been carried forward in the aircraft forms that were destroyed in the crash.⁴¹¹

Aircraft maintenance records for 88-26060 showed that there were six IFF system (transponder and KIT 1C) discrepancies in the 210 days prior to the accident. These included a failed Mode IV check, two transponder self-test failures, an incorrect knob installation, an IFF

caution light illuminated in flight, and a Mode II button stuck. All writeups had been documented as repaired or checked and found to be functioning properly.⁴¹² It cannot be determined whether these corrected discrepancies were related to the accident.

Serial number 87-26000. Historical maintenance records revealed that all modification work orders had been completed.⁴¹³ There were no abnormal trends in the oil analysis records. No oil samples were overdue.⁴¹⁴ The records showed that the aircraft had seven non-grounding discrepancies that would have been carried forward to the aircraft forms that were destroyed in the crash. None of these discrepancies appear to have been related to the accident.⁴¹⁵

Aircraft maintenance records for 87-26000 showed that there was one IFF system (transponder and KIT 1C) discrepancy in the 210 days prior to the accident. The records indicated that the transponder would not hold the Mode IV code. The corrective action taken was to replace the KIT 1C battery.⁴¹⁶ It cannot be determined whether this corrected discrepancy was related to the accident.

Maintenance Personnel and Supervision. The aircraft were serviced for flight in accordance with Army directives. Preflight servicing of the aircraft was conducted by the accident flight crew chiefs.⁴¹⁷ Servicing records, including refueling, replenishing component fluid levels, and the completion of daily scheduled inspections for the 14 April 1994 flight, were carried in the logbooks. The logbooks were destroyed in the accident.⁴¹⁸ Training records revealed that the servicing personnel (crew chiefs) were experienced and qualified.⁴¹⁹ Contractor maintenance personnel were also experienced and qualified.⁴²⁰

The servicing personnel (crew chiefs) were responsible for loading (keying) the encrypted Mode IV code into the aircraft transponders.⁴²¹ The Army has no requirement to document the keying process. A representative of the US Army Aviation Electronic Combat Project Manager's Office evaluated all Black Hawk crew chiefs at Diyarbakir on 28 April 94 and determined that keying of Mode IV of the transponders was being accomplished in accordance with applicable technical manuals.⁴²²

Engine, Fuel, Hydraulic, and Oil Inspection Analysis. Available information indicates that the engine, fuel, hydraulic, and lubrication systems were functioning properly prior to the accident. Post-crash fuel, hydraulic fluid, and oil samples were not taken from either Black Hawk helicopter due to the extensive destruction of the components caused by impact forces and post-crash fires.⁴²³

Airframe and Aircraft Systems. Records and recovered components from the helicopter wreckage were examined. The IFF transponders were the only Black Hawk systems recovered from the crash sites whose operation may have been related to the accident. Tear-down analysis was conducted on the two IFF transponders and one cryptographic computer (KIT 1C).⁴²⁴

Serial number 88-26060. The AN/APX-100 (Transponder) was recovered and shipped to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana, for tear-down analysis.⁴²⁵ Tear-down

analysis indicated that, due to the damage to the AN/APX-100 (transponder), it was not possible to ascertain the operational condition of the unit, or if the Mode IV control switch was activated (on) at the time of the accident.⁴²⁶ The KIT 1C was recovered and sent to the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, Kelly AFB, Texas, for tear-down analysis.⁴²⁷ Tear-down analysis of the KIT 1C indicated that, due to extensive damage to the component, no determination could be made about the condition of the component prior to the accident, or whether or not the unit was turned on at the time of the accident.⁴²⁸

Serial number 87-26000. The AN/APX-100 (Transponder) was recovered and sent to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana, for tear-down analysis.⁴²⁹ Tear-down analysis showed that transponder power was on at the time of the accident.⁴³⁰ The KIT 1C of this aircraft was not recovered. Observations made during the tear down analysis which relate to possible transponder switch positions and the operational status of the Mode IV function are discussed below.

e. Summary of AAI and IFF Anomalies.

The following areas have been identified as possible reasons for the lack of Mode IV IFF indications received by the F-15s during the intercept.

Terrain masking. The signals between aircraft AAI systems and transponders require line-of-sight in order to be effectively received.⁴³¹ The intercept's parameters raise the possibility that terrain masking may have intermittently interrupted the signals, preventing a valid Mode IV identification.⁴³²

Signal interference by proximity. The F-15C manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation, and the Department of Defense's IFF Program Office indicate the theoretical possibility that an F-15 aircraft, electronically interrogating two other aircraft flying in close proximity to each other, could experience difficulty receiving the IFF reply from those aircraft. The close proximity of two aircraft could result in a situation where neither aircraft's transponder signal would be received by an AAI system.⁴³³ On the other hand, an independent input by the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division at Indianapolis, Indiana, indicated that the AAI interrogator should have seen, as a minimum, one valid Mode IV response.⁴³⁴

Computer simulation testing by the Theater Air Command and Control Simulation Facility (TACCSF) at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, revealed that, using certain interrogation modes, the F-15 AAI system would not consistently get successful interrogations of two UH-60s flying in close proximity.⁴³⁵ Subsequent flight tests at Nellis AFB, Nevada, using F-15Cs and MH-60 helicopters indicated a very high success rate in interrogations of two helicopters flying in close proximity. Interrogation failures observed during the flight test were attributed to terrain masking and a lack of the required radar contacts during some interrogations.⁴³⁶

Insufficient AAI interrogation time. TACCSF simulator results indicated that the probability of an IFF response being received by the F-15 AAI system was "largely determined by the amount of time the 'coolie switch' was held in position during any particular interrogation

request." (The "coolie switch" is a multi-function switch which includes the AAI function.) The TACCSF report also stated, "It was often necessary to hold the coolie switch in the interrogate position for several seconds to obtain a response while in 'Track-While-Scan' or 'Search' modes". The probability of a positive IFF response is dependent on the number of times the transponder is "swept" by the interrogator. Depending on the radar antenna scan pattern, several sweeps of the radar (several seconds of sweep time) may be required to get a successful response.⁴³⁷

Interrogator and Receiver Side Lobe Suppression (ISLS and RSLs). The interrogator and receiver side lobe suppression systems are designed to reduce the interrogating pilot's screen "clutter" caused by multiple, excessive replies to an interrogation. Indications are that it is possible that the relative angles of intercept between the F-15Cs and the Black Hawk helicopters could have produced a condition where either of these suppression functions may have prevented a transponder reply by the helicopters.⁴³⁸

Effect of helicopter low level flight profile on the correlation between the F-15 Fire Control Computer and AAI interrogator. The F-15's fire control radar (FCR) uses a target's "doppler shift" to track the target and direct the interrogator. The FCR computer may have difficulty tracking a low altitude, slow moving target. Without a reliable radar lock, the F-15's interrogator might not present a response to the pilot, even though a valid reply was transmitted by the transponder.⁴³⁹

Possible Black Hawk Crew Actions. Potential problems could arise as a result of mistakes during the Mode IV keying process. They include issue/receipt of an incorrect Mode IV code, equipment malfunctions, and errors by personnel conducting the loading process. However, the available evidence indicates that the keying of 88-26060 and 87-26000 on 14 April 1994 was done with the correct code for the day and that the loading procedures were accomplished in accordance with applicable directives and technical manuals.⁴⁴⁰ The detachments KYK 13s were determined to be fully operational by Tobyhanna Army Depot.⁴⁴¹

Improper helicopter engine shut-down procedures could result in the loss of the Mode IV code from the transponder's memory. The board could not determine whether this occurred following the shut down of the Black Hawks at Zakhu on 14 April 1994.⁴⁴²

It is possible that the Mode IV switches were turned off during flight; however, there is no evidence indicating that the Black Hawk pilots deliberately turned off the Mode IV switch on both helicopters while in flight.⁴⁴³

The accident board was unable to determine from the information available why the F-15 AAI's did not receive a Mode IV response from the Black Hawk helicopters' transponders.

f. Crew Qualifications:

(1) AWACS Crew Qualifications. The Individual Training Records and Flight Evaluation Folders (FEF) for each member of the AWACS crew were reviewed. Except for the mission crew commander, all of the AWACS crew members were qualified and mission ready.⁴⁴⁴

Except for the instructor computer display maintenance technician, all crew members were current in OPC theater certification.⁴⁴⁵ Upon arrival at Incirlik AB each crew member received additional theater-specialized training for OPC and a local orientation briefing.⁴⁴⁶ Several members had participated in previous deployments to OPC.⁴⁴⁷

Mission Crew Commander. The accident mission crew commander, who had a total of 518 total hours of flying time, completed initial qualification training (IQT) on 3 February 1993 with a "Qualified" rating.⁴⁴⁸ No evaluation discrepancies were noted and no additional training was recommended.⁴⁴⁹ He completed mission qualification training (MQT) within the prescribed time and was certified as mission ready (MR) in March 1993.⁴⁵⁰ To maintain MR status, the mission crew commander was required to fly at least one sortie per month, or at least three sorties within the previous three month period.⁴⁵¹ On 22 December 1993, he was placed in a "duty-not-involving-flying" (DNIF) status. Subsequently, the mission crew commander underwent a hearing evaluation that required a waiver prior to his return to flying status. The waiver was effective beginning 14 February 1994.⁴⁵² Because he had not flown since 22 December 1993, his MR status was downgraded to basic qualified (BQ) supervised status.⁴⁵³ In BQ status, the mission crew commander was ineligible to fly without the supervision of an instructor, and was not certified to perform those duties required in contingency or wartime operations.⁴⁵⁴ He flew an instructor supervised sortie on 23 February 1994, and was returned to MR status.⁴⁵⁵ The mission crew commander was again placed in DNIF status on 29 March 1994, but was returned to flying status on 8 April 1994.⁴⁵⁶ However, because he flew no sorties in March and had flown only one sortie in the first three months of 1994, he did not meet the minimum sortie requirements for being MR. The mission crew commander had flown only the one 8.3 hour sortie in the last 90 days.⁴⁵⁷ He was incorrectly left in MR status, and was deployed to OPC on 9 April 1994.⁴⁵⁸ Since he was incorrectly designated MR on the flight authorization orders for 14 April 94, he was not placed under the supervision of an instructor.⁴⁵⁹ An instructor mission crew commander (the AWACS staff mission crew commander) flew on the 14 April 94 mission, but was not designated for, and did not perform, instructor duties on 14 April 1994.⁴⁶⁰ The AWACS accident mission crew commander, who had flown only one sortie in the previous three months, was not currently qualified on 14 April 1994, in accordance with Air Force regulations.

Senior Director. The accident senior director (SD), who had 2383.7 total hours of flying time, completed weapons director (WD) initial qualification training on 5 July 1989, with a "Qualified" rating.⁴⁶¹ In October 1990, he was rated "Unsatisfactory" on the simulator portion of his first checkride with discrepancies noted for not properly positioning aircraft under his control. After additional training, he successfully completed the checkride on 6 November 1990.⁴⁶² In January 1992, he received another "Unsatisfactory" on a simulator checkride, again for poor aircraft positioning. After additional training, the checkride was successfully reaccomplished.⁴⁶³ The senior director completed the Senior Director Upgrade Training course on 6 October 1992, receiving a "Qualified" rating. Additional training was recommended to improve his ability to prioritize mission radios during periods of heavy radio use.⁴⁶⁴ During his senior director upgrade training, he had one "Unsatisfactory" mission on 12 August 1992 (Student Non-Progress [SNP] report for safety) in the flying training phase. The SNP for safety was because he had fallen asleep while the WDs under his supervision were controlling fighters.⁴⁶⁵ Normal progress and instructor comments were evident on the remainder of his senior director upgrade training

missions. The senior director's mission qualification training simulator record noted several areas for improvement, including the need to be more familiar with the skill levels of the WDs under his supervision, the need to insure that both he and the WDs he supervised understood the ROE, and the need to insure WDs under his supervision totally understood their various responsibilities.⁴⁶⁶ Mission Qualification training comments during the flying training phase were positive and indicated no problems.⁴⁶⁷ A review of the Deployment Training Feedback form for a previous deployment to Saudi Arabia (November through December 1992), indicated that he demonstrated strong leadership and aggressive attributes during the deployment.⁴⁶⁸ On 15 April 93, the SD successfully completed his mission qualification evaluation with one discrepancy and no additional training recommended.⁴⁶⁹ A review of the flight training data for the SD indicated that he had completed all flying, ground, and simulator requirements. His flight training sortie accomplishments as an SD were well above Air Force requirements. The accident SD was current and mission ready to perform his assigned duties on 14 April 1994.⁴⁷⁰

Enroute Controller. The accident enroute controller, who had 1109 total hours of flying time, received an "Unsatisfactory" rating on his first simulator check ride on 21 February 1992. The "Unsatisfactory" rating was for safety, and additional training was recommended prior to his simulator re-evaluation.⁴⁷¹ He completed WD initial qualification training on 14 April 1992 with a "Qualified" rating.⁴⁷² However, once the enroute controller began MQT, he required additional sorties to complete training objectives. His MQT was extended an additional 30 days to accomplish the required training.⁴⁷³ Prior to 18 March 1993, the enroute controller's status was downgraded from MR to BQ when he did not fly an effective weapons sortie for more than 60 days. On 18 March 1993, he was returned to MR status after flying a sortie under an instructor's supervision.⁴⁷⁴ On 14 June 1993, the enroute controller failed his annual simulator evaluation with "Unsatisfactory" ratings for safety and airspace coordination. As a result, he was downgraded to an "Unqualified" (UQ) status. His squadron operations officer stated that the UQ evaluation was "...as much a reflection of the high out of CONUS TDY load/lack of home station flying training for our WDs, as it is an indication of (his) failure to prepare himself for this evaluation."⁴⁷⁵ Eight additional simulator training sessions were conducted prior to his re-evaluation.⁴⁷⁶ The re-evaluation was conducted on 13 August 1993 with an overall "Qualified" rating, although an "Unsatisfactory" grade was given for improper aircraft positioning.⁴⁷⁷ Deployment Training Feedback forms were reviewed for a November-December 1992 OPC deployment and a March 1993 GREEN FLAG training exercise. Both indicated that the enroute controller performed well and was motivated and hard working.⁴⁷⁸ A review of flight training data indicated that he had completed all of his semi-annual aircraft control requirements. The enroute controller was current and mission ready to perform his assigned duties on 14 April 1994.⁴⁷⁹

TAOR Controller. The accident TAOR controller, who had 161.5 total hours of flying time, completed WD initial qualification training on 5 January 1994 with a "Qualified" rating. No additional training was recommended.⁴⁸⁰ His training summary report indicates that he displayed "impeccable officership" and "professional qualities" through all phases of training, but that he needed time and practice to develop more self-confidence.⁴⁸¹ His initial qualification training Individual Mission Grade Sheets indicated no problems in training. The TAOR controller completed MQT within syllabus guidelines, and instructor comments on the MQT Individual

Mission Grade Sheets were positive. They indicated that he controlled his missions well, demonstrated knowledge of the ROE, and showed good situational awareness. However, one instructor commented that he needed to "...know his limits and communicate to SD/WDs when he needs help."⁴⁸² A review of flight training data indicated that the TAOR controller had met all applicable training requirements. The accident TAOR controller was current and mission ready to perform his assigned duties on 14 April 1994.⁴⁸³

Instructor Computer Display Maintenance Technician. The instructor computer display maintenance technician's (ICDMT) flight training data indicated that his theater certification for the OPC area of responsibility had expired on 11 December 1993.⁴⁸⁴ Theater training is required prior to aircrew members assuming duties within the OPC theater.⁴⁸⁵ A review of the ICDMT's flight evaluation folder and individual training records indicated no other discrepancies. The instructor computer display maintenance technician, who had 3515 total hours of flying time, was current and mission ready in his crew position.⁴⁸⁶ However, due to his expired theater certification, he was not currently qualified to perform duties in OPC on 14 April 1994.⁴⁸⁷

Staff Mission Crew Commander. The detachment staff mission crew commander who was on board the accident AWACS had 2527.7 total flying hours. He completed initial mission crew commander qualification training on 10 February 1993 with a "Qualified" rating. No discrepancies were noted.⁴⁸⁸ His upgrade training to instructor mission crew commander was completed with a "Qualified" rating on 15 March 1994. No discrepancies were noted. The end-of-course summary report for his instructor mission crew commander course indicated that he excelled during the flying phase and was an effective leader and instructor.⁴⁸⁹ On 14 April 1994, the staff mission crew commander was tasked to fly with the AWACS accident mission crew commander to provide assistance if required.⁴⁹⁰ The staff mission crew commander logged primary flight time (not instructor time) on the AF Form 781, and the flight orders indicate he was not flying as an instructor.⁴⁹¹ He logged an instructor sortie on the AF Form 3526 Event Accomplishment Report.⁴⁹² The staff mission crew commander on board the accident AWACS aircraft was current and mission ready on 14 April 1994.⁴⁹³

Qualification and Training Course Materials. A review of the mission crew training process was conducted by the AWACS technical advisor. Initial upgrade and mission qualification training syllabi and course materials addressed those tasks required to attain mission ready qualification in the AWACS.⁴⁹⁴ Continuation training materials and requirements were designed to maintain or improve capabilities needed to perform AWACS roles and missions.⁴⁹⁵ Pre-deployment training materials covered the OPC theater of operations and AWACS responsibilities.⁴⁹⁶ However, theater certification material was based on USCENTCOM Southwest Asia plans rather than OPC plans.⁴⁹⁷ The OPC simulator training materials stressed the importance of AWACS support to MCC helicopter operations.⁴⁹⁸ In-theater briefing materials did not address AWACS support to MCC helicopter operations.⁴⁹⁹ The AWACS in-theater weapons training book contained conflicting, unit-generated ROE guidance.⁵⁰⁰

(2) F-15C Crew Qualifications.

F-15C Flight Lead. The flight lead, who had 1561.9 total hours of flying time (656.1 hours in the F-15) completed initial qualification training in the F-15, on 28 January 1991, with a "Qualified" rating. No discrepancies were noted.⁵⁰¹ He completed mission qualification training on 12 July 1991 with a "Qualified" rating. No major discrepancies were noted.⁵⁰² The F-15 flight lead was qualified as a two-ship flight lead on 30 November 1992.⁵⁰³ He was qualified as a four-ship flight lead on 22 October 1993.⁵⁰⁴ A review of his training records revealed no problem areas. The F-15 flight lead completed his low altitude training requirements and was certified to fly operational missions as a flight lead as low as 500 ft AGL, on 19 April 1993.⁵⁰⁵ During the time he was qualified as an F-15 pilot (3 years and 3 months), he had flown a total of two air-to-air training sorties below 1,000 ft AGL.⁵⁰⁶ The F-15 flight lead had flown 26 sorties and 77.7 hours in the 90 days through 14 April 1994.⁵⁰⁷ He was current and mission ready to perform his assigned duties on 14 April 1994.⁵⁰⁸

F-15C Wingman. The wingman, who had 3009.6 total hours of flying time (1126.3 hours in the F-15), completed initial qualification training in the F-15 on 21 November 1983 with a "Qualified" rating. No discrepancies were noted.⁵⁰⁹ By 12 February 1985, he was mission ready, and two-ship flight lead, four-ship flight lead, and instructor pilot qualified.⁵¹⁰ After four years of non-flying duties, he completed initial requalification training in the F-15 on 11 June 1990, with a "Qualified" rating. No discrepancies were noted.⁵¹¹ By 22 March 1991, the wingman had completed mission requalification training, two-ship flight lead and four-ship requalification training, low altitude step down training, and instructor pilot requalification training.⁵¹² The wingman was again assigned to non-flying duties from 24 June 1992 until 1 June 1993.⁵¹³ He completed requalification training in the F-15 on 2 August 1993 with a "Qualified" rating. No discrepancies were noted.⁵¹⁴ The wingman requalified as a two-ship flight lead on 14 January 1994.⁵¹⁵ He requalified as a four-ship flight lead on 8 February 1994.⁵¹⁶ He completed instructor pilot requalification training on 10 March 1994.⁵¹⁷ Based on the wingman's previous low altitude qualification, the wingman's previous squadron commander had certified the wingman to fly operational missions as low as 500 feet AGL.⁵¹⁸ Because he had not flown a low-altitude sortie since 18 November 1993, he was currently qualified to perform missions down to 1000 feet AGL.⁵¹⁹ He had flown 18 sorties and 34.5 hours in the 90 days through 14 April 1994.⁵²⁰ The F-15C wingman was current and mission-ready to perform his assigned duties on 14 April 1994.⁵²¹

F-15C Visual Recognition Training. The Air Force threat recognition training program "...stresses crew members' ability to identify...operational air, naval, ground, missile and electronic equipment of any nation which could threaten US and allied forces. Aircrews must be able to identify both friendly and enemy equipment..."⁵²² USAFE regulations give responsibility for establishing an intelligence program, to include visual recognition training, to wing commanders.⁵²³ The parent fighter wing of the accident pilots further delegated that responsibility to each fighter squadron commander.⁵²⁴

The accident pilots' fighter squadron last conducted formal, visual recognition training in December 1993.⁵²⁵ The training in 1993 included viewing 35 mm slides of friendly and enemy

helicopters.⁵²⁶ The accident pilots stated that the majority of the helicopter slides used in their training were from ground level looking up, and showed either the front or side of the helicopter.⁵²⁷ Differences between friendly and hostile helicopter camouflage and color schemes were not discussed during the squadron's training.⁵²⁸ The accident pilots may not have been aware that Iraqi Hind helicopters had a different color scheme (light tan and brown camouflage) from that of the US Black Hawk helicopters (dark green and black camouflage).⁵²⁹ The lead pilot stated he had never seen a Black Hawk helicopter with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached.⁵³⁰ The wingman stated that he had never seen a photo of a Black Hawk with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached.⁵³¹ One of the squadron's visual training slides at home station depicts a Black Hawk helicopter with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached.⁵³² It could not be determined if either of the accident pilots had ever viewed that slide.

(3) UH-60 Black Hawk Crew Qualifications. The individual training records and flight evaluation folders for each of the accident Black Hawk helicopters crew members were reviewed. All Black Hawk helicopter crew members were qualified, current, and mission ready. Each crew member had completed all training appropriate for the mission prior to deployment to Turkey and had received theater specific training upon arrival at Diyarbakir AB. There were no training deficiencies noted.⁵³³

g. Medical:

(1) AWACS. A review of all the medical and dental records of the accident crew members was accomplished. No disqualifying conditions were documented in any of the medical or dental records. All personnel had current flying class physicals and were medically qualified for flying duties at the time of the accident. Their flying experience is summarized at Tab T1a.⁵³⁴

Complete physical examinations were performed on all crew members, including full eye and hearing tests.⁵³⁵ Full dental exams were not performed since no crew member reported any dental problems and no dental abnormalities were detected. There were no defects noted that were related to the accident.⁵³⁶

Body fluids from the staff mission crew commander and the TAOR controller for blood alcohol and urine toxicologic screenings were taken on 14 April 1994. All tests were negative. When the accident board learned that screenings had not been accomplished on all AWACS crew members,⁵³⁷ all required screenings were directed and conducted. All additional screenings were accomplished on 17 April 1994.⁵³⁸ The body fluid tests disclosed nothing which appeared related to the circumstances of the accident.⁵³⁹ There were no illegal drugs detected. No crew member had a carbon monoxide level above normal limits. Complete blood counts and blood glucose levels were within normal limits for all crew members.⁵⁴⁰

Complete psychosocial interviews, including 72-hour and 14-day histories, were conducted with each crew member except the mission crew commander, the enroute controller, the TAOR controller, and the ACE on board the AWACS. These individuals declined the interviews on the advice of defense counsel. The ACE, through counsel, provided a limited 24-hour history which revealed adequate crew rest and poor nutrition. Associates were interviewed regarding the

72-hour and psychosocial backgrounds on the mission crew commander, the enroute controller, the ACE, and the TAOR controller. All crew rest requirements were reportedly met.⁵⁴¹

(2) F-15C: A review of all the medical and dental records of the accident pilots was accomplished. No disqualifying conditions were documented in any of the medical or dental records. The records indicated that both pilots had current flying physicals and were medically qualified for flying duties.⁵⁴²

Complete physical examinations were performed on both F-15C pilots, including full eye and hearing tests. Full dental exams were not performed, since neither F-15C pilot reported any dental problems and no dental abnormalities were detected. Both pilots were given full optometric examinations.⁵⁴³ The wingman had previously been fully qualified for flying duties. However, he had a condition that resulted in a slowly progressive eyelid droop. The wingman was evaluated by an ophthalmologist on 7 April 1993, and was given the option of corrective surgery, which he declined. At that time, the condition was not severe enough to medically disqualify the pilot from flying duties. The wingman's flight physical on 17 May 1993 noted "mild eyelid ptosis (droop) bilaterally (both eyes)." His most recent routine flight physical, performed on 14 February 1994, made no comment regarding the eyelid droop, and noted that he had 20/20 visual acuity in both eyes, near and far, without correction. A full optometric examination on 24 April 1994 found the wingman to have minimal upper/outer visual field loss in his right eye due to the eyelid droop. All other tests of his eyes and vision were normal. He was evaluated by an ophthalmologist on 5 May 1994 who confirmed the visual field loss, characterizing it as "visually significant right brow (eyelid) ptosis." This visual field loss, which on 5 May 1994 exceeded Air Force standards, did not affect his central vision which is the source of sharp visual acuity. Central vision with its sharp acuity is the type of vision normally used to attempt specific recognition of an object such as an aircraft. However it could have affected his peripheral vision on the upper right side at the time of the accident.⁵⁴⁴

Body fluids from both F-15C pilots, for blood alcohol and urine toxicologic screenings, were taken on 14 April 1994. All tests were negative. Neither pilot had a carbon monoxide level above normal limits. Complete blood counts and blood glucose levels were within normal limits for both pilots.⁵⁴⁵

Complete psychosocial interviews, including 72-hour and 14-day histories, were conducted with both the F-15C pilots. All crew rest requirements were met.⁵⁴⁶

(3) UH-60 Black Hawk: A review of all the medical and dental records of the accident Black Hawk crew members was accomplished. No disqualifying conditions were documented in any of the medical or dental records. All personnel had current flying class physicals and were qualified for flying duties at the time of the accident.⁵⁴⁷

Complete autopsies including microscopic and toxicological evaluations were performed on all casualties. There were no pre-existing medical abnormalities found in the helicopter crew members. Several passengers had minor pre-existing medical abnormalities at the time of death.

Toxicological screens and blood alcohol levels were negative for all casualties. The cause of death for all casualties was multiple blunt force injuries.⁵⁴⁸

Associates were interviewed regarding the 72-hour and psychosocial backgrounds on the eight helicopter crew members. All crew rest requirements were reportedly met.⁵⁴⁹

Medical Summary: A review of medical records, physical examination results, toxicological reports, autopsy findings and interviews, disclosed no pre-existent mental or physical defects, other than those noted above, that were relevant to this accident.⁵⁵⁰

h. Human Factors:

(1) E-3B AWACS.

Crew-Mindset. Some of the accident crew members indicated they were not responsible for controlling Black Hawk helicopters.⁵⁵¹ This perception was compounded by the seemingly separate nature of the Black Hawk operations.⁵⁵² Additionally, there was confusion within the crew regarding who was responsible for tracking helicopters in the TAOR.⁵⁵³ The crew members also indicated they lacked adequate control authority over fighter aircraft.⁵⁵⁴ On 14 April 94, the Black Hawk helicopters entered the TAOR prior to the fighters. The AWACS crew members did not acknowledge responsibility for tracking or predicting the Black Hawks' flight path enroute to their announced destination when the Black Hawk flight faded from the AWACS radar scope. They assumed that the helicopter track had faded from radar because the helicopters had landed at an intermediate stop. AWACS crew members did not try to validate this assumption.⁵⁵⁵

Crew-Circadian Rhythm. Low grade circadian rhythm desynchrony (commonly referred to as "jet lag") was present in all crew members except the staff mission crew commander, staff weapons director, air surveillance officer, computer technician and the ACE. With the exception of the individuals noted, the crew departed Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on 10 April at 1300Z, and arrived at Incirlik AB on 11 April at 1100Z. The crew members appeared to adjust fairly rapidly to the time changes, considering they had traveled eastbound through 8 time zones in 24 hours. No crew member complained of fatigue on the morning of 14 April. The International Civil Aviation Organization formula for recommended rest time indicates a need for 1.8 days of rest before performing flight duties after such a trip.⁵⁵⁶ The accident crew flew their first mission on this rotation at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT on day four in country; this was standard for AWACS crews operating in the OPC theater.⁵⁵⁷ The accident crew reported no ill effects from circadian rhythm desynchrony, and had the required crew rest to fly this mission.⁵⁵⁸

(2) F-15C.

Pilots-Mindset. Based on the Airspace Control Order requirement for a fighter sweep to "sanitize" the area before other OPC aircraft could enter the TAOR, and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) of 14 April 1994 which did not show any OPC aircraft scheduled into the TAOR before the first F-15C flight, the accident pilots believed there would be no friendly aircraft in the area.⁵⁵⁹ This mindset was reinforced when the F-15C pilots acquired the Black Hawk helicopters on radar,

but received no valid friendly indications by electronic interrogation.⁵⁶⁰ This mindset was further reinforced when AWACS transmitted to the F-15C flight "Clean there," meaning AWACS had no contacts at the reported location.⁵⁶¹ The F-15C pilots may have begun the visual intercept with a mindset that the unknown aircraft were probably not "friendly."⁵⁶²

Aircraft Visual Identification. Both pilots had received only limited visual recognition training in the previous four months.⁵⁶³ The process of identifying the two "unknown" helicopters was complicated by the presence of wings (sponsons) and external fuel tanks, giving an appearance, from the high aft quadrant, similar to a Hind helicopter with sponsons and weapons.⁵⁶⁴ There were US flags painted on the bottom of the fuselage, the external fuel tanks and the side doors of the Black Hawk helicopters.⁵⁶⁵ However, calculations based on the size of the flags relative to the reported slant range distances between the fighters and the helicopters indicate that the flags were most likely indiscernible.⁵⁶⁶ At the slant ranges reported, the flags would have appeared as bright spots.⁵⁶⁷ However, the surrounding terrain was dotted with light gray rocks which could have minimized this feature.⁵⁶⁸ The F-15C flight lead wore an authorized high contrast yellow visor.⁵⁶⁹ This visor blocks out blue colors, functionally reducing the visible portions of the flag against a dark green/black background.⁵⁷⁰ The relatively low contrast between the dark green/black camouflaged Black Hawks and the green terrain, compounded visual recognition problems, making identification more difficult.⁵⁷¹

In the accident sequence, available visual recognition time was most likely divided between the attempted identification of the helicopters, terrain avoidance, and flying the aircraft.⁵⁷² The over-take time between the accident F-15Cs and the Black Hawk helicopters limited the time during which the F-15s would have been close enough to make an accurate visual identification. Finally, the F-15C pilots had limited low altitude experience, which may have increased the stress of operating in a low altitude environment.⁵⁷³

(3) UH-60 Black Hawk.

Crew-Mindset. Although no Black Hawk crew members survived the accident, testimony from other Black Hawk pilots from their unit indicated that they did not believe that AWACS coverage or a fighter sweep was required before helicopters could fly within the security zone of the TAOR. However, they stated that AWACS coverage was required for flights outside the security zone.⁵⁷⁴ The Black Hawk unit pilots also testified that they usually had limited communication with AWACS in the TAOR, due to the mountainous terrain.⁵⁷⁵ Finally, one of the helicopter pilots testified that he assumed that if the AWACS crew wanted him to leave the enroute frequency, they would tell him.⁵⁷⁶

i. Nav aids and Facilities. There were no Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS) that affected the accident missions. All navigational aids and facilities required to perform the mission were fully operational.⁵⁷⁷

j. Weather. The forecast weather in the TAOR on 14 April 1994 was for clear skies with unlimited visibility. The forecast winds were variable at 5 knots and the altimeter setting was 29.75 inches of mercury. No hazards to flight (turbulence, icing, hail, etc.) were forecast. The

maximum forecast temperature in the TAOR was 26 degrees Celsius. The forecast sunrise was 0236Z, and sunset was forecast for 1540Z.⁵⁷⁸

The Surface Weather Observation at Zakhu at 0345Z reported the skies were clear and the visibility was unlimited. The winds were from 090 degrees at 5 knots. The temperature was 20 degrees Celsius.⁵⁷⁹

At approximately 0715Z, the F-15 flight lead reported to the ACE on board the AWACS that the weather in the TAOR was "clear" and the contrail level was 31,000 to 35,000 feet.⁵⁸⁰ Weather was not related to the accident.

k. News media: There was extensive media coverage of the initial events surrounding the accident. Press releases were managed by USEUCOM/PA and OATSD/PA.⁵⁸¹

l. Directives and Publications. The following directives and publications were relevant to the accident:

(1) Command and Control Directives and Publications.

(a) USEUCOM Directive (ED) 55-47, 22 May 1989, Appendix A, Peacetime ROE, (SECRET)

(b) USCINCEUR 062043Z Apr 91. OPOD Ser 001, Humanitarian Relief Operations (SECRET)

(c) USCINCEUR 162230Z Apr 91. OPOD Ser 002, Temporary Refugee Shelters (SECRET)

(d) USCINCEUR 040900Z Jul 91. OPOD Ser 003, Residual Forces (SECRET)

(e) USCINCEUR 141333Z Sep 91. OPOD Ser 004, Redeployment of Ground Forces (SECRET)

(f) USCINCEUR 141609Z Aug 92. ROE Review for OPC (SECRET)

(g) USCINCEUR 151203Z Oct 92. ROE Request (SECRET)

(h) CTF Provide Comfort/CS 2041-15Z Jul 91, CTF Provide Comfort OPLAN 91-7, Residual Force (SECRET)

(i) PROVIDE COMFORT Airspace Control Order (ACO) and Standing Special Instructions (SPINS), Volume I, Volume II, dated 12 Dec 93.

(j) CFAC/DO letter, undated, Rules of Engagement, (SECRET), with one attached, Aircrew Read File (ARF) 183, ROE/Procedures for Provide Comfort Aircraft (SECRET)

(k) 7440CWP 131400Z Apr 94, Air Tasking Order (ATO), 14 Apr 94 (SECRET)

(l) Battle Staff Directive #1, Change to PC ATO #1103, 14 Apr 94 (SECRET)

(2) AWACS Directives and Publications.

(a) AFR 60-1, Flight Management, Feb 90

(b) MCR 55-33, E-3 Operating Procedures - Aircrews, 3 May 93

(c) ACC Reg 51-60 Vol 2, E-3 Aircrew Training, 1 Jun 92

(d) 522 Operations Group Operating Instruction 60-2, Flying 522 ACW (Deployed) Turkey Operating Procedures, 7 Sep 93

(3) F-15 Directives and Publications.

(a) USAFER 51-50, Vol 7, Tactical Pilot Training F-15, Jun 91

(b) USAFER 60-2, Vol 1, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program Organization and Administration, Jun 89

(c) USAFER 55-115, USAFE 1-15 Pilot Operational Procedures, Jan 87

(d) AFR 160-43, Medical Examinations and Standards, 16 Feb 93

(e) AFR 60-16, General Flight Rules, Jan 92

(4) Black Hawk Directives and Publications

(a) FM 1-302 Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE) for Army Aircrews, dated 30 September 1983.

(b) MCC SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) dated 6 Apr 93, incorporating change dated 19 May 93

(c) Eagle Flight Detachment SOPs, dated 18 Mar 94

3. Statement of Opinion

Under 10 U.S.C. 2254 (D) any opinion of accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT has been a successful coalition effort in response to human rights abuses against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The operation has effectively deterred Iraq from disrupting peace and order in the UN-established security zone.

The 14 April 1994 shoot-down of two US Black Hawk helicopters by two US F-15C aircraft in northern Iraq was caused by a chain of events which began with the breakdown of clear guidance from the Combined Task Force to its component organizations. This resulted in the lack of a clear understanding among the components of their respective responsibilities. Consequently, CTF component organizations did not fully integrate Military Coordination Center helicopter activities with other OPC air operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility. Additionally, OPC personnel did not receive consistent, comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the USEUCOM-directed ROE. As a result, some aircrews' understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied, became over-simplified.

MCC personnel were given a high degree of independence in helicopter operations, without an adequate consideration for the threat of engagement from other OPC aircraft. Neither the CTF staff nor the Combined Forces Air Component staff requested or received timely, detailed flight information on planned MCC helicopter activities in the TAOR. Consequently, the OPC daily Air Tasking Order was published with little detailed information regarding US helicopter flight activities over northern Iraq. Specific information on routes of flights and times of MCC helicopter activity in the TAOR was normally available to the other OPC participants only when AWACS received it from the helicopter crews by radio and relayed the information on.

The AWACS mission crew commander on 14 April 1994, who had flown only one sortie in the previous three months, was not currently qualified in accordance with Air Force regulations. The AWACS weapons controllers, under his supervision, did not have a clear understanding of their individual responsibilities to provide support to MCC helicopters. They shared the common view, along with the CFAC airborne command element officer, that MCC helicopter activities were not an integral part of OPC air operations. There was general misunderstanding throughout OPC organizations regarding the extent to which the provisions of the Airspace Control Order applied to MCC helicopter activities. AWACS personnel did not routinely monitor the Black

Hawk helicopter flights or pass information on those flights to other OPC aircraft. The result was that there was no effective coordination of OPC fixed-wing and helicopter operations within the TAOR.

On 14 April 1994, AWACS controllers were aware that the Black Hawk helicopters had departed Zakhu, and were proceeding east into the TAOR. The F-15 pilots were not aware of the Black Hawk helicopters already in the area. The fighters twice informed AWACS that they had unknown radar contacts in the TAOR. The AWACS mission crew commander, senior weapons director, enroute controller and TAOR controller had access to electronic information regarding the presence of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the F-15s' reported radar contacts. However, there is no evidence that they were aware of, recognized, or responded to this information. They did not advise the F-15 pilots of the presence of friendly aircraft. The helicopters were unable to hear the radio transmissions between the F-15 flight and AWACS because they were on a different radio frequency.

The F-15 pilots attempted to electronically identify the radar contacts by interrogating the ATO-designated IFF Mode I and Mode IV aircraft codes. The helicopter crew members were apparently not aware of the correct Mode I code specified for use within the TAOR and had the Mode I code specified for use outside the TAOR in their IFF transponders. The result was that the F-15s did not receive a Mode I response. When the lead F-15 pilot interrogated the IFF Mode IV code, he received a momentary friendly response. However, on two subsequent attempts, no Mode IV response was received. The F-15 wingman attempted one Mode IV interrogation and received no response.

The reason for the unsuccessful Mode IV interrogation attempts cannot be established, but was probably attributable to one or more of the following factors: both F-15 pilots may have selected the incorrect interrogation mode; both F-15 Air-to-Air Interrogators (AAIs) may have incorrectly processed the Black Hawks' transponder signals; both helicopter IFF transponder codes may have been loaded incorrectly; there may have been "garbling" of the friendly Black Hawks' IFF responses, produced by two helicopters using the same code in close proximity to each other; there may have been intermittent loss of line-of-sight radar contact between the F-15s and the helicopters, due to mountainous terrain and the Black Hawks' low-altitude, which could have precluded a successful Mode IV interrogation.

When the F-15 pilots were unable to get positive/consistent IFF responses they performed an intercept in order to visually identify the "unknown" aircraft. They each made a single identification pass on the Black Hawks. However, the identification passes were accomplished at speeds, altitudes and distances where it was unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the Black Hawks' markings. Neither F-15 pilot had received recent, adequate visual recognition training. The pilots did not recognize the differences between the US Black Hawk helicopters with wing-mounted fuel tanks and Hind helicopters with wing-mounted weapons. The F-15 flight lead misidentified the US Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind helicopters. Following his identification pass, he asked his wingman to confirm the identification. The wingman, who was a senior squadron supervisor and instructor pilot, saw two helicopters, but did not positively identify them as Hinds. The wingman did not notify the flight lead that he had been unable to make a positive

identification, and allowed the engagement to continue. The flight lead, acting within the specified ROE, fired a single missile and shot down the trail Black Hawk helicopter. At flight lead's direction, the F-15 wingman also fired a single missile and shot down the lead Black Hawk helicopter.


JAMES G. ANDRUS
Maj Gen, USAF
Board President

FOOTNOTES

- 1 TAB Y1; Y2
- 2 TAB AC8i
- 3 TAB AC8j
- 4 TAB AC8i; V92/Q92
- 5 TAB AC8d
- 6 TAB AA9
- 7 TAB AA9/p2, para 5A1 (compare AA24, Annex F, para 2E)
- 8 JCS Pub 02, 21 Apr 89/p3-9
- 9 TAB AA9/tab14; V92/Q8
- 10 JCS Pub 02, 21 Apr 89, p3-17, para 3-16
- 11 TAB AA9/tab7, para 1A1
- 12 TAB AA9/p3, para 4D4
- 13 TAB AA9/p2, para 3H, 3Q2
- 14 TAB AA9/tab14
- 15 TAB AA9/tab8, para 1A1 ,3H5
- 16 TAB V33/Q11; V100A/Q8
- 17 TAB AA9/tab8, para 3P2
- 18 TAB V116/p1-3
- 19 TAB V116/p1, para 4
- 20 JCS Pub 02, 21 Apr 1989
- 21 TAB V33/Q8,9
- 22 TAB V33/Q9
- 23 TAB V97/Q6
- 24 TAB AA9/tab3, para 3G5
- 25 TAB AA9/p5, para 2E; V34/Q11,12
- 26 TAB V34/Q6,11,20
- 27 TAB V34/Q47,50,51; V32/Q10,12
- 28 TAB V34/Q54
- 29 TAB V32/Q7,31,32
- 30 TAB V32/Q21; V80/Q58; V92/Q23
- 31 TAB V80/Q22
- 32 TAB V32/Q26,67; AA3
- 33 See TAB AA29
- 34 TAB AA25; AA29
- 35 TAB V34/Q20; V80/Q25
- 36 TAB AA1
- 37 TAB AA9/p3, para 4D4; p4, para 2D; K3a
- 38 TAB AA9/p3, para 4D3
- 39 TAB K3a
- 40 TAB V109/Q17; AA18/p1-2
- 41 TAB AA9/p4, para 2C
- 42 TAB V100A/Q43,45-47,53
- 43 TAB AA9/p4, para 2C
- 44 TAB V95/p1, para 2; V97/Q11
- 45 TAB K3a; AA1; AA9
- 46 TAB K3a; AA9

-
- 47 TAB AA9/tab14, Annex F, para 2b
 - 48 TAB K3a; V92/Q10,13
 - 49 TAB V26/Q49,64; O3D, Atch 8
 - 50 TAB K3a; K3d
 - 51 TAB AA9/p5, para 2G1
 - 52 TAB AA1/Vol II/p8, para 16C
 - 53 TAB AA1; V29/Q45; V28/Q13
 - 54 TAB K3a; K3d
 - 55 TAB O3d, Atch 6; AA9/p5, para 2K
 - 56 TAB AA4/para 5-3; V14/Q43
 - 57 TAB O3d, Atch 6,8
 - 58 TAB O3d, Atch 6,8
 - 59 TAB O3d, Atch 6,8
 - 60 TAB AA4/para5-3b; V18/Q8; V21/Q69
 - 61 TAB AA9/p6, para 2K
 - 62 TAB AA19/OG OI 55-7
 - 63 TAB V92/Q16,17,18
 - 64 TAB K3a; K3d
 - 65 TAB K3a; K3d; AC3e
 - 66 TAB K3a; AA1
 - 67 TAB K3a; K3b; MCM 3-1, Vol IV, para 1-1
 - 68 TAB V29/Q29; AA1/p8, para 16C; AC4h
 - 69 TAB AA-24, Annex F, para 2J2
 - 70 TAB K3a; K3b
 - 71 TAB AA12/p1, para 1; p2, para 2
 - 72 TAB V69/p1, para 3
 - 73 TAB V32/Q21,67-68; V62/Q274; V34/Q24-25; V92/Q23; AA1; K3a; AA3; V80/Q58
 - 74 TAB V28/Q200; V29/Q165
 - 75 TAB V80/Q107-109,176,188-193; V30/Q22-40; V62/Q102
 - 76 TAB AA3; V80/Q188-193; V30/Q37; V62/Q110-112
 - 77 TAB AA3
 - 78 See V30/Q21-40(interview continuation); V31/Q22-25,28-29,39,41,47,66-68, 86-91; V80/Q176, 183-193; V62/Q102-103, 107-111, 128; V28/Q204/223; V29/Q181-190
 - 79 TAB V33/Q11; V34/Q90-93; V97A/Q54; V108/Q27; V116/p1-2; V112/Q63-66; V100A/Q29-30
 - 80 TAB V33/Q216-221
 - 81 TAB V92/Q10,13,29-30,121
 - 82 TAB V97/Q5; V97A/Q79,81; V106/Q7,18
 - 83 TAB V34/Q30; V80/Q83; V92/Q12; V117/Q27
 - 84 TAB V80/Q83; V96/Q86-93; V109/Q18
 - 85 TAB V95/p1, para 2
 - 86 TAB V32/Q53,54,63; V92/Q10
 - 87 TAB K3a; K3d
 - 88 TAB AA19/p2, para2C(3)
 - 89 TAB V26/Q31,35
 - 90 TAB AA16
 - 91 TAB V117/Q64,71-73; V96/Q49
 - 92 TAB V69/p2, para 2; V100/Q11; V117/Q34,60; V33/Q41
 - 93 TAB V28/Q13,77; V29/Q84
 - 94 TAB V97/Q17,24; V96/Q18,23-24; V100A/Q25,67
 - 95 TAB V97/Q17,20-21,24
 - 96 TAB V97/Q24,25; V96/Q30-31; V109/Q19
 - 97 TAB K3a

-
- 98 TAB V58/p3, para2; V97/Q27; AC8f
 - 99 TAB V32/Q46; V97A/Q10; V97/Q27
 - 100 TAB V2B/Q18; V111/p2, para2
 - 101 TAB AC1e
 - 102 TAB V69B/item 69b
 - 103 TAB AC1e
 - 104 TAB V109/Q26
 - 105 TAB AC8f; K1; K3a; V110/Q140; V26/Q31; V76/Q71-73
 - 106 TAB V2B/Q13; V2A/Q52,55
 - 107 TAB V28/Q226; V29/Q24,25,32
 - 108 TAB V26/p 35-38; V29/Q32-33; V28/Q226
 - 109 TAB V26/Q84-86; V28/Q76-77; V29/Q110-111
 - 110 TAB K3a
 - 111 TAB V93/Q24; V14/Q67
 - 112 TAB K3c
 - 113 TAB AA1; K3a; K3b
 - 114 TAB AC3e
 - 115 TAB K3c
 - 116 TAB V10/Q12-13; V14/Q116; V16/Q59; V11/p1, para 5
 - 117 TAB V14/Q357; V48/p10, para 2
 - 118 TAB V14/Q357; V48/p10, para 2
 - 119 TAB AC3b; AC3e
 - 120 TAB V16/Q135-136; AC3b
 - 121 TAB AA1, Vol II, para 16f
 - 122 TAB V48/p9, para 4-5; V14A/Q15-16, 58; V50A/Q43-44
 - 123 TAB V16A/Q18-21; N3,p9; V69/p2, para 5
 - 124 TAB V9/p1, para 4; W3
 - 125 TAB O3d,para IVc; V13/Q40
 - 126 TAB O3d,para IVc; V93/Q17; V19/p3, para 3; V14/Q61-64; V13/Q40
 - 127 TAB AA4; V13A/Q68-74
 - 128 TAB O7a
 - 129 AFR 60-1
 - 130 TAB O7a
 - 131 TAB V13/Q70-73; V93/Q68; K6
 - 132 TAB V93/Q68; V14A/Q2; AC3i
 - 133 TAB V13/Q70; K6
 - 134 TAB V93/Q67-68
 - 135 TAB V13A/Q3-4
 - 136 TAB AC3i; V13A/Q3
 - 137 TAB AC3f; V93/Q68-69
 - 138 TAB V13A/Q4; V93/Q70
 - 139 TAB AC3i; V93/Q68
 - 140 TAB AC3i; V93/Q68; K3d
 - 141 TAB AC3i; K3a; K3b; K3d
 - 142 TAB AC3i; V13A/Q3-4
 - 143 TAB H3a; V6/p1, para 4
 - 144 TAB AC3e
 - 145 TAB AC3d
 - 146 TAB AA23/p7; AC3e; AC3g/p1
 - 147 TAB AC3e
 - 148 TAB AA4/para5-3a(2)(d)
 - 149 TAB AC3d

150 TAB AC3e
151 TAB V18/Q34,41; O3f/p12
152 TAB O10
153 TAB O3f/p6
154 TAB O3f/p9
155 TAB O3f/p5
156 TAB O3f/p5; Z4a
157 TAB V16/Q72-73,142; VZ4B1-2; N3; V16A/Q17
158 TAB V16/Q72
159 TAB V16/Q81
160 TAB O3f/p6
161 TAB O3f/p6
162 TAB O3f/p6; V16/Q74
163 TAB V24/p1, para 4; O3f/p7
164 TAB AA1, Vol II, para 30
165 TAB O3f/p8, Atch 5; Z4b2; V16/Q72-82,147
166 TAB V16A/Q15; V14/Q117
167 TAB O3f/p7; V14/Q109
168 TAB AC4e
169 TAB O3f/p7
170 TAB N3/p9; V14/Q113-114; V16A/Q16-18; V16/Q142
171 TAB V16A/Q18-19
172 TAB O3f/p7; V16A/Q16; V114/Q118
173 TAB V16A/Q7-8; V14/Q72-75
174 TAB V16A/Q7-8; V14/Q72, 74
175 TAB V14A/Q16,58,61
176 TAB AC3b; V14A/Q18
177 TAB N3/p6-15
178 TAB Z4c1-9
179 TAB Z4c9; R2
180 TAB R1; Z4c10; V16/Q187
181 TAB O3f/p10-11
182 TAB O3f/p10-11
183 TAB V16A/Q18-22
184 TAB Z4d1-2; O3f/p8
185 TAB O3f/p10
186 TAB O3f/p8
187 TAB N3/p12
188 TAB V29/Q33
189 TAB N3/p13; V29/Q33; V28/Q13; Z4e
190 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q33; V14/Q204
191 TAB V29/Q33; V16/Q9
192 TAB O3f,p10-11
193 TAB V28/Q13,61; V29/Q33; V14/Q108,113,134,184
194 TAB O3f/p8; V14/Q88-89
195 TAB O3f/p8; Z4f1-4
196 TAB V29/Q34-37; R2
197 TAB V28/Q13,76; V17/Q170; V14/Q209-210
198 TAB N3,p13-15; V21/Q44
199 TAB Z4g1-7
200 TAB V23/p1, para 4; O3e/p2
201 TAB AA31

202 TAB V14/Q221,285; V16/Q172; V18/Q19,20,22-24,26,29,53; V19/p1, para 6; V20/p1, para 5; V21/Q28;
V17/Q170,188
203 TAB Z4g4-7; V14/Q317,318,321,329
204 TAB O3f/p8,11
205 TAB N3,p6-15; V28/Q13,76; V29/Q33-37; V16/Q174, 213
206 TAB Z4g1-6
207 TAB Z4g6; Z4h1-3
208 TAB V17/Q170; V29/Q37-38; R2
209 MCM Vol I/pA1-6, A1-8
210 TAB Z4g6
211 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q37; N3/p13-15
212 TAB V19/p2, para 3; V20/p2, para 1; V21/Q24-25; V16/Q118; V17/Q74
213 TAB AA4 (MCR 55-33, para 5-3b(3)(a))
214 TAB AA4 (MCR 55-33, para 5-3a(2))
215 TAB V16/Q86; AA4 (MCR 55-33, para 5-2c(2))
216 TAB V21/Q39; V22/p1, para 4
217 TAB O3f/p9; Z4h2
218 TAB O3f/p10-11
219 TAB Z4h2
220 TAB V29/Q38; N3/p15
221 TAB Z4h3-7
222 TAB N3/Ltr 25 May 94, para 5a and Appendix A, Time Point 0728Z
223 TAB V28/Q137
224 TAB V29/Q42
225 TAB V28/Q155; V29/Q45; AC3c
226 TAB V28/Q66,76,157
227 TAB AC3a/p2-3
228 TAB AC3a
229 TAB AC3g
230 TAB AC3e
231 TAB AC3e
232 TAB AC3a/p6
233 TAB K3a
234 TAB AC4d
235 TAB K3a; K3b; K3d; AA1
236 TAB K3a
237 TAB K3a; K3b; K3d
238 TAB AC4d, AFR 60-16
239 TAB AC4g; V28/Q192, V29/Q158
240 TAB V28/Q186,197; V29/Q159,164
241 TAB O7a, Atch 4
242 TAB O7a, Atch 4
243 TAB V29/Q23; O7a, Atch 4
244 AFR 60-1, para 7-6
245 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q23
246 TAB AC4d; V28/Q13; V29/Q23
247 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q23; V2A/Q4
248 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q24; V2A/Q52
249 TAB V2A/Q52,56-57; V2B/Q5,18; V62/Q264
250 TAB V28/Q13,23; V29/Q24
251 TAB V29/Q90; MCR 55-115; V28/Q13
252 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q30

253 TAB V28/Q25-26; V29/Q25
254 MCM 3-1, Vol I
255 TAB V28/Q40; V29/Q30
256 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q30; V36/Q28; V41/p2, para4,5
257 TAB H4b; H5b
258 TAB H4a; H5a; V36/Q28; V41/p2, para4,5
259 TAB V28/Q49; V29/Q32
260 TAB V28/Q48; V36/Q28; V41/p2, para 4-6; V29/Q30
261 TAB V29/Q32
262 TAB V28/Q13,53; V29/Q32
263 TAB AC4e
264 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q32
265 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q32-33
266 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q34
267 TAB V29/Q34; R2
268 TAB V29/Q35
269 TAB V29/Q35
270 TAB V29/Q35; R2
271 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q37
272 TAB V29/Q37
273 TAB V28/Q13
274 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q37-38
275 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q37-38; R2
276 TAB V28/Q13,78
277 TAB V29/Q38
278 TAB V29/Q38; O9/p1,4; R2
279 TAB R2
280 TAB R3
281 TAB V29/Q38
282 TAB V29/Q38,41; R2
283 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q38
284 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q41
285 TAB V28/Q13,120
286 TAB V29/Q41
287 TAB V28/Q13,137; V29/Q135
288 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q42
289 TAB V29/Q42,45; R2
290 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q45; V65/p1, para 5
291 TAB V28/Q13; V65/p1, para 6; R7; R8
292 TAB V28/Q28; V29/Q53
293 TAB V28/Q13
294 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q45
295 TAB V28/Q178; V29/Q153
296 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q45
297 TAB V28/Q13; V29/Q157
298 TAB V28/Q188; V29/Q46; AC4e
299 TAB AC11
300 TAB AC8
301 TAB K1; V51/p1, para 6
302 TAB K1; AA1, Vol II, para 14A/B
303 TAB K1
304 TAB K1; AA1

305 TAB V59/p2, para 2
306 TAB N3; AC1c; AC8c/p1; V74/p2, para 2
307 TAB J1c; J2c
308 TAB AA10/p3-18.1.2.3
309 TAB AA26/p1-50
310 TAB AA26/p1-50; J3b; V50B/p1, para 4; V46/p5, para 1
311 TAB V59/p1, para 4; V49/p2, para 2
312 TAB J1c; J2c
313 TAB W1; W2
314 TAB V50/p1, para 3
315 TAB V58/p3, para 2; V50A/Q32
316 TAB V58/p2, para 6, p3, para 2-3; T1e
317 TAB O7a
318 TAB 07a; AC1d
319 AR40-1
320 TAB AA15/p1; AC1b
321 TAB AC1b
322 TAB AA8; V74/p1 para 2-3
323 TAB AA8; AC1b; V58/p3, para 1
324 TAB V50/p2, para 7; V48/p6, para 5; V104/p7 para 6; V104A/p2 para 1
325 TAB Z4b
326 TAB AA8; T1e; K1; W2; V51/p1, para 6
327 TAB K1; AC1d; V51/p1, para 6
328 TAB V55/p2, para 3; V56/p2, para 2
329 TAB V104/p5, para 7
330 TAB V55/p2, para 2
331 TAB K1; AC1c; V59/p1, para 4
332 TAB V60/p4, para 4; V59/p1, para 4
333 TAB V16/Q72-73,142, 147; N3; O3f/p8, Atch 5; V69/p2, para 3-5
334 TAB V69/p2, para 2,3
335 TAB V33/Q142
336 TAB V48/p9, para 3; V50A/Q54,56
337 TAB V69/p2, para 3; AC8c/p1
338 TAB V69/p2, para 3
339 TAB V69/p2, para4; AC1a
340 TAB AA10/p 8-2,8-9
341 TAB V48/p15, para 2; V104/p8, para 4,6; p9, para 5
342 TAB V69/p2, para 5
343 TAB N3, p8-9; V14/Q113,184; V16A/Q18-21; V69/p2, para 5; AC1f
344 TAB V100/Q16
345 TAB AA1, Vol II, para 16I
346 TAB AC1f
347 TAB V100/Q16
348 TAB R1
349 TAB Z4b
350 TAB K3a
351 TAB O3f/p8; K3a
352 TAB AA1/p2, para 30
353 TAB O3f/p6
354 TAB AC3c/p1; O9/p1,3
355 TAB O9/p1; V65/p1, para 5; V66/p1, para 5
356 TAB O9/p1; V29/Q45; AC3c

357 TAB V65/p1, para 5; V66/p1, para 5
358 TAB O9 (Crash Site #1)
359 TAB O9 (Crash Site #1); R7
360 TAB O9 (Crash Site #2)
361 TAB O9 (Crash Site #2); V65/p2, para 1
362 TAB V28/Q13; AC3c
363 TAB V65/p1, para 6
364 TAB O9 (Crash Site #2)
365 TAB O9 (Crash Site #2)
366 TAB O9 (Crash Site #2); R8
367 TAB AA10/p9-3
368 TAB AA10/9-3
369 TAB O7a; X
370 TAB T1d
371 TAB V69B/p1
372 TAB T1c; T1d
373 TAB O7a; X
374 TAB AC8b
375 TAB AC8g
376 TAB AC8c/p3
377 TAB AC8b/p3
378 TAB V78/p3, para 4; AC8b/p4,6
379 TAB V78/p3, para 2
380 TAB AC8b/p4-5; AC8g; AC3e; V62/Q230-231
381 TAB AC8b/p6
382 TAB AC8c/p4
383 TAB AC8g
384 TAB AC8g; V42/p4, para 2
385 TAB AC8h
386 TAB O3e/p5, para 3
387 TAB O3e/p5, para 3
388 TAB O3e,p5, para 2
389 TAB AC3h
390 TAB V16/Q196-198; V17/Q196-197; V14/Q270,277-280,283
391 TAB N3
392 TAB O3e/p4, para 3
393 TAB O3e/p4, para 6
394 TAB O5a/p2; O5b/p3
395 TAB O4a/p2; O4b/p3
396 TAB O4b/p5; O5b/p5; O4a/p2; O5a/p2
397 TAB V28/Q195,197; V29/Q154,159,164
398 TAB O4a/p2, para 3; O5a/p2, para 3
399 TAB V30/Q20-22; V29/Q32; V31/Q16
400 TAB O5b/p3
401 TAB O5b/p3
402 TAB O5b/p4
403 TAB O5b/p3
404 TAB V3B/p1, para 5,6; V28/Q13; V62/Q54
405 TAB O4b/p3
406 TAB O4b/p3
407 TAB O4b/p4
408 TAB H1; H2

409 TAB H1c
410 TAB H1d
411 TAB H1b
412 TAB H1b
413 TAB H2c
414 TAB H2d
415 TAB H2b
416 TAB H2b
417 TAB V54/p3, para 1; V56/p1, para 2-3
418 TAB O1a/p2; O2a/p2
419 TAB T1b; T2b
420 TAB V59/p1, para 2-3; V60/p1, para 2-3; V61/p1, para 2-3
421 TAB V48/p7, para2
422 TAB O1a, Atch 2
423 TAB O1a/p4; O2a/p4
424 TAB O1a/p5; O2a/p5
425 TAB O1a, Atch 1
426 TAB J1e
427 TAB O1a, Atch 1
428 TAB J1d
429 TAB O2a, Atch 1
430 TAB J2e
431 TAB O11/p18, para 2
432 TAB O11/p18, para 4
433 TAB O10, Atch 2,3
434 TAB O11, Atch 2
435 TAB O10/p2, para 2
436 TAB O10/p2, para 4
437 TAB O10/p21-22
438 TAB O11/p21, para 2-3
439 TAB O11/p19, para 1
440 TAB O11/p9, para 4
441 TAB J2g
442 TAB O11/p11, para 2
443 TAB O11/p14, para 4
444 TAB T3a; T3b; AA5/p8, table 1-1
445 TAB T3a; T3f
446 TAB V93/Q16
447 TAB V14/Q66,69; V16/Q29; V17/Q31; V18/Q17; V21/Q66
448 TAB T3a/p4; T3b/p1
449 TAB T3b/p2
450 TAB T3a/p4
451 TAB AA5/p8, para 1-8f
452 TAB T3b/p4
453 TAB AA5/p19, para4-12a(4); T3b/p5,11
454 TAB AA5/p29, para A2-9/p30, para A2-21
455 TAB T3b/p5,11
456 TAB T3b/p5
457 TAB T3b/p5,6,11,13; AA5/p8, table 1-1
458 TAB T3b/p5
459 TAB K3c
460 TAB K3c; V13/Q5,13-14

461 TAB T3a/p4; T3c/p1
462 TAB T3c/p4-5
463 TAB T3c/p6-7
464 TAB T3c/p8-9
465 TAB T3c/p10-11
466 TAB T3c/p11-12
467 TAB T3c/p13-15
468 TAB T3c/p16-17
469 TAB T3c/p18-19
470 TAB T3c/p20-22
471 TAB T3a/p5; T3d/p1-2
472 TAB T3d/p3
473 TAB T3d/p4
474 TAB T3d/p5-8
475 TAB T3d/p9-10
476 TAB T3d/p11-20
477 TAB T3d/p21-22
478 TAB T3d/p23-26
479 TAB T3d/p27-29
480 TAB T3a/p5; T3e/p1,2
481 TAB T3e/p3
482 TAB T3e/p4-13
483 TAB T3e/p14-16
484 TAB T3f/p1
485 TAB AA5/p13, para 4-5a(4)(a)
486 TAB T3a/p8
487 TAB T3f/p1; AA5/p13, para 4-5a(4)(a); p19, para 4-12a(3)(a)
488 TAB K3c; V13/Q5; T3a/p4; T3g/p2-3
489 TAB T3g/p4-5
490 TAB K3c; V13/Q5
491 TAB T3g/p6-7; K3c
492 TAB T3g/p8
493 TAB T3g/p1
494 TAB O3a; O3b
495 TAB O3c
496 TAB O3d/p1-2
497 TAB O3d/p1
498 TAB O3d, Atch 6
499 TAB O3d/p3, Atch 8,9
500 TAB O3d/p3, Atch 11
501 TAB T4a/p1; T5e
502 TAB T5h/p3-4
503 TAB T5f/p1
504 TAB T5f/p1
505 TAB T5f/p1
506 TAB T5b/p1; V29/Q127
507 TAB T4a/p1
508 TAB T4a; MCR 51-50, Chap 4, 1 Jun 93; USAFER 51-50, Vol XXX, 15 Nov 91
509 TAB T4a/p1; T4h/p1-2
510 TAB T4h/p3-10; T4e
511 TAB T4h/p11-12
512 TAB T4e; T4f/p1,2

513 TAB T4a
514 TAB T4h/p13,14
515 TAB T4f/p1
516 TAB T4i/p1
517 TAB T4f/p2
518 TAB T4f/p1
519 TAB T4a/p2; MCR 51-50, Chap 4, 1 Jun 93; USAFER 51-50, Vol XXX, 15 Nov 91
520 TAB T4a/p2
521 TAB T4a/p2; MCR 51-50, Chap 4, 1 Jun 93; USAFER 51-50, Vol XXX, 15 Nov 91
522 TAB AA27/p1
523 TAB AA28/p2
524 TAB AA22/p2
525 TAB V28/Q263; V29/Q234
526 TAB V28/Q263; V29/Q234
527 TAB V28/Q265; V29/Q235-236; V63/p1; V71/p1
528 TAB V118/p2, para 5-6
529 TAB V28/Q215,217; AC6c
530 TAB V29/Q141
531 TAB V28/Q270
532 TAB AC7c
533 TAB O7a/p1
534 TAB O7a/p1
535 TAB O7a/p1
536 TAB O7a/p1, Atch 1
537 TAB V37
538 TAB O7a/p1
539 TAB O7a, Atch 7
540 TAB O7a/p1
541 TAB O7a/p1
542 TAB O7a/p1
543 TAB O7a/p1
544 TAB O7a, Atch 3
545 TAB O7a/p1
546 TAB O7a/p1, Atch 4
547 TAB O7a/p12
548 TAB X
549 TAB O7a/p12-13; AR95-1; AR40-1
550 TAB O7a/p1,12
551 TAB O6/p2-3
552 TAB V13/Q324,328-330; V14/Q188; V16/Q96-98,143,145
553 TAB O6/p3-4
554 TAB O6/p4
555 TAB V14/Q185-187; V16/Q201; V16A/Q18-20; V17/Q130-131
556 TAB O7a, Atch 9
557 TAB V93/Q16
558 TAB O7a/p1
559 TAB O6/p4-5
560 TAB O6/p5-7
561 TAB V28/Q66,76; V29/Q33
562 TAB V29/Q122; V28/Q13
563 TAB O6/p5
564 TAB V28/Q13,122-123; V29/Q141; V48/p3 para4; V50/Q22

565 TAB V48/p4, para 3; V49/p4, para 6
566 TAB O8/p14-15
567 TAB O8/p14-15, Atch 1
568 TAB O8/p14-15, Atch 1; R7-8
569 TAB V29/Q99-100; O8/p10
570 TAB O8/p10,16
571 TAB O8/p8-10,16; V29/Q38
572 TAB O8/p4, 12-13
573 TAB O6/p5
574 TAB V48/p4, para 4/p9, para 2; V50/Q51,54; V51/p2, para 7
575 TAB V46/p3 para5; V48/p10 para3; V50/Q29,72,74; V51/p2 para9
576 TAB V50/Q103
577 TAB AC8a
578 TAB W3
579 TAB W1
580 TAB V28/Q13; K3a
581 TAB AB4

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

VOLUME 3

TABS A thru H

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

COPY

15

OF

16

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
- B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
- D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
- E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
- H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
- I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
- J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
- K Military Flight Plans**
- L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms**
- M Certificate of Damage**
- N Transcripts of Recorded Communications**

A

USAF MISHAP REPORT

(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)

1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Day, Month and Year) 14 April 1994	2. VEHICLE(S) OR MATERIEL INVOLVED (Model designation and serial no. if applicable) F-15C/84-0025 UH-60A/87-26000 F-15C/79-0025 E-3B/77-0351 UH-60A/88-02060	3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY (Base Code and Report Serial No.)
--	---	--

4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE, STATE, COUNTY, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN, IF ON BASE, IDENTIFY, IF OFF BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE. 3646.1N 4405.3E	5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE LOCAL 0730Z	6. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> DAWN <input type="checkbox"/> DUSK
--	--	--

7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING OR OWNING VEHICLE OR MATERIEL AT TIME OF MISHAP						
MAJOR COMMAND USAFE USAREUR	SUBCOMD OR AF 17AF V Corps	AIR DIVISION 159 Avn Regt	WING 52FW 6th BN	GROUP	SQ OR UNIT 53 FS C CO	NAME & BASE CODE Spangdahlem Giebelstadt

8. (List organizations of second vehicle, if they differ from Item 7 above)

ACC	12 AF		552ACW		963 AWACS	Tinker AFB
-----	-------	--	--------	--	-----------	------------

9. ORGANIZATION AND BASE SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not abbreviate)

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED
(See AFR 127-2 for specific instructions)

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL	GRADE	SSAN	ASSIGNED DUTY	AERO RATING	DEGREE INJURY (Use Abbr)	DAYS LOST ON TT ONLY
Control Witness #25		Data Masked	Pilot, F-15C	P	N	
Control Witness #26		Data Masked	Pilot, F-15C	P	N	
McKenna, Patrick M.	Capt		Pilot, UH60A	P	F	
Garrett, John W.	CW2		Pilot, UH60A	P	F	
Hall, Michael A.	CW2		Pilot, UH60A	P	F	
Mounsey, Erik S.	WO1		Pilot, UH60A	P	F	
Bass, Cornelius A.	SPC		Crew, UH60A	G	F	
Colbert, Jeffrey C.	SPC		Crew, UH60A	CC	F	

1 (Enter applicable letter(s) in DEGREE INJURY column. None-N; Temporary Total-TT; Permanent Partial-PP; Permanent Total-PT; Fatal-F; Missing-M)

11. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF CIRCUMSTANCES. GIVE A DETAILED HISTORY OF FLIGHT OR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE MISHAP. THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE "ANALYSIS PART" OF THE REPORT. ANALYSIS OF AND CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS OBTAINED ONLY IN THE INTEREST OF MISHAP PREVENTION WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY.

See attached summary of circumstances.

Item 10. (cont.)

Robinson, Michael S.	SPC	Crew, UH60A	CC	F
Ellner, Mark A.	PFC	Crew, UH60A	G	F
Normal E-3B--See Crew Orders				N

12. AUTHENTICATION			
CERTIFICATION BY (Title)	TYPED NAME AND GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE

Item 11. Factual Summary of Circumstances

On 14 April 1994, two US Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters assigned to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) were tasked to support the Combined Task Force, Military Coordination Center (MCC). The helicopters were to transport the US and Turkish co-commanders of the MCC and other staff officers to the Kurdish towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, both of which are in the OPC Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in northern Iraq. Concurrently, a USAF E-3B Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft was tasked to provide airborne threat warning and control for OPC aircraft in the TAOR.

Additionally, two F-15C fighter aircraft were tasked to conduct a defensive counter air mission in the TAOR. Shortly after entering the TAOR, the F-15s detected the two Black Hawk helicopters on radar, but were unable to determine the identity of the helicopters through electronic means. The F-15s performed an intercept and each fighter made a visual identification pass to determine the helicopters' identity. The Black Hawk helicopters were misidentified as Iraqi Hind, (NATO designation) attack helicopters. Based on the misidentification, the F-15 pilots engaged and shot down the two Black Hawk helicopters with air-to-air missiles. The helicopters were destroyed and all personnel on-board were killed.

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
- B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
- D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
- E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
- H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
- I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
- J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
- K Military Flight Plans**
- L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms**
- M Certificate of Damage**
- N Transcripts of Recorded Communications**

A

E

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
- B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
- D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
- E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
- H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
- I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
- J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
- K Military Flight Plans** **A**
- L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms** **B**
- M Certificate of Damage** **C**
- N Transcripts of Recorded Communications**

TAB C

AF FORM 711b

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

C-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

C-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

C-3 E-3B AWACS

C-4 F-15C 79-0025

C-5 F-15C 84-0025

C-1

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

(To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. Appropriate items only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)

1. MISHAP CLASS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> DEST	2. ACFT MDS & SERIAL NO. UH-60A 88-26060	3. DATE 14 Apr 94	4. UNIT CONTROL NO.	5. ACFT ASSIGNMENT/STATUS CODE USAREUR(Not Applicable)
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) ¹				
OPERATOR AT CONTROLS				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS McKenna, P.		B. COMPONENT U.S. Army		
C. <u>Unknown</u> POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP		D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED USAREUR, V Corps 159th Avn Regt, 6th BN, C CO		G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING OPC,CTF, Eagle Flight Det		
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Garrett, J.		B. COMPONENT U.S. Army		
C. <u>Unknown</u> POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP		D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED USAREUR, V Corps 159th Avn Regt, 6th BN, C CO		G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING OPC, CTF, Eagle Flight Det		
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS		B. COMPONENT		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP		D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED		G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING		
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS		B. COMPONENT		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP		D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED		G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING		
CLEARANCE				
FROM Diyarbikir Turkey to Zacho			TO TAOR and Return	
<input type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> IFR	<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FT TO FT	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT
<input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS		<input type="checkbox"/> NO CLEARANCE		<input type="checkbox"/> NA
11. DURATION OF FLIGHT		12. TYPE OF MISSION		13. ALTITUDE/ELEVATION
HOURS 1	TENTHS 9	Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Support Mission (Passengers)		Contour Altitudes
14. PHASE OF OPERATION In-flight--low level		15. TYPE OF MISHAP Inadvertent shoot-down of friendly helicopters		
16. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMC <input type="checkbox"/> SIMULATED IMC <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSITION <input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/> ON TOP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR IN IMC CONDITIONS				
17. N/A AIRFIELD DATA APPLICABLE TO TAKEOFF AND LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN 2 MILES OF AIRFIELD				
A. FIELD ELEVATION (Feet)		B. COMPOSITION OF RUNWAY <input type="checkbox"/> ASPHALT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCRETE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)		
C. LENGTH OF RUNWAY (Feet)	D. RUNWAY HEADING	E. DISTANCE OF TOUCHDOWN FROM RUNWAY (Feet)	F. SURFACE CONDITION <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> WET <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)	
G. LENGTH OF OVERRUN	H. COMPOSITION OF OVERRUN (Specify)	I. BARRIER TYPE USED LOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
J. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OCCURENCE (For example, type of instrument or lighting approach used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross weight, forced landing)				

¹ If more than four pilots are involved (Flight Crew) report same information required on additional sheet for each

TAB C

AF FORM 711b

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

C-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

C-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

C-3 E-3B AWACS

C-4 F-15C 79-0025

C-5 F-15C 84-0025

C-1

C-2

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

(To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. Appropriate items only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)

1. MISHAP CLASS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> DEST		2. ACFT MOS & SERIAL NO. UH-60A 87-26000		3. DATE 14 Apr 94		4. UNIT CONTROL NO.		5. ACFT ASSIGNMENT/STATUS CODE USAREUR(Not Applicable)	
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) ¹									
OPERATOR AT CONTROLS									
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Hall, M.					B. COMPONENT U.S. Army				
C. Unknown POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP					D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE		
FRONT SEAT	LEFT SEAT	REAR SEAT	RIGHT SEAT	JUMP SEAT					
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED USAREUR, V Corps 159th Avn Regt, 6th BN, C CO					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING OPC, CTF, Eagle Flight Det				
OTHER PILOT									
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Mounsey, E.					B. COMPONENT U.S. Army				
C. Unknown POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP					D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE		
FRONT SEAT	LEFT SEAT	REAR SEAT	RIGHT SEAT	JUMP SEAT					
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED USAREUR, V Corps 159th Avn Regt, 6th BN, C CO					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING OPC, CTF, Eagle Flight Det				
OTHER PILOT									
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT				
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP					D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE		
FRONT SEAT	LEFT SEAT	REAR SEAT	RIGHT SEAT	JUMP SEAT					
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING				
OTHER PILOT									
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT				
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP					D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE		
FRONT SEAT	LEFT SEAT	REAR SEAT	RIGHT SEAT	JUMP SEAT					
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING				
CLEARANCE									
FROM Diyarbakir, Turkey to Zacho					TO TAOR and Return				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> IFR	<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FT TO FT	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT	<input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS	<input type="checkbox"/> NO CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/> NA		
11. DURATION OF FLIGHT				12. TYPE OF MISSION			13. ALTITUDE/ELEVATION		
HOURS 1		TENTHS 9		Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Support Mission (Passengers)			Contour Altitudes		
14. PHASE OF OPERATION In-flight--low level					15. TYPE OF MISHAP Inadvertent shoot-down of friendly helicopter				
16. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMC <input type="checkbox"/> SIMULATED IMC <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSITION <input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/> ON TOP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR IN IMC CONDITIONS									
17. N/A AIRFIELD DATA APPLICABLE TO TAKEOFF AND LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN 2 MILES OF AIRFIELD									
A. FIELD ELEVATION (Feet)				B. COMPOSITION OF RUNWAY <input type="checkbox"/> ASPHALT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCRETE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)					
C. LENGTH OF RUNWAY (Feet)		D. RUNWAY HEADING		E. DISTANCE OF TOUCHDOWN FROM RUNWAY (Feet)		F. SURFACE CONDITION <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> WET <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)			
G. LENGTH OF OVERRUN		H. COMPOSITION OF OVERRUN (Specify)		I. BARRIER TYPE	USED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	LOCATION			
J. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OCCURENCE (For example, type of instrument or lighting approach used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross weight, forced landing)									

¹If more than four pilots are involved (Flight Crew) report same information required on additional sheet for each

TAB C

AF FORM 711b

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

C-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

C-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

C-3 E-3B AWACS

C-4 F-15C 79-0025

C-5 F-15C 84-0025

C-1

C-2

C-3

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

(To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. Appropriate items only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)

1. MISHAP CLASS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> DEST	2. ACFT MOD & SERIAL NO. E-3B 77-0351	3. DATE 94-04-14	4. UNIT CONTROL NO.	5. ACFT ASSIGNMENT/STATUS CODE ACC/12AF/CC
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) ¹				
OPERATOR AT CONTROLS				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Control Witness #09		B. COMPONENT REG AF		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP				D. NATIONALITY
E. AGE				
FRONT SEAT		LEFT SEAT		REAR SEAT
RIGHT SEAT		JUMP SEAT		
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED ACC, 12AF, 552ACW, 963rd AWACS			G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING	
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Control Witness #005		B. COMPONENT REG AF		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP				D. NATIONALITY
E. AGE				
FRONT SEAT		LEFT SEAT		REAR SEAT
RIGHT SEAT		JUMP SEAT		
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED ACC, 12AF, 552ACW, 963rd AWACS			G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING	
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS		B. COMPONENT		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP				D. NATIONALITY
E. AGE				
FRONT SEAT		LEFT SEAT		REAR SEAT
RIGHT SEAT		JUMP SEAT		
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED			G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING	
OTHER PILOT				
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS		B. COMPONENT		
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP				D. NATIONALITY
E. AGE				
FRONT SEAT		LEFT SEAT		REAR SEAT
RIGHT SEAT		JUMP SEAT		
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED			G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING	
CLEARANCE				
10. FROM Incirlik AB, Turkey TO Incirlik AB, Turkey				
VFR		IFR	LOCAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FT TO FT
DIRECT		AIRWAYS	NO CLEARANCE	NA
11. DURATION OF FLIGHT		12. TYPE OF MISSION		13. ALTITUDE/ELEVATION
HOURS	TENTHS	Airborne Warning and Control in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT		31,000 MSL
9	7			
14. PHASE OF OPERATION In-flight--Normal			15. TYPE OF MISHAP Inadvertent shoot-down of friendly helicopter	
16. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMC <input type="checkbox"/> SIMULATED IMC <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSITION <input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/> ON TOP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR IN IMC CONDITIONS				
17. AIRFIELD DATA APPLICABLE TO TAKEOFF AND LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN 2 MILES OF AIRFIELD				
A. FIELD ELEVATION (Feet) N/A		B. COMPOSITION OF RUNWAY <input type="checkbox"/> ASPHALT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCRETE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)		
C. LENGTH OF RUNWAY (Feet)		D. RUNWAY HEADING	E. DISTANCE OF TOUCHDOWN FROM RUNWAY (Feet)	F. SURFACE CONDITION <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> WET OTHER (Specify)
G. LENGTH OF OVERRUN		H. COMPOSITION OF OVERRUN (Specify)		I. BARRIER TYPE USED LOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
J. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OCCURENCE (For example, type of instrument or lighting approach used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross weight, forced landing)				

¹ If more than four pilots are involved (Flight Crew) report same information required on additional sheet for each

TAB C

AF FORM 711b

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

C-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

C-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

C-3 E-3B AWACS

C-4 F-15C 79-0025

C-5 F-15C 84-0025

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled in)

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

(To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. Appropriate items only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)

1. MISHAP CLASS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> DEST		2. ACFT MDS & SERIAL NO. F15C 79-0025		3. DATE 94-04-14		4. UNIT CONTROL NO.		5. ACFT ASSIGNMENT/STATUS CODE USAFE/CG		
6. PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) ¹										
6. OPERATOR AT CONTROLS										
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Control Witness #25					B. COMPONENT REG AF					
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT				US		
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED IIISAFE, 17AF, 52FW, 53FS					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING					
7. OTHER PILOT										
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT					
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT						
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING					
8. OTHER PILOT										
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT					
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT						
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING					
9. OTHER PILOT										
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT					
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT						
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING					
10. CLEARANCE										
FROM Incirlik AB, Turkey					TO Incirlik AB, Turkey					
<input type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> IFR	<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PT TO PT	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT	<input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS	<input type="checkbox"/> NO CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/> NA			
11. DURATION OF FLIGHT			12. TYPE OF MISSION				13. ALTITUDE/ELEVATION			
HOURS 3	TENTHS 4		Defensive Counter Air in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT				4,000ft MSL			
14. PHASE OF OPERATION Inflight-Air-to-Air Gunnery					15. TYPE OF MISHAP Inadvertent shoot-down of friendly helicopter					
16. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS										
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VMC <input type="checkbox"/> SIMULATED IMC <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSITION <input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/> ON TOP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR IN IMC CONDITIONS										
17. AIRFIELD DATA APPLICABLE TO TAKEOFF AND LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN 2 MILES OF AIRFIELD										
A. FIELD ELEVATION (Feet)			B. COMPOSITION OF RUNWAY <input type="checkbox"/> ASPHALT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCRETE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)							
C. LENGTH OF RUNWAY (Feet)		D. RUNWAY HEADING		E. DISTANCE OF TOUCHDOWN FROM RUNWAY (Feet)		F. SURFACE CONDITION <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> WET <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)				
G. LENGTH OF OVERRUN		H. COMPOSITION OF OVERRUN (Specify)			I. BARRIER TYPE USED LOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
J. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OCCURENCE (For example, type of instrument or lighting approach used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross weight, forced landing)										

¹If more than four pilots are involved (Flight Crew) report same information required on additional sheet for each.

TAB C

AF FORM 711b

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

C-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

C-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

C-3 E-3B AWACS

C-4 F-15C 79-0025

C-5 F-15C 84-0025

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-4

C-5

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT

(To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. Appropriate items only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)

1. MISHAP CLASS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> DEST		2. ACFT MDS & SERIAL NO. F15C 84-0025		3. DATE 94-04-14		4. UNIT CONTROL NO.		5. ACFT ASSIGNMENT/STATUS CODE USAFE/CC			
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW)											
6. OPERATOR AT CONTROLS											
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS Control Witness #26					B. COMPONENT REG AF						
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT				
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED USAFE, 17AF, 52FW, 53FS					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING						
7. OTHER PILOT											
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT						
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT				
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING						
8. OTHER PILOT											
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT						
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT				
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING						
9. OTHER PILOT											
A. LAST NAME, INITIALS					B. COMPONENT						
C. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP								D. NATIONALITY		E. AGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> FRONT SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> LEFT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> REAR SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT SEAT		<input type="checkbox"/> JUMP SEAT				
F. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ASSIGNED					G. MAJCOM, NAF, DIV, WG, SQ ATTACHED FOR FLYING						
10. CLEARANCE											
FROM Incirlik AB, Turkey					TO Incirlik AB, Turkey						
<input type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> IFR		<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PT TO PT		<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT		<input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS	<input type="checkbox"/> NO CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
11. DURATION OF FLIGHT				12. TYPE OF MISSION				13. ALTITUDE/ELEVATION			
HOURS 3		TENTHS 4		Defense Counter Air in support of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT				4,000ft MSL			
14. PHASE OF OPERATION Inflight-Air-to-Air Gunnery						15. TYPE OF MISHAP Inadvertent shoot-down of friendly helicopter					
16. METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS											
<input type="checkbox"/> VMC <input type="checkbox"/> SIMULATED IMC <input type="checkbox"/> TRANSITION <input type="checkbox"/> IMC <input type="checkbox"/> ON TOP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR IN IMC CONDITIONS											
17. AIRFIELD DATA APPLICABLE TO TAKEOFF AND LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN 2 MILES OF AIRFIELD											
A. FIELD ELEVATION (Feet)					B. COMPOSITION OF RUNWAY <input type="checkbox"/> ASPHALT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCRETE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)						
C. LENGTH OF RUNWAY (Feet)			D. RUNWAY HEADING		E. DISTANCE OF TOUCHDOWN FROM RUNWAY (Feet)			F. SURFACE CONDITION <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> WET <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)			
G. LENGTH OF OVERRUN			H. COMPOSITION OF OVERRUN (Specify)			I. BARRIER TYPE USED LOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
J. CONDITIONS AFFECTING OCCURENCE (For example, type of instrument or lighting approach used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross weight, forced landing)											

If more than four pilots are involved (Flight Crew) report same information required on additional sheet for each

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
- B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
- D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
- E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
- H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
- I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
- J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
- K Military Flight Plans** **A**
- L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms** **B**
- M Certificate of Damage** **C**
- N Transcripts of Recorded Communications** **D**

TAB D

AF FORM 711c

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

D-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

D-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

D-3 E-3B AWACS

D-4 F-15C 79-0025

D-5 F-15C 84-0025

D-1

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 88-26060				2. MISSION DESIGN AND SERIES (MDS) UH-60A			
3. HISTORICAL DATA							
AIRCRAFT				DEFICIENT PART COMPONENT OR ACCESSORY			
AIR FORCE ACCEPTANCE DATE		N/A		NOUN		N/A	
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS		1222.0		PART NUMBER		N/A	
LAST OVERHAUL DATE		962 Acft Hrs		T.O. REFERENCE		N/A	
OVERHAULING ACTIVITY (Name & Loc)				FIGURE		N/A	
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL		260		INDEX		N/A	
HOURS SINCE LAST SCHEDULED INSP.		20 hrs		WORK UNIT CODE		N/A	
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION		18 Mar 94		TDR REQUESTED		YES NO	
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION		30 hr insp		MDR SUBMITTED		YES NO	
DATE ASSIGNED PRESENT ORGN.		14 Jun 93		MDR NUMBER			
ORGN. TRANSFERRED FROM		C6/159th Parent		MIP NUMBER			
ENGINE (Complete a Column for each Engine)							
INSTALLED POSITION		#1		#2			
ENGINE MODEL AND SERIES		T700-GE-700		T700-GE-700			
ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER		GE-E-307603		GE-E-207487			
TOTAL ENGINE HOURS		1188		1964			
NUMBER OF MAJOR OVERHAULS		0		0			
HRS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL		-		-			
DATE OF LAST OVERHAUL		-		-			
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY		-		-			
DATE LAST INSTALLED		Prior to deployment to Eagle Flight					
HOURS SINCE LAST INSTALLED		Unknown		Unknown			
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION		-		-			
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION		-		-			
FUEL (Type & Octane Rating)		JP 8		JP 8			
TDR REQUESTED		N/A		N/A			
4. N/A SOAP SAMPLES (Engine, CSD, Gearbox or APU failure of which occurred or was suspected)							
ITEM AND SERIAL NUMBER							
HOURS SINCE		FE CR AG AL CU SN MG TI					
O/H		OIL CHANGE		O/H		OIL CHANGE	
5. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT (Furnish complete damage information under Tab "L". See AF Form 711h)							
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT				MANHOURS TO REPAIR		COST (ESTIMATE)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR							
<input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> MINOR <input type="checkbox"/> LESS THAN MINOR OR NONE							
6. FIRE DATA (To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P - Probable or K - Known, in squares)							
A. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE		B. IGNITION SOURCE		C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL			
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM		ELECTRICAL SYSTEM		STATIC ELECTRICITY/LIGHTNING		CARGO	
PROPULSION SYSTEM		PNEUMATIC SYSTEM		OTHER (Specify)		ELECTRICAL INSULATION	
FUEL SYSTEM		PROPULSION SYSTEM				LUBRICATING OIL	
BLEED AIR SYSTEM		BLEED AIR		UNKNOWN		EXPLOSIVES	
OTHER (Specify)						OTHER (Specify)	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM						FUEL	
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM						UNKNOWN	
7. N/A LOCATION OF INITIAL FIRE							
		KNOWN PROBABLE		KNOWN PROBABLE		KNOWN PROBABLE	
BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT				AFT OF FIREWALL		WHEEL WELL	
BOMB BAY				FORWARD OF FIREWALL		CARGO-PASSENGER COMPARTMT.	
COCKPIT OR CREW QUARTERS				ROCKET POD		OTHER (Specify)	
ENGINE SECTION				TIRE, WHEEL OR BRAKE		UNKNOWN ()	
8. N/A MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA							
		KNOWN PROBABLE		KNOWN PROBABLE		KNOWN PROBABLE	
INITIAL IGNITION OCCURRED IN AN EXPLOSIVE MANNER PRIOR TO GROUND IMPACT.				INTENSITY OF EXPLOSION WAS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE OR APPRECIABLY CONTRIBUTE TO IN-FLIGHT AIRFRAME BREAK-UP.			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED AFTER FIRE BEFORE GRD IMPACT.				OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (Specify)			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO GROUND IMPACT.				UNKNOWN OR NOT AVAILABLE			

TAB D

AF FORM 711c

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

D-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

D-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

D-3 E-3B AWACS

D-4 F-15C 79-0025

D-5 F-15C 84-0025

D-1

D-2

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 87-26000				2. MISSION DESIGN AND SERIES (MDS) UH-60A					
3. HISTORICAL DATA									
AIRCRAFT				DEFICIENT PART COMPONENT OR ACCESSORY					
AIR FORCE ACCEPTANCE DATE	N/A			HOUR	N/A				
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	1247.3			PART NUMBER	N/A				
LAST OVERHAUL DATE	13 Apr 93			T.O. REFERENCE	N/A				
OVERHAULING ACTIVITY (Name & Loc)	Dyncorp-E(stirs)			FIGURE	N/A				
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL	332.4			INDEX	N/A				
HOURS SINCE LAST SCHEDULED INSP.	18.7			WORK UNIT CODE	N/A				
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	31 Mar 94			TDR REQUESTED	YES	NC	YES		
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	10 hr insp			MDR SUBMITTED	YES	NC	YES		
DATE ASSGND PRESENT OPGN.	14 Jun 93			MDR NUMBER	N/A				
DRGN. TRANSFERRED FROM	C6/159th Parent			MIP NUMBER	N/A				
ENGINE (Complete a Column for each Engine)									
INSTALLED POSITION	No. 1			No. 2					
ENGINE MODEL AND SERIES	T700-GE-700			T700-GE-700					
ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	GE-E-306050			GE-E-306119					
TOTAL ENGINE HOURS	2,123.3			1,798.3					
NUMBER OF MAJOR OVERHAULS									
HRS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL									
DATE OF LAST OVERHAUL									
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY									
DATE LAST INSTALLED									
HOURS SINCE LAST INSTALLED	271.3			332.3					
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION									
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION									
FUEL (Type & Octane Rating)	JP 8			JP 8					
TDR REQUESTED	N/A			N/A					
4. N/A SOAP SAMPLES (Engine, CSD, Gearbox or APU failure of which occurred or was suspected)									
ITEM AND SERIAL NUMBER									
HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SA	MG	TI
O/H	OIL CHANGE								
HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SA	MG	TI
O/H	OIL CHANGE								
5. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT (Furnish complete damage information under Tab "L". See AF Form 711h)									
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT				MANHOURS TO REPAIR		COST (ESTIMATE)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR									
<input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> MINOR <input type="checkbox"/> LESS THAN MINOR OR NONE									
6. N/A FIRE DATA (To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P - Probable or K - Known, in squares)									
A. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE			B. IGNITION SOURCE			C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL			
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	PROPULSION SYSTEM		ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	STATIC ELECTRICITY/LIGHTNING	CARGO	HYDRAULIC FLUID			
FUEL SYSTEM	BLEED AIR SYSTEM		PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	ELECTRICAL INSULATION	LUBRICATING OIL			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)		PROPULSION SYSTEM		EXPLOSIVES	OTHER (Specify)			
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	UNKNOWN		BLEED AIR	UNKNOWN	FUEL	UNKNOWN			
7. N/A LOCATION OF INITIAL FIRE									
	KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE	
BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT			AFT OF FIREWALL			WHEEL WELL			
BOMB BAY			FORWARD OF FIREWALL			CARGO-PASSENGER COMPARTMT.			
COCKPIT OR CREW QUARTERS			ROCKET POD			OTHER (Specify)			
ENGINE SECTION			TIRE, WHEEL OR BRAKE			UNKNOWN ()			
8. N/A MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA									
	KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE	
INITIAL IGNITION OCCURRED IN AN EXPLOSIVE MANNER PRIOR TO GROUND IMPACT.				INTENSITY OF EXPLOSION WAS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE OR APPRECIABLY CONTRIBUTE TO IN-FLIGHT AIRFRAME BREAK-UP.					
EXPLOSION OCCURRED AFTER FIRE & BEFORE GRD IMPACT.				OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (Specify)					
EXPLOSION OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO GROUND IMPACT.				UNKNOWN OR NOT AVAILABLE					

TAB D

AF FORM 711c

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

D-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

D-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

D-3 E-3B AWACS

D-4 F-15C 79-0025

D-5 F-15C 84-0025

D-1

D-2

D-3

(When filled in)

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 77-0351		2. MISSION DESIGN AND SERIES (MDS) E-3B	
3. HISTORICAL DATA			
AIRCRAFT		DEFICIENT PART, COMPONENT OR ACCESSORY	
AIR FORCE ACCEPTANCE DATE	3 Oct 78	NOUN	
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	13,265.6	PART NUMBER	
LAST OVERHAUL DATE (PDM)	9 Apr 90	T.O. REFERENCE	
OVERHAULING ACTIVITY (Name & Loc)	OC/ALC TAFB, OK	FIGURE	
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL	3,593.4	INDEX	N/A
HOURS SINCE LAST SCHEDULED INSP.	204.8	WORK UNIT CODE	N/A
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	20 Aug 93	TDP REQUESTED	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NC <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	-6, Phase #3	MDR SUBMITTED	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NC <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE ASSIGNED PRESENT ORGN.	3 Sep 93	MDR NUMBER	
ORGN. TRANSFERRED FROM	062 AWACS/PACAF	WIP NUMBER	

ENGINE (Complete a Column for each Engine)				
INSTALLED POSITION	#1	#2	#3	#4
ENGINE MODEL AND SERIES	TF-33-P100A	TF33-P100A	TF33-P100A	TF33-P100A
ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	P696843	P660116	P659990	P696816
TOTAL ENGINE HOURS	11,971.7	19,046.7	16,758.1	11,181.1
NUMBER OF MAJOR OVERHAULS	1	1	1	0
HRS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL	517.7	9,873.7	7,693.1	N/A
DATE OF LAST OVERHAUL	22 Dec 92	5 May 76	11 Jun 75	N/A
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	OC/ALC	OC/ALC	OC/ALC	OC/ALC
DATE LAST INSTALLED	7 Jun 93	21 Mar 94	13 May 92	14 Jan 94
HOURS SINCE LAST INSTALLED	418.3	47.3	1540.4	169.7
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	9 Mar 93	14 Feb 89	14 Nov 89	19 Oct 93
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	Overhaul	6000HR HSI/-9PE	6000HR HSI/-9PE	6000HR HSI/-9PE
FUEL (Type & Octane Rating)	JP-4	JP-4	JP-4	JP-4
TDR REQUESTED	No	No	No	No

4. N/A SOAP SAMPLES
(Engine, CSD, Gearbox or APU failure of which occurred or was suspected) N/A

ITEM AND SERIAL NUMBER																			
HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SN	MG	TI	HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SN	MG	TI
O/H	OIL CHANGE									O/H	OIL CHANGE								

5. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT
(Furnish complete damage information under Tab "L". See AF Form 711h)

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT	MANHOURS TO REPAIR	COST (ESTIMATE)
<input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMIC REPAIR		
<input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> MINOR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LESS THAN MINOR OR NONE		

6. N/A FIRE DATA
(To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P - Probable or K - Known, in squares)

A. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE		B. IGNITION SOURCE		C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL	
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	PROPULSION SYSTEM	ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	STATIC ELECTRICITY/LIGHTNING	CARGO	HYDRAULIC FLUID
FUEL SYSTEM	BLEED AIR SYSTEM	PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	ELECTRICAL INSULATION	LUBRICATING OIL
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	PROPULSION SYSTEM		EXPLOSIVES	OTHER (Specify)
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	UNKNOWN	BLEED AIR	UNKNOWN	FUEL	UNKNOWN

7. N/A LOCATION OF INITIAL FIRE

KNOWN		PROBABLE		KNOWN		PROBABLE	
BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT						WHEEL WELL	
BOMB BAY				FT OF FIREWALL		CARGO-PASSENGER COMPARTMT.	
COCKPIT OR CREW QUARTERS				FORWARD OF FIREWALL		OTHER (Specify)	
ENGINE SECTION				ROCKET POD			
				TIRE, WHEEL OR BRAKE		UNKNOWN	

8. N/A MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA

KNOWN		PROBABLE		KNOWN		PROBABLE	
INITIAL IGNITION OCCURRED IN AN EXPLOSIVE MANNER PRIOR TO GROUND IMPACT.				INTENSITY OF EXPLOSION WAS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE OR APPRECIABLY CONTRIBUTE TO IN-FLIGHT AIRFRAME BREAK-UP.			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED AFTER FIRE BEFORE GRD IMPACT.				OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (Specify)			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO GROUND IMPACT.				UNKNOWN OR NOT AVAILABLE			

34

TAB D

AF FORM 711c

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

D-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

D-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

D-3 E-3B AWACS

D-4 F-15C 79-0025

D-5 F-15C 84-0025

D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

(When filled in)

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 84-0025	7. MISSION DESIGN AND SERIES (MDS) F-15C
--------------------------------------	---

3. AIRCRAFT		DEFICIENT PART COMPONENT OR ACCESSORY					
AIR FORCE ACCEPTANCE DATE	MAR 86	NOUN	/				
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	3008.9	PART NUMBER					
LAST OVERHAUL DATE	N/A (1st due 96)	T.O. REFERENCE				N/A	N/A
OVERHAULING ACTIVITY (Name & Loc)	N/A	FIGURE					
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL	N/A	INDEX					
HOURS SINCE LAST SCHEDULED INSP.	9.7	WORK UNIT CODE					
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	3 MAR 94	TDR REQUESTED				YES	NO
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	#1 HPO	MDR SUBMITTED				YES	NO
DATE ASGND PRESENT ORGN.	25 FEB 94	MDR NUMBER					
ORGN. TRANSFERRED FROM	36 FW	MIP NUMBER					

ENGINE (Complete a Column for each Engine)				
INSTALLED POSITION	#1	#2	/	
ENGINE MODEL AND SERIES	PW100-100	PW100-100		
ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	P68-0698	P68-1754		
TOTAL ENGINE HOURS Flt Time	3247.0	3247.0		
NUMBER OF MAJOR OVERHAULS				
HRS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL				
DATE OF LAST OVERHAUL	N/A	N/A		N/A
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY				N/A
DATE LAST INSTALLED				
HOURS SINCE LAST INSTALLED				
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION				
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION				
FUEL (Type & Octane Rating)	JP4/JP8	JP4/JP8		
TDR REQUESTED	No	No		

4. N/A	SDAP SAMPLES (Engine, CSD, Gearbox or APU failure of which occurred or was suspected)	N/A
--------	--	-----

ITEM AND SERIAL NUMBER											
HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SN	MG	TI	HOURS SINCE	
D/H	OIL CHANGE									D/H	OIL CHANGE

5. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT (Furnish complete damage information under Tab "L". See AF Form 711h)		
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMIC REPAIR <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> MINDR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LESS THAN MINDR OR NONE	MANHOURS TO REPAIR	COST (ESTIMATE)

6. FIRE DATA (To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P - Probable or K - Known, in squares)					
A. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE		B. IGNITION SOURCE		C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL	
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	PROPULSION SYSTEM	ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	STATIC ELECTRICITY/LIGHTNING	CARGO	HYDRAULIC FLUID
FUEL SYSTEM	BLEED AIR SYSTEM	PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	ELECTRICAL INSULATION	LUBRICATING OIL
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	PROPULSION SYSTEM		EXPLOSIVES	OTHER (Specify)
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	UNKNOWN	BLEED AIR	UNKNOWN	FUEL	UNKNOWN

7. LOCATION OF INITIAL FIRE							
KNOWN		PROBABLE		KNOWN		PROBABLE	
BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT				AFT OF FIREWALL			WHEEL WELL
BOMB BAY				FORWARD OF FIREWALL			CARGO-PASSENGER COMPARTMT.
COCKPIT OR CREW QUARTERS				ROCKET POD			OTHER (Specify)
ENGINE SECTION				TIRE, WHEEL OR BRAKE			UNKNOWN []

8. MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA							
KNOWN		PROBABLE		KNOWN		PROBABLE	
INITIAL IGNITION OCCURRED IN AN EXPLOSIVE MANNER PRIOR TO GROUND IMPACT.				INTENSITY OF EXPLOSION WAS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE OR APPRECIABLY CONTRIBUTE TO IN-FLIGHT AIRFRAME BREAK-UP.			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED AFTER FIRE BEFORE GRD IMPACT.				OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (Specify)			
EXPLOSION OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO GROUND IMPACT.				UNKNOWN OR NOT AVAILABLE			

TAB D

AF FORM 711c

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

D-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

D-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

D-3 E-3B AWACS

D-4 F-15C 79-0025

D-5 F-15C 84-0025

D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

D-5

(When filled)

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIEL REPORT

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 79-0025	2. MISSION DESIGN AND SERIES (MDS) F-15C
--------------------------------------	---

3. HISTORICAL DATA	
AIRCRAFT	DEFICIENT PART COMPONENT OR ACCESSORY
AIR FORCE ACCEPTANCE DATE Aug 80	NOVA
TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS 3600	PART NUMBER
LAST OVERHAUL DATE 07/29/93	T.O. REFERENCE N/A
OVERHAULING ACTIVITY (Name & Loc) IAI (Ben Gurion A)	FIGURE N/A
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL 290.6	INDEX
HOURS SINCE LAST SCHEDULED INSP. 116.1	WORK UNIT CODE
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION 01/28/94	TDR REQUESTED YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION #1 HPO	MDR SUBMITTED YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE ASSIGNED PRESENT ORGN. 25 FEB 94	MDR NUMBER
ORGN. TRANSFERRED FROM 36 FW	MIP NUMBER

ENGINE (Complete a Column for each Engine)	
INSTALLED POSITION #1	#2
ENGINE MODEL AND SERIES PW100-100	PW100-100
ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER P68-1412	P68-1901
TOTAL ENGINE HOURS Flt Time 3039	2682
NUMBER OF MAJOR OVERHAULS	
HRS SINCE LAST MAJOR OVERHAUL	
DATE OF LAST OVERHAUL N/A	N/A
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	
DATE LAST INSTALLED	
HOURS SINCE LAST INSTALLED	
DATE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	
TYPE OF LAST SCHEDULED INSPECTION	
FUEL (Type & Octane Rating) JP4/JP8	JP4/JP8
TDR REQUESTED NO	NO

4. N/A SOAP SAMPLES (Engine, CSD, Gearbox or APU failure of which occurred or was suspected) N/A

ITEM AND SERIAL NUMBER																			
HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SN	MG	TI	HOURS SINCE		FE	CR	AG	AL	CU	SN	MG	TI
O/H	OIL CHANGE									O/H	OIL CHANGE								

5. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT (Furnish complete damage information under Tab "L". See AF Form 711h)

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR <input type="checkbox"/> SUBSTANTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> MINOR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LESS THAN MINOR OR NONE	MANHOURS TO REPAIR	COST (ESTIMATE)
---	--------------------	-----------------

6. N/A (To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P - Probable or K - Known, in squares)

A. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING THE FIRE		B. IGNITION SOURCE		C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL	
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	PROPULSION SYSTEM	ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	STATIC ELECTRICITY/LIGHTNING	CARGO	HYDRAULIC FLUID
FUEL SYSTEM	BLEED AIR SYSTEM	PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	ELECTRICAL INSULATION	LUBRICATING OIL
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	OTHER (Specify)	PROPULSION SYSTEM		EXPLOSIVES	OTHER (Specify)
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM	UNKNOWN	BLEED AIR	UNKNOWN	FUEL	UNKNOWN

7. N/A LOCATION OF INITIAL FIRE

	KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE
BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT			AFT OF FIREWALL			WHEEL WELL		
BOMB BAY			FORWARD OF FIREWALL			CARGO-PASSENGER COMPARTMT.		
COCKPIT OR CREW QUARTERS			ROCKET POD			OTHER (Specify)		
ENGINE SECTION			TIRE, WHEEL OR BRAKE			UNKNOWN ()		

8. N/A MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA

	KNOWN	PROBABLE		KNOWN	PROBABLE
INITIAL IGNITION OCCURRED IN AN EXPLOSIVE MANNER PRIOR TO GROUND IMPACT.			INTENSITY OF EXPLOSION WAS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE OR APPRECIABLY CONTRIBUTE TO IN-FLIGHT AIRFRAME BREAK-UP.		
EXPLOSION OCCURRED AFTER FIRE & BEFORE GRD IMPACT.			OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (Specify)		
EXPLOSION OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO GROUND IMPACT.			UNKNOWN OR NOT AVAILABLE		

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
- B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
- D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
- E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
- G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
- H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
- I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
- J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
- K Military Flight Plans**
- L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms**
- M Certificate of Damage**
- N Transcripts of Recorded Communications**

**A
B
C
D
E**

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
 - B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
 - D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
 - E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
 - H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
 - I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
 - J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
 - K Military Flight Plans** **A**
 - L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms** **B**
 - M Certificate of Damage** **C**
 - N Transcripts of Recorded Communications** **D**
- E**
F

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
 - B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
 - D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
 - E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
 - H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
 - I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
 - J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
 - K Military Flight Plans** **A**
 - L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms** **B**
 - M Certificate of Damage** **C**
 - N Transcripts of Recorded Communications** **D**
- E**
F
G

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- A AF Form 711 - USAF Mishap Report**
 - B AF Form 711a - Ground Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - C AF Form 711b - Aircraft Flight Mishap Report**
 - D AF Form 711c - Aircraft Maintenance and Materiel Report**
 - E AF Form 711d - Missile or Space Vehicle Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - F AF Form 711e - Explosives Mishap Report (Not Applicable)**
 - G Flight and Personnel Records (Not Applicable)**
 - H AFTO Forms 781 and DA Forms 2408**
 - I Materiel Deficiency Report (Not Applicable)**
 - J Technical or Engineering Evaluations**
 - K Military Flight Plans** **A**
 - L DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Forms** **B**
 - M Certificate of Damage** **C**
 - N Transcripts of Recorded Communications** **D**
- E**
F
G
H

TAB H

AFTO FORMS 781 AND DA FORMS 2408

H-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

H-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

H-3 E-3B AWACS

H-4 F-15C 79-0025

H-5 F-15C 84-0025

H-1

TAB H-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

H-1a DA Form 2408-13, Aircraft Status Information Record, 13 April 1994

H-1b DA Form 2408-13-1, Extracts from the 30 Day Maintenance Record

H-1c DA Form 2408-5, Equipment Modification Record

H-1a

H-1d DA Form 2408-20, Oil Analysis Record

H-1e DA Form 2408-17, Aircraft Inventory Record

DATE

13 APR 94

NUMBER OF PAGES IN FLIGHT PACK

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. UIC W0V27A		4. STATION FDEU		5. NAME OF CE/MECH SPC Robinson	
6. ENGINE HIT READINGS			7. APU HISTORY			8. ROUNDS FIRED AIR-FRAME		9. ENGINE STARTS	
DATE	NO. 1	NO. 2		HOURS	STARTS	HR METER		NO. 1	NO. 2
			CURRENT	1528.2	2092				
			TODAY	1.0	10				
			TOTAL	1529.2	2102				
10. SYSTEM STATUS					11. FLIGHT DATA				
ACFT						AIRCRAFT HOURS	LANDINGS		HSF/ CYCLES
							STD	AUTO	
						CURRENT	1217.7	93	0
ARM						TODAY	4.3	5	0
ELECT						TOTAL	1222.0	98	0
OTHER									
12. SCHEDULED INSPECTION INFORMATION									
a. HOURS OF OPERATION SINCE LAST GENERATION	b. NEXT PHASE/SCHEDULED INSP (NO)			d. HOURS OF OPERATION TO NEXT PHASE/SCHEDULED INSPECTION			e. PMD DUE		
	PMS II						DATE COMPLETED		
	c. NEXT PHASE/SCHEDULED INSP DUE AT						PID		
	1462.4								
13. LOCAL USE									
3/7									

DA FORM 2408-13, OCT 91

EDITION OF DEC 66 IS OBSOLETE

AIRCRAFT STATUS INFORMATION RECORD

For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751; the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from DA Form 2408-13, DTD 13 APR 94, file # 88-26060, which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB H-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

H-1a DA Form 2408-13, Aircraft Status Information Record, 13 April 1994

H-1b DA Form 2408-13-1, Extracts from the 30 Day Maintenance Record

H-1c DA Form 2408-5, Equipment Modification Record

H-1a

H-1d DA Form 2408-20, Oil Analysis Record

H-1e DA Form 2408-17, Aircraft Inventory Record

H-1b

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060				2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 28 MAR 94		4. PAGE 1	
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	A	13 OCT 93				10 APR 94			
FAULT/REMARKS COP CENTER MAP LIGHT INOP (61620-01-253-0143)						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	C/F GJC		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 1054.8		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID	TI MAN-HOURS		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	H	09 OCT 93				10 APR 94			
FAULT/REMARKS #1 ENG ECU V/N NOT INSTALLED ON ENG. 2408-12-1						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	C/F GJC		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 1054.8		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID	TI MAN-HOURS		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	H	10 NOV 93				10 APR 94			
FAULT/REMARKS 4th (UH60A) DOOR WINDOW USED Pressure Valve						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	C/F GJC		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 1054.5		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID	TI MAN-HOURS		

DA FORM 2006-13-1; OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the responsible agency is OCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 day Maintenance Record, 88-26060

which is kept in the records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turk

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS				
/	H	10 NOV 93				10 APR 94			ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
H CARGO DOOR WINDOW WELD BUSHING WORN							C/F G/C					
AVC HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH				
1054.8												
W O	REQ	OTHER					TIPID	TI MAN-HOURS				
		0.4	F 4405-0528									
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS				
/	A	10 NOV 93				10 APR 94			ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
GUARDERS WINDOW VENT LEVER NOT INSTALLED							C/F G/C					
AVC HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH				
154.8												
W O	REQ	OTHER					TIPID	TI MAN-HOURS				
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS				
/	H	10 NOV 93				10 APR 94			ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
E/ENG BUSHING NYLON BUMBERS CRACKED							C/F G/C					
AVC HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH				
1054.8												
W O	REQ	OTHER					TIPID	TI MAN-HOURS				

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826002				2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 28 MAR 94		4. PAGE 2	
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	A	10 NOV 93				10 APR 94			
FAULT/REMARKS #2 ENG COUPLING ALONG BUZZERS OBTAINED						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	C/F C/S		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC		CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
109.48									
W.O.	REQ	OTHER							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	A	1 DEC 93				10 APR 94			
FAULT/REMARKS LOWER TAILBOOM STEP ROTATES FORWARD						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	C/F C/S		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC		CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
109.2									
W.O.	REQ	OTHER							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	
	A	21 JAN 94				23 MAR 94	1620	1187.8	
FAULT/REMARKS 111-112-94 ASR11-05 REPLACEMENT OF RH MR SPINDLE DUE AT THE NEXT PMIS-2						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
						ACTION	ENTIRE ENTIRE INSPECTION UG. 4000 2408-141 W		
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS	WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC		CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
1124.5									
W.O.	REQ	OTHER							

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8026060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 28 MAR 94		4. PAGE 3						
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION						
STATUS	SYS A	DATE 12 FEB 94	NO	TIME	PID	DATE 10 APR 94	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS 4th REFIN PANEL NOT EME MODIFIED WALW WING 1-1520-237-50-59						ACTION C/F G/L						
A/C HRS 1142.4						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH
W.O.		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS				
STATUS	SYS A	DATE 12 FEB 94	NO	TIME	PID	DATE 10 APR 94	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS PIN FILTER HEADERS REMD FROM FAULT/ADVISORY PANEL SYSTEM NO LONGER EME MODIFIED WALW WING 1-1520-237-50-59						ACTION C/F G/L						
A/C HRS 1142.4						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH
W.O.		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS				
STATUS	SYS A	DATE 22 FEB 94	NO	TIME	PID	DATE 10 APR 94	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC	
FAULT/REMARKS OPERATE WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIED IN THE ENCLOSED AWR DATED 1 DEC 93						ACTION C/F G/L						
A/C HRS 1147.6						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH
W.O.		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS				

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS		WUC		
	A	09111994				10 APR 94						
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
4th STAIR CARRIER NEEDS HYDOLED							C/F G/C					
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH			
189.9												
W/O		REQ	OTHER		TI/PID			TI MAN-HOURS				
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS		WUC		
	A	26 MAR 94		1621		28 MAR 94	0745	1189.8				
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
COLLECT VARIOUS BEARING PISTON INSP DONE BEFORE 1ST F.H. G/C							INSP COMPLETE ETC. P/M					
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH			
1189.8												
W/O		REQ	OTHER		TI/PID			TI MAN-HOURS				
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS		WUC		
	A	26 MAR 94		1621		28 MAR 94	0745	1189.8				
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
VISUAL INSP OF FFMS READ BEFORE 1ST F.H. G/C							INSP COMPLETE ETC. P/M					
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH			
1189.8												
W/O		REQ	OTHER		TI/PID			TI MAN-HOURS				

1 AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 5826060				2. MODEL 4116DA			3 DATE 25 MAR 94		4. PAGE 4												
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION															
M	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 26 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1623	PID	DATE 28 MAR 94	TIME 0745	HRS 1189.8												
FAULT/REMARKS Visual Insp of GPS RGD BEFORE REFIT						ACTION INSP COMPLETE P177															
A/C HRS 1189.8						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC									
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH					
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 28 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1630	PID	DATE 10 APR 94	TIME	HRS												
FAULT/REMARKS Mode 4 chk DUE 1189.1 ACFT HRS						ACTION C/F C/S															
A/C HRS 1189.8						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC									
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
R	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 28 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1656	PID	DATE 30 MAR 94	TIME 1100	HRS 1195.4												
FAULT/REMARKS FLT 1 COPILOT'S DEDON NEEDS ADJUSTMENT P177						ACTION ADJUSTED DEDON															
A/C HRS 1189.9						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC									
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER		TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 19 MAR 94		4. PAGE 9							
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC		
A	A	17 MAR 94		1600		19 MAR 94	0630	1169.7					
FAULT/REMARKS collage new boost servo INSFP due to						ACTION Completed w. flying							
A/C HRS 1169.7						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W.O.						TI MAN-HOURS							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC		
A	A	17 MAR 94		1600		19 MAR 94	0645	1169.7					
FAULT/REMARKS visual INSFP of AFMS INSFP due before first flight						ACTION Completed w. flying							
A/C HRS 1169.7						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W.O.						TI MAN-HOURS							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC		
A	A	17 MAR 94		1600		17 MAR 94	0645	1169.7					
FAULT/REMARKS visual INSFP of GPS due before first flight						ACTION Completed w. flying							
A/C HRS 1169.7						CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W.O.						TI MAN-HOURS							

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record, 88-26060

which is kept in my records system.

23 Mar 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt. USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
<i>A</i> STATUS	SYS <i>A</i>	DATE <i>18 MAR 94</i>	NO	TIME <i>1410</i>	PID	DATE <i>18 MAR 94</i>	TIME <i>1630</i>	HRS <i>1167.7</i>			
FAULT/REMARKS <i>Aircraft which Due 18 MAR 94 RL</i>						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE			WUC	
						ACTION <i>Completed 11/11</i>					
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS <i>1169.7</i>		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS		
<i>A</i> STATUS	SYS <i>A</i>	DATE <i>19 MAR 94</i>	NO	TIME <i>1300</i>	PID	DATE <i>19 MAR 94</i>	TIME <i>1100</i>	HRS <i>1174.0</i>			
FAULT/REMARKS <i>FLT 1 Tail wheel will not unlock. m/hell.</i>						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE			WUC	
						ACTION <i>checked ground OK w/STJ</i>					
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS <i>1174.1</i>		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS		
<i>A</i> STATUS	SYS <i>A</i>	DATE <i>19 MAR 94</i>	NO	TIME <i>1300</i>	PID	DATE <i>23 MAR 94</i>	TIME <i>0700</i>	HRS <i>1175.3</i>			
FAULT/REMARKS <i>IFF light along with master caution comes on during FLT m/hell.</i>						ROUNDS	ACTION CODE			WUC	
						ACTION <i>checked ground OK w/STJ</i>					
						PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS <i>1174.1</i>		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
W.O.		REQ	OTHER			TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS		

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 03 APR 94		4. PAGE 11					
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
R STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
		30 MAR 94		1454		30 MAR 94	1700	1198.2			
FAULT/REMARKS 100000 140AC: I NSP DUE 1199. P ACFT HRS 09 APR 94						ACTION Completed					
A/C HRS 1198.4 WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC						CMH OMH FMH DMH					
W.O. REQ OTHER 2405-13-2 P 12						TI PID TI MAN-HOURS					
M STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
		30 MAR 94		1607		30 MAR 94	1610	1198.4			
FAULT/REMARKS 1 GA Zeus fastener on APU fuel control panel Not Disturbed						ACTION Installed Zeus fastener					
A/C HRS 1197.4 WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC						CMH OMH FMH DMH					
W.O. REQ OTHER						TI PID TI MAN-HOURS					
P STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
		30 MAR 94		1100		30 MAR 94	1630	1198.1			
FAULT/REMARKS Blue TIR pic Rod Bonding Jumper Broken						ACTION REPLACED BONDING JUMPER +WIP OK P/B					
A/C HRS 1193.1 WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC						CMH OMH FMH DMH					
W.O. REQ OTHER 2405-11-2 P 13						TI PID TI MAN-HOURS					

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record 88-26060

which is kept in my records system.

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

Date _____

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
		A	31MAR94		1100		5 APR 94	1430	1202.4			
FAULT/REMARKS							ROUNDS	ACTION CODE		WUC		
NIR SPAR pressure ck due APR 12 94							ACTION completed					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS 1198.4			WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
WO			REQ	OTHER 2408-13-29523			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
<input type="checkbox"/>	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
		A	31MAR94		1100		10 APR 94					
FAULT/REMARKS							ROUNDS	ACTION CODE		WUC		
Gyromagnetic + starob, compass swing							ACTION CFCJC					
Due Apr 1 94							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS 1198.4			WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
WO			REQ	OTHER			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
		A	31MAR94		0930		31 MAR 94	1000	1198.4			
FAULT/REMARKS							ROUNDS	ACTION CODE		WUC		
static grounding cable broken							ACTION Replaced cable					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
A/C HRS 1198.4			WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH		
WO			REQ	OTHER			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			

REVERSE OF DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER <u>8326060</u>		2. MODEL <u>UH60A</u>		3. DATE <u>03 APR 94</u>		4. PAGE <u>17</u>					
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION				PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION							
STATUS	SYS <u>A</u>	DATE <u>03 APR 94</u>	NO.	TIME <u>0820</u>	PID	DATE <u>10 APR 94</u>	TIME	HRS			
FAULT/REMARKS <u>Zincs (valve) not installed on 2/s stop fitting</u>				ROUNDS				ACTION CODE	WUC		
<u>DODR</u>				ACTION <u>C/F C/S</u>							
A/C HRS <u>193.4</u>				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER	TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
FAULT/REMARKS <u>Fus #1 O.K. 5/22</u>				ROUNDS				ACTION CODE	WUC		
A/C HRS				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER	TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
FAULT/REMARKS <u>Fus #2 O.K. 5/22</u>				ROUNDS				ACTION CODE	WUC		
A/C HRS				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER	TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS			
A/C HRS				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER	TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from:

50 Army Maintenance Report 83-26060
which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

1 AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 3226060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 04 APR 94		4. PAGE 18											
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION											
#	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC					
#		A	03 APR 94		1812		04 APR 94	1615	1202.0								
FAULT/REMARKS Coll 4th boost servo Insp Doc N						ACTION completed v. 4-g											
A/C HRS 1202.0		WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W O		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
#	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC					
#		A	03 APR 94		1814		04 APR 94	1615	1202.0								
FAULT/REMARKS Visual Insp of AMFS Before first flight						ACTION completed v. 4-g											
A/C HRS 1202.0		WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W O		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
#	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC					
#		A	03 APR 94		1815		04 APR 94	1615	1202.0								
FAULT/REMARKS Visual Insp of 6BS before first flight						ACTION completed v. 4-g											
A/C HRS 1202.0		WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
W O		REQ		OTHER		TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS		CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is OCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record, 88-26060

which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION							
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC			
	A	04 APR 94		C.930		10 APR 94	1							
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION							
25 HR Oil Samples 1 up 1213.4 Rct							C/F GCS							
MIRs M														
A/C HRS							CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
1202.0														
WHEN DISC							TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS				
W.O.														
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC			
	A	04 APR 94		1420		04 APR 94	1540	1202.0						
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION							
Blue MIR PIC upper Rod Bearing excessive							Replaced Bearing 7024							
Limitation I/A/W 55-1520-237-23.3 M														
A/C HRS							CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
1202.0														
WHEN DISC							TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS				
W.O.														
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC			
	A	04 APR 94		1450		04 APR 94	1635	1202.0						
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION							
MTF Repairs for Removal + Reinstallation							Completed w/ Rng							
of Blue MIR PIC Rod														
A/C HRS							CMH		OMH		FMH		DMH	
1202.0														
WHEN DISC							TI PID			TI MAN-HOURS				
W.O.														

REVERSE OF DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 04 APR 94		4. PAGE 21					
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
	A	04 APR 94		1540		10 APR 94					
FAULT/REMARKS 250 HR STAB INSPO DUE 1212.4 ACFT HRS						ACTION C/F 90					
A/C HRS / 1202.0		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH	TI MAN-HOURS	
W/O		REQ	OTHER			TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
#	A	04 APR 94		1450		04 APR 94	1500	1202.0			
FAULT/REMARKS Mod Required For Removal + Reinstall of Blue M/R p/c Rod						ACTION mod OK w/ [initials]					
A/C HRS / 1202.0		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH	TI MAN-HOURS	
W/O		REQ	OTHER			TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC
FAULT/REMARKS						ACTION					
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH	TI MAN-HOURS	
W/O		REQ	OTHER			TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS			

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record: 88-26060
which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060		2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 08 APRIL 94		4. PAGE 24	
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION				PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION			
11A	STATUS A	SYS A	DATE 05 APR 94	NO	TIME 1920	PID	
FAULT/REMARKS Coll + Yaw Boost Servo Inst DUC Before 1st FH Check				ACTION INSP COMPLETE PTMC			
A/C HRS 1202.8				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER		
11A	STATUS A	SYS A	DATE 05 APR 94	NO	TIME 1920	PID	
FAULT/REMARKS Visual Insp of AFMS Required Before 1st FH Check				ACTION INSP COMPLETE PTMC			
A/C HRS 1262.8				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER		
11A	STATUS A	SYS A	DATE 05 APR 94	NO	TIME 1920	PID	
FAULT/REMARKS Visual Insp of GPS Required Before 1st FH Check				ACTION INSP COMPLETE PTMC			
A/C HRS 1202.8				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER		

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record, 88-26060
which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
1213

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt. USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION																		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
FAULT/REMARKS <u>FIT 1 OK W. H. G.</u>							ACTION _____																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH																
W O		REQ	OTHER			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS																	
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
FAULT/REMARKS <u>FIT 2 OK W. H. G.</u>							ACTION _____																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
A/C HRS		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH																
W O		REQ	OTHER			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS																	
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
FAULT/REMARKS <u>FIT 3 PLS UHF Radio T. mop</u> <u>W. H. G.</u>							ACTION <u>C/F G/C</u>																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> <td>PID</td> <td>HOURS</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
A/C HRS <u>1206.7</u>		WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH	OMH	FMH	DMH																
W O		REQ	OTHER			TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS																	

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 8826060				2. MODEL UH60A		3. DATE 28 MAR 94		4. PAGE 4					
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION							
M	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 26 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1623	PID	DATE 28 MAR 94	TIME 0745	HRS 1187.8				
FAULT/REMARKS Visual INSPECTION OF GPS ROAD BEFORE 151 FH JC						ACTION INSPECTION COMPLETE 7/17/94							
A/C HRS 1189.8						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER					
---	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 28 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1630	PID	DATE 10 APR 94	TIME	HRS				
FAULT/REMARKS Mode 4 chk DUE 1189.1 ACFT HRS M						ACTION C/F C/L C/S							
A/C HRS 1189.8						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER					
K	STATUS	SYS A	DATE 28 MAR 94	NO.	TIME 1656	PID	DATE 30 MAR 94	TIME 1106	HRS 1193.4				
FAULT/REMARKS FLT 1 COPILOTS DOOR NEEDS ADJUSTMENT						ACTION ADJUST DOOR 12 MAR							
A/C HRS 1193.9						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER					

DA FORM 2409-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is OCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

30 Day Maintenance Record, 88-21060
which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt. USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turk

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION																		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
<i>A</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>28 MAR 94</i>		<i>1657</i>		<i>3 April 94</i>	<i>10 00</i>	<i>1202.0</i>		<i>1</i>															
FAULT/REMARKS <i>TRANSPONDER INOP ACFT Restricted from I MC III</i>							ACTION <i>REPAIR WIRING TO TRANSPONDER CONTROL HEAD T. SE</i>																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
AC HRS <i>1193.9</i> WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC							CMH OMH FMH DMH																		
WO REQ OTHER							TIPID TI MAN-HOURS																		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
<i>H</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>28 Mar 94</i>		<i>1700</i>		<i>4 Apr 94</i>	<i>1100</i>	<i>1202.4</i>																	
FAULT/REMARKS <i>Red #112 blade has a 1/2" crack on the leading edge near tip cap J. Haskins</i>							ACTION <i>Repaired I/A/W TMSS-1520-237-23 paragraph 5-21 J. Haskins</i>																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
AC HRS <i>1193.9</i> WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC							CMH OMH FMH DMH																		
WO REQ OTHER							TIPID TI MAN-HOURS																		
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID	DATE	TIME	HRS	ROUNDS	ACTION CODE	WUC														
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION																		
							<table border="1"> <tr> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> <th>PID</th> <th>HOURS</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS						
PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS																				
AC HRS WHEN DISC HOW REC MAL EFF WUC							CMH OMH FMH DMH																		
WO REQ OTHER							TIPID TI MAN-HOURS																		

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 88-26060		2. MODEL UH-60A		3. DATE 20 JAN 94		4. PAGE 6							
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION						PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION							
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 20 JAN 94	NO.	TIME 0900	PID	DATE 20 JAN 94	TIME 0930	HRS 1120.3					
FAULT/REMARKS 1/4 MAIN LANDING GEAR JIRE LEAKING AIR 5.4025						ACTION REPAIRED LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY 5.4025							
A/C HRS 1120.3						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER 2408-13297					
<input type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 21 JAN 94	NO.	TIME 1515	PID	DATE 2 Feb 94	TIME	HRS					
FAULT/REMARKS UH-60-94-ASAM-03, REPLACEMENT OF ALL M/R SPINDLE DUE AT THE NEXT PMS-2 MTRAM ✓						ACTION CIF - Kowalew							
A/C HRS 1124.5						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 25 JAN 94	NO.	TIME 1600	PID	DATE 26 JAN 94	TIME 1700	HRS					
FAULT/REMARKS FLT 1 XPDR MODE 2 set button #4 is stuck in down position. MM add.						ACTION Cleaned Set Button Chm							
A/C HRS 1134.5						WHEN DISC		HOW REC		MAL EFF		WUC	
W.O.						REQ		OTHER					

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
For use of this form, see DA PAM 738-751, the proponent agency is DCSLOG

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

Historical Records 88-26060
which is kept in my records system!

23 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 88-26060		2. MODEL UH-60A		3. DATE 14 Dec 93		4. PAGE 16		
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION				PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 14 DEC 93	NO.	TIME 0700	PID	DATE 14 DEC 93	TIME 0710	HRS 1093.4
FAULT/REMARKS XPANDER FAILS SELF TEST WITH TOP ANT SELECTED, LEFT REST FROM IFR CRASH				ACTION REPLACED XPANDER ANT. CONNECTORS IN 4000 HOURS				
A/C HRS 1093.4				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER 2408-13-2 Pg 17			DMH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 14 DEC 93	NO.	TIME 0715	PID	DATE 14 DEC 93	TIME 0800	HRS 1093.4
FAULT/REMARKS MISC REQ FOR REPLACEMENT OF XPANDER ANT CONNECTORS				ACTION Failed Secondary Release				
A/C HRS 1093.4				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER			DMH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATUS	SYS A	DATE 14 DEC 93	NO.	TIME 0800	PID	DATE 14 DEC 93	TIME 0830	HRS 1093.4
FAULT/REMARKS XPANDER FAILS SELF TEST WITH TOP ANT SELECTED, LEFT REST FROM IFR CRASH				ACTION Replaced XPANDER				
A/C HRS 1093.4				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC	CMH
W.O.				REQ	OTHER 2409-13-2 Pg 17			DMH

DA FORM 2408-13-1, OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

Historical Records, 88-26060

which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

PART I - FAULT INFORMATION							PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION					
STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO	TIME	PID		DATE	TIME	HRS			
FAULT/REMARKS							ROUNDS	ACTION CODE			WUC	
ACTION												
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
NC HRS	WHEN DISC		HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC		DATE		TIME	HRS		
WO	REQ		OTHER				ROUNDS		ACTION CODE			
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
<i>B</i>							13 NOV 93	1550	1063.0			
FU ONE OK <i>PM</i>							camp C Beachln					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
<i>B</i>	<i>A</i>	13 NOV 93		1000			13 NOV 93	1050	1062.2			
PMS-1 due @ 1064.8 Act hrs <i>Z</i>							failed mode 4 cr C Beachln					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
<i>B</i>	<i>A</i>	13 NOV 93		1005			13 NOV 93	1050	1062.2			
Mode 4 cr due at 1062.4 Act hrs C Beachln							failed mode 4 cr C Beachln					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			
NC HRS	WHEN DISC		HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC		DATE		TIME	HRS		
WO	REQ		OTHER				ROUNDS		ACTION CODE			
FAULT/REMARKS							ACTION					
							PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
							CMH		OMH	FMH	DMH	
							TI PID		TI MAN-HOURS			

1. AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 88260600		2. MODEL UH-60A		3. DATE 13 Nov 93		4. PAGE 24	
PART I - FAULT INFORMATION				PART II - CORRECTING INFORMATION			
#7	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	
		A	12 NOV 93		1408		
FAULT/REMARKS				DATE 13 NOV 93			
Coll + yaw burst seen insp DUE				TIME 0800		HRS 1060.7	
				ROUNDS		ACTION CODE	
				ACTION <u>Completed</u>			
				PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 10100.7				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER		
#7	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	
		A	12 NOV 93		1409		
FAULT/REMARKS				DATE 13 NOV 93			
Prior to 1st FLT. insp of MR B: filer				TIME 0800		HRS 1060.7	
for cracks =/A/W ATCOM UH60-93281-11000 memo				ROUNDS		ACTION CODE	
				ACTION <u>Completed</u>			
				PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 1060.7				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER		
#5	STATUS	SYS	DATE	NO.	TIME	PID	
		A	12 NOV 93		1410		
FAULT/REMARKS				DATE 12 NOV 93			
100 HR Insp. Due 10624 ACH				TIME 1630		HRS 1060.7	
HRS <u>10624</u>				ROUNDS		ACTION CODE	
				ACTION <u>Completed</u>			
				PID	HOURS	PID	HOURS
AC HRS 1060.7				WHEN DISC	HOW REC	MAL EFF	WUC
W.O.				REQ	OTHER 2408-13-7 p 25		
				TIPIID		TI MAN-HOURS	

DA FORM 2408-13-1 OCT 91

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTNANCE RECORD

EXTRACT	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from	
<u>Historical Records 88-26060</u>	
which is kept in my records system.	
<u>23 Nov 94</u> Date	<u>W. L. Harris</u> WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB H-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

H-1a DA Form 2408-13, Aircraft Status Information Record, 13 April 1994

H-1b DA Form 2408-13-1, Extracts from the 30 Day Maintenance Record

H-1c DA Form 2408-5, Equipment Modification Record

H-1a

H-1d DA Form 2408-20, Oil Analysis Record

H-1e DA Form 2408-17, Aircraft Inventory Record

H-1b

H-1c

1. NOMENCLATURE					2. REGISTRATION NUMBER	3. SERIAL NUMBER			
HELICOPTER UH-60A						88-26060			
4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED					5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED				
MWO NUMBER	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr)	PRI-ORITY	ECN	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S)	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr)	MAN HRS	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application)	
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	
MWO 55-2840-248-50-28	19 JAN 89	N	D	SELF SEALING ADAPTER (OIL CAP REPLACEMENT)	12 JAN 89	1	DYNCORP	J. Pugh (CIV)	
MWO 1-5945-237-50-1	15 JAN 89	N	D	Electromagnetic Inter. Protection (EMI)	19 JUL 89	12	DYNCORP-E	J. Pugh (CIV)	
MWO 55-1520-237-50-54	10-7 89	N	D	INCOOP STAIR ALTIMETER GROUNDING TRAP	16 JUL 90	3.0	DYNCORP-E	[Signature]	
MWO 55-1520-237-50-83	3 MAR 90	N	D	Improved Tiedown Fittings	31 Aug 90	5	DYNCORP-E	N. Klumb	
MWO 01-1520-237-50-01	15 NOV 90	N	D	Installation of Improved Tiedown Ring Eyebolt	27 Aug 91	4.0	DynCorp-E	S. Daley CIV Contr.	
MWO 55-1570-237-50-58	15 JAN 91	N	D	Incorporation of Engine Drive Shaft Balancing Procedure	13 SEPT 91	8.0	DynCorp-E	S. Daley CIV Contr.	
MWO I- 1520-237-50-59	22 FEB 91	N	D	Electromagnetic Environment Protection	21 DEC 92	850	DynCorp-E	K. Stivers (CIV)	
MWO I- 1520-237-50-64	1 SEP 91	N	D	Instl. of improved engine cowling release handle assy	6 JAN 93	2.0	DynCorp-E	K. Stivers (CIV)	
MWO 55-4030-237-50-1				IMPROVED CRO ON THE CARGO Hook ASSY	P/C/W	.1	DYNCORP-E	E. Wane (CIV)	
MWO 55-1520-237-50-47				IMPROVED WIRE STRAPS SYSTEM	P/C/W	.1	DYNCORP-E	E. Wane (CIV)	
MWO LEX-2561	8 NOV 93			ANX. Fuel Quantity Indicating System (ESSS)	6 DEC 93	80.0	SERV-AIR	L. Patis SSG TI	

DA FORM 2408-5, 1 JAN 64

EQUIPMENT MODIFICATION RECORD

For use of this form, see TM 38-750; the procuring agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from the Historical Flight Record Equipment Modification Record 88-26060 which is kept in my records system.

23 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSF
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Tur

1. NOMENCLATURE

Sp = Assy.

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER

A204-07109
C504-03072

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED

MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
18-1520-237-20-129 P 061900	6/12/92	N	D	Imp For Three User. Spindle Assy.	4/5/92	.3	3LA DDDSP	<i>[Signature]</i> C. J. WG-1
LH-60-94-ASAM-03	JAN 94	M		INSPECTION OF ACFT HISTORICAL RECORDS FOR M/R SPINDLE BEARING SN CHGIC	21 JAN 94	.5	WDX2AA	<i>[Signature]</i> WDX2AA

3.1.2.

1. TITLE AND DESCRIPTION

Spindle Assy.

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER

A204-07227
C504-03176

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED

MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
B 1-1520-237-20-129 P 061900 E	6/12/92	N	D	Swap For Three Users. Spindle Assy.	4/5/92	.3	DLA DDDSF	<i>[Signature]</i> C.S. WG-1
44-60-99-ASAM-03	JAN 94	M		INSP. OF ACFT HISTORICAL RECORDS FOR M/R SPINDLE BEARING SN CHECK	21 JAN 94	.5	WDXZAA	<i>[Signature]</i> A. H. H. / I

1. Nomenclature

Spindle Assy.

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER


A204-07136
C504-03376

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED


MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
B 1-1520-237-20-129 P 061900 3	6/12/92	N	D	Insp For Three Users. Spindle Assy.	27/4/92	.3	DLA DDOSP	<i>[Signature]</i> C.V. W.C.-1
UH-60-94-ASAM-03	JAN 94	M		INSPECTION OF ACFT HISTORICAL RECORDS FOR M/R SPINDLE BEARING SN CHECK	21 JAN 94	.5	WDX2AA	<i>[Signature]</i>



1. NOMENCLATURE M/R EXPANDABLE PIN	2. REGISTRATION NUMBER	3. SERIAL NUMBER AVK-02869X
---	------------------------	------------------------------------

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED					5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED			
MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	

1. NOMENCLATURE M/R EXPANDABLE PIN	2. REGISTRATION NUMBER	3. SERIAL NUMBER AVK-02803X
---------------------------------------	------------------------	--------------------------------

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED	5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED
---------------------------	----------------------------

MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application)
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	


1. NOMENCLATURE					2. REGISTRATION NUMBER	3. SERIAL NUMBER			
M/R EXPANDABLE PIN						AVK-02871X			
4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED					5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED				
MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i	
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	 	

DA FORM 2408-5, 1 JAN 64

EQUIPMENT MODIFICATION RECORD
 For use of this form, see TM 38-750; the proponent agency is
 Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

1. NOMENCLATURE M/R EXPANDABLE PIN					2. REGISTRATION NUMBER		3. SERIAL NUMBER <i>AVK-02865X</i>		
4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED					5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED				
MWO NUMBER <i>a</i>	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>b</i>	PRI-ORITY <i>c</i>	ECH <i>d</i>	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) <i>e</i>	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>f</i>	MAN HRS <i>g</i>	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO <i>h</i>	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) <i>i</i>	
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	<i>Gl. St</i>	DYN AOD 702

2.1117

1. NOMENCLATURE					2. REGISTRATION NUMBER		3. SERIAL NUMBER	
M/R EXPANDABLE PIN							AVK-02796X	
4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED					5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED			
MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	 <div data-bbox="1911 584 2005 673" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> DTN AOD 702 </div>

1. NOMENCLATURE M/R EXPANDABLE PIN				2. REGISTRATION NUMBER		3. SERIAL NUMBER AVK-02797X		
4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED				5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED				
MWO NUMBER <i>a</i>	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>b</i>	PRI-ORITY <i>c</i>	ECH <i>d</i>	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) <i>e</i>	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>f</i>	MAN HRS <i>g</i>	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO <i>h</i>	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application)
1-1520-237-20-130	15 Sept 92	U	I	INSP.&/OR REPLCMT. OF M/R PIN	29 Mar.93	.5	DYNCORP-E	<i>[Signature]</i> DYN AOD 702

OMENCLATURE

Spindle Assy.

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER

A204-06943
C504-03111

MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED

MWO NUMBER	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr)	PRI-ORITY	ECN	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S)	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr)	MAN HRS	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application)
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
100-237-20-107 26,1900 E	6/12/92	N	D	Swap For Three Unscr. Spindle Assy.	24/4/92	.3	DLA DDSP	<i>[Signature]</i> C. J. W-1
100-94-ASAM-23	JAN 94	M		INSP. OF ACFT HISTORICAL RECORDS FOR M/R SPINDLE BEARING SN CHECK.	21 JAN 94	.5	WDKZAA	<i>[Signature]</i> A. P. H. V. T.

1. NOMENCLATURE

M/R Blade Tip Cap

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER

A495-02643A

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED

MWO NUMBER <i>a</i>	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>b</i>	PRI-ORITY <i>c</i>	ECH <i>d</i>	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) <i>e</i>	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) <i>f</i>	MAN HRS <i>g</i>	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO <i>h</i>	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) <i>i</i>
<i>W11-60-91-ASAm-02</i>	<i>13 DEC 90</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>One time + recurring insp of Tip Cap</i>	<i>12 May 91</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>C Co 7-227</i>	<i>McA. A. McQuinn</i>

1. NOMENCLATURE

M/R Blade Tip Cap

2. REGISTRATION NUMBER

3. SERIAL NUMBER

A495-02820A

4. MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED

5. MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED

MWO NUMBER a	DATE OF MWO (Day/Mo/Yr) b	PRI-ORITY c	ECH d	MWO TITLE AND KIT NUMBER(S) e	DATE MWO APPLIED (Day/Mo/Yr) f	MAN HRS g	ORGANIZATION APPLYING MWO h	SIGNATURE (Certification of MWO Application) i
<i>111-60-91-ASAM-02</i>	<i>13 DEC 90</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>One time + recurring inspection of Tip Cap</i>	<i>12 May 91</i>	<i>.5</i>	<i>C6 7-227</i>	<i>Neil A. Peterson</i>

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

COPY

15

OF

14

**AFR 110-14 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
INDEX OF TABS**

- O Additional Substantiating Data Reports**
- P Statement of Damage to Private Property**
- Q Documents Appointing Safety Board (Not Applicable)**
- R Diagrams**
- S Photographs from Safety Report (Not Applicable)**
- T Individual Flight Records/Personnel Records**
- U Aircraft Maintenance Records**
- V Testimony and Statements of Witnesses**
- W Weather Observations**
- X Statements of Death**
- Y Appointment Documents**
- Z Photographs**
- AA Regulations and Directives**
- AB Administration and Glossaries**
- AC Other Documents**

- O**
- P**
- Q**
- R**
- S**
- T**
- U**
- V**
- W**
- X**
- Y**
- Z**
- AA**
- AB**
- AC**

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1a



AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule

11045

DATE: 14 APR 94



ROW 1

ROW 2

ROW 3

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

15 May 94
 Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Inct Base, Tur

216

MILITARY COORDINATION CENTRE

Combined Task Force
Operation Provide Comfort

Zakho, N. Iraq

Thursday

Irbil (MF 0709)

SALAH ad Din (MF 2829)

Date: 14 APR 94

0930 - EMD + STAFF
1015 - SP - CP
1030 - ACFT Arrive
1050 - T/O
1130 - Arrive - BAVZAN
(MAKE RADIO CONTACT
w/ BAFB)
~~1155 T/O~~
1145 - Arrive Irbil
1215 Depart "
1230 Arrive Salahad Din
1430 Depart " "
1530 Arrive ZAKHO

Remarks:

- Need to work A plan
to send

- Send msg to P.O.
requesting specific of
INB

- what, when

(Priority power + P.O.
office)

Hail + Jarewell → 1800h →

WX:

AWAC - 1130 - 1730 Local

HUM
- Maj Shapland
SFC Hodge

#6 COL Thompson
COL ALP
COL Mulhorn
SALIH

#1 LTC SWANN
LTC DEMETZ
LT PIPER

TUM
- SSG BAVCLAY
- SSG ROBINSON

IN:

- SSG Parks
- TSG BADMAN
- Mr DABNEY
- TSG Hamlett
- TSG
- LT Piper

OUT:

- SSG PARKS
- TSGT BADMAN
- Mr Dabney
- Mr STRZOK
- LT STRZOK

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1a

AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1b

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule

EAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT
AIRCREW MISSION BRIEF

MISSION BRIEF-BACK

*1. MISSION:

- a. Mission can be accomplished as briefed.
b. Identify required deviations from mission: NONE

2. PERMISSION PLANNING:

- *a. WEATHER (-1 REQD IF NOT LOCAL) e. IFF KEYED
*b. PERFORMANCE PLANNING f. NOISE ABATEMENT
*c. NOTAMS g. ALSE
*d. CREW STATUS
(1) Crew Endurance
(2) Qualified and current

3. PASSENGERS/CARGO/AMMUNITION:

- a. ___ Loads planned per briefing.
b. ___ Passenger manifest on file.

*4. FLIGHT ROUTE: AS BRIEFED

5. REFUELING ARRANGEMENTS: _____

6. REMARKS/SAFETY: _____

7. WEATHER UPDATE EACH STOP:

8. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

- **a. NA Snow Ops **b. Mountain Ops
**b. Formation Flight **d. NA NVG Ops

[Signature]
(PIC/Air Mission Commander's Signature)

POST-MISSION DEBRIEF

*1. MISSION STATUS:

- ___ Completed as briefed ___ Not Completed (See remarks)
___ Cancelled (See remarks) ___ Changed (See remarks)

2. PIREPS: _____

*3. CREW ENDURANCE STATUS: _____

4. AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- *a. Maintenance _____ *c. Fuel _____
*b. Avionics _____ d. Ammunition _____

5. REMARKS: _____

6. HOURS FLOWN: _____

(PIC/AIR MISSION COMMANDER'S SIGNATURE)

* Mandatory for all flights.

** Mandatory if flight conditions will be performed or exist.

MCKENNA / GARRETT

Enclosure 2 (Risk Assessment Sheet) to
 Appendix 6 (Mission Briefing) to
 ANNEX B (Operation, Training and Standardization) to Co C, 6th Bn 159th
 Avn SOP

SUPERVISION	3
Parent	1
Attached	3
Unsupervised	5

CONDITION	1
Day	1
IMC	2
Night	3
NVG	3

COMPELXITY	6
Terrain Flight	1
Multiaircraft Ops	1
External Loads	1
Overwater Ops	1
Rappel/STABO/Paradrop/Helicast	1
Millilux (2.5)	2
Mountain Ops	2
Snow Ops	2
Emergency Procedures (IP/SP)	2
MTF (Power On)	2
MTF (Power Off)	3

MISSION PLANNING	1
Detailed	1
Adequate	3
Minimal	5

WEATHER	1		
>1000/5	<1000/5	<500/800	
Day	1	2	4
Night	2	4	6

CREW SELECTION	PC 2	PI 4	
Total	>1000	>500	<500
NVG	>100	<100	<50
	1	2	4

CREW ENDURANCE	PC	PI
	Garrison	Field
Optimum	1	2
Adequate	3	4
Minimal	5	6

CREW ENDURANCE PARAMETERS:

Optimum: 12+ hrs uninterrupted rest last 24 hrs or <8 hrr duty day

Adequate: 8-12 hrs uninterrupted rest last 24 hrs or a 8-12 hr duty day

Minimal: <8 hrs uninterrupted rest last 24 hrs

RISK ASSESSMENT COMPUTATIONS:			
CATEGORY:	RISK VALUE	CATEGORY:	RISK VALUE
SUPERVISION	3	WEATHER	1
CONDITION	1	CREW SELECTION	PC 2 PI 4
COMPLEXITY	6	CREW ENDURANCE	PC 1 PI 1
MISSION PLANNING	1	TOTAL RISK ASSESSED	20
		LOW RISK 08 - 20	
		MEDIUM RISK 21 - 30	
		HIGH RISK 31 +	

APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

Low Risk Missions - Briefing Officer [Signature] signature

Medium Risk Missions - Company Commander _____ signature

High Risk Missions - 1st LTC in COC _____ signature

WAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT
AIRCREW MISSION BRIEF

*UNIT: E.F.D.
*DATE: 14 APR 94
*MSN NO: A1470

BRIEFING

1. SITUATION:

- a. Threat: Iraq, PKK
- b. Friendly Forces: USAF, Air Cap
- c. Attachments/Detachments: MCC
- d. Weather: 175-1 attached

*2. MISSION: Support MCC as directed (transport pax/cargo to Zakhu/TAOR).

3. EXECUTION:

- *a. Mission Type: TAC C F S T X D
- *b. Authorized Conditions: AA D DG DS H N NG TR W
- *c. Authorized Flight Modes: Multi-ship: yes/no
- d. Movement Techniques: _____
- *e. Aircraft/Crews:

	TYPE/TAIL #	PC/SEAT	PI/SEAT	CE	OR
(1)	UH60/ <u>001</u>	<u>McKENNA</u>	<u>GARRETT</u>	<u>COLDSPR</u>	<u>ELLNER</u>
(2)	UH60/ <u>000</u>	<u>HALL</u>	<u>MOUNSEY</u>	<u>ROBINSON</u>	<u>RAIS</u>
(3)	UH60/ _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
(4)	UH60/ _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

- *f. Special Mission Equipment: ERFs, Cold Wx Kits, TACSAT, Water & MRES
- *g. Authorized Loads: Pax: Yes/No Cargo: Yes/No Ammunition: Yes/No
- h. Flight Route: LTCC > LLTR 1234 > ZAKHU > TAOR > ZAKHU > LLTR 1234 > LTCC
- i. Mission Restrictions: No flight after official sunset, no single ship beyond Zakhu without CO's approval.
- j. Additional Remarks: Flying above or below the established altitude is authorized (IAW ACO). Contact AWACS with intentions. _____

- ** (1) Snow Operations (Associated Hazards): Yes/No
- ** (2) Formation Flight (AMC Briefed): Yes/No
- ** (3) All Requirements Of AVN MSG 93-04 On Use Of ERFs Complied With: Yes/No
- *k. Noise Abatement (Briefed on USAREUR and local procedures): Yes/No
- l. ALSE Requirements: SRU-21P, PRC-90, PRC-112

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:

- a. Refuel/Rearm Location: LTCC, Zakhu
- b. Ration Support: LTCC, Zakhu
- c. RON Support: LTCC, Zakhu
- d. Maintenance Support: LTCC

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

- *a. Command: (1) Air Mission Commander: McKENNA
- (2) Supported unit and command relationship: MCC
- b. Signal: IFF Keyed: Yes/No COMSEC Operations: Yes/No
- Other: _____

6. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

- a. Wx, Wires, Birds, Mtn & Snow Ops, Flt Following
- b. Risk Assessment: 20
- c. Conduct Mode IV/IFF and APR 39 checks, if msn allows

[Signature]
(Briefing Officer's Signature)

* Mandatory for all flights.

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
 Date: 15 May 94

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1a

AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1b

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule


AC-1c

21-12

ARMY AIRCRAFT TRAFFIC LOG (USAREUR Reg 95-40)					AIRFIELD								
AIRCRAFT NO 1	IFR/ VFR 2	TYPE 3	POINT OF DEPARTURE 4	ROUTE 5	TIME					CODE 11	REFUEL 12	POI 13	
					ETD 6	ATD 7	ETE 8	ETA 9	ATA 10				
12 APR 94													
060	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0520				1210			
056	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0520				1210			
13 APR 94													
656	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0525							
060	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0525				1316			
14 APR 94													
060	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0522							
060	V	UH60	LTCC	→ TAOR → LTCC	0520	0522							
634	V	UH60	LTCC	→ LTAG	0730	0730				1410			
634	V	UH60	LTAG	→ LTCC	1240	1240				1450			

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.


 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

7 May 94
 Date

DISPATCHER ON DUTY

DATE

DUTY OFFICER

PAGE OF PAGES

INITIALS			INITIALS			ATD	INITIALS			REMARKS	CLOSED
AFOD	OPNS	TOWER	AFOD	OPNS	TOWER		AFOD	OPNS	TOWER		
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	HALL / MENARD / ROBINSON / EITNER	
/	CSD CSD	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	HOLDEN / MENARD / MONSIEUR / BASS	X
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		X
/	VJ CSD	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	Henry / Mounsey / McCarthy / Bass	X
/	VJ CSD	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	Koch / Barrett / Robinson / Weather	X
/	CSD	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	McKinnon / Bennett / Colbert / EITNER	X
/	CSD	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	Hall / Mounsey / Johnson / Bass	X
/	CSD JH JH	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	Holden / Menard / McCarthy	X
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/	Holden / Menard / McCarthy	X
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		
/	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/		

STOCKS ARE EXHAUSTED

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule

AC-1a

AC-1b

AC-1c

AC-1d

EAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT
 MISSION SCHEDULE
 THURSDAY, 14 APRIL 1994

MSN#	TAIL#	CALLSIGN	-- FC/PI----CE/GUNNER--	REMARKS/DESTINATION
A1470	001	EAGLE 01	McKENNA/GARRETT COLBERT/ELLNER	2 SHIP TAOR
A1470	000	EAGLE 02	HALL/MOUNSEY ROBINSON/BASS	
A1477	060	EAGLE 10	HOLDEN/MENARD McCARTHY	1 SHIP INCIRLIK WX CALL 0745
AIRCREWS * SHOWTIME AT OPS: 0615 * ETD TO AIRFIELD: 0635 * PREFLIGHT TIME : 0700 * ETD FOR MISSION: 0820 * ETA BACK TO LTCC: ???? * READ POST MISSION SHEET IN OPS AFTER MISSION. * PERFORM COM CHECK ON FM. * CALL AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE, 30 MINUTES OUT, LANDING LTCC. * AMC/PIC RETURN EQUIPMENT, FILL OUT BRAIN BOOK, FILL OUT DEBRIEF.				MAINTENANCE WEAPONS DRAW: 0605 1) Bowen 2) Ellner

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

15 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1a

AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1b

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule

AC-1c

AC-1d

AC-1e

MCC OPERATIONS SCHEDULE

WEEK OF 10 - 17 APR 94

AS OF: 08 APR 94

10 APR MCC:0530Z KEMAKA (LF 2691)/BESHINGI (LF 2495)/
SUNDAY ALOKA CP/FAYDAH O-LOOK

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X ADMIN

IN:

OUT:

11 APR MCC:0615Z DERGINI (LG 7510)/PEPIRKA (MG 0107)
MONDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 4 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:

OUT:

12 APR MCC:0530Z SORIYA (LF 2822)/AVLENE (LG 1722)
TUESDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X TAOR

IN: COL MULHERN

OUT:

13 APR MCC:0615Z SURI (LF 9597)/KHALILAN (LF 8480)
WEDNESDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:

OUT:

14 APR MCC:0530Z SUMMAYL (LF 0881)/SADDAM LAKE RECON
THURSDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X ADMIN

IN:

OUT:

EXTRACT

... the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Team of ...
... investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters ...
... in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is ...

MCC Ops Schedule 10-17 Apr 94

20 May 94

WILLIAM L. HERRING, Captain
Evidence Custodian
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

MCC OPERATIONS SCHEDULE

WEEK OF 10 - 17 APR 94

AS OF: 13 APR 94

10 APR MCC:0530Z KEMAKA (LF 2691)/BESHINGI (LF 2495)/
SUNDAY ALOKA CP/FAYDAH O-LOOK

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X ADMIN

IN:COL HUNT

OUT:WO1 COFFMAN

11 APR MCC:0615Z DERGINI (LG 7510)/PEPIRKA (MG 0107)
MONDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 4 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:

OUT:

12 APR MCC:0530Z SORIYA (LF 2822)/ALOKA CP/FAYDAH O-LOOK
TUESDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:COL MULHERN/MAJ MAILHES

OUT:COL HUNT/MAJ SHAW

13 APR MCC:0615Z KHALILAN (LF 8480)/ALOKA CP/FAYDAH O-LOOK
WEDNESDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:MAJ REMMEY/SGM McDANIELS/

OUT:MAJ REMMEY/SGM McDANIELS/
MAJ ROSENGARD/SGT CHAFFELL

14 APR MCC:0615Z IRBIL (MF 0709)/SALAH AD DIN (MF 2826)
THURSDAY

EAGLE:0520-0630Z 2 X MCC SPT MSN

IN:SSG PARKS/TSG BADMAN/MR DABNEY

OUT:SSG PARKS/TSG BADMAN/
MR DABNEY

EXTRACT

... was Custodian for the Accident Investigation ...
... of two U.S. Army Black Hawk Helicopters ...
... on 12 April 1994, and that the ...

MCC Ops Schedule 10-17 Apr 94

20 May 94

W. H. H.
WILLIAM H. HARRIS
Evidence Custodian
Incident # 10-17 Apr 94

1. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

SUMMARY: - POWER CUT/PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY.
- GOI ACTIVITY: NSTR.
- JSOTF REACTION FORCE.

A. (U) POWER CUT: AS OF 1900 HRS LOCAL ON 08 APR 94, THE ELECTRICITY FROM GOI HAS STILL NOT BEEN RESTORED TO THE DAHUK GOVERNORATE. IT IS NOW 248 DAYS SINCE IT WAS CUT ON 5 AUG 93. WORK CONTINUES ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY. IT IS REPORTED THAT LIMITED POWER IS NOW AVAILABLE TO THE THREE URBAN AREAS OF DAHUK, SUMMAYL (LF0881), AND ZAKHO.

B. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) GOI ACTIVITIES: NSTR

C. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) TRUCK TRAFFIC: TRUCK TRAFFIC FOR 7 APR 94 - NOT AVAILABLE.

D. (U) VISITORS TO ZAKHO HOUSE: 6.

2. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) COMMUNICATIONS: NTR

3. ~~(S)~~ ^(U)

{CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (138 WORDS)!}

4. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) LOGISTICS AS OF 08 APR 94:

JP-4 STATUS 15,149/20,000 GALLONS
MOGAS STATUS 20,140/50,000 LITRES
DIESEL STATUS 3,940/50,000 LITRES

5. PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NTR

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RMNF~~
UNCLAS

EXTRACT
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from
MCC SITREP - 098, 8 APR 94, except for Deleted Classified
which is kept in my records system. *Portions*
W. H.
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt. USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
Date *20 May 94*

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
~~CONFIDENTIAL/RMNF~~ to UNCLASSIFIED.
Donald G. Norris
20 MAY 94
Date
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

MCC HELICOPTERS MISSIONS:

- APR - 1 SHIP ADMIN
- 10 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN
- 11 APR 94 - 4 SHIP MCC SUPPORT MISSION
- 12 APR 94 - 2 SHIP TAOR
- 13 APR 94 - 2 SHIP MCC SUPPORT MISSION
- 14 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN
- 15 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN
- 16 APR 94 - 2 SHIP MCC SUPPORT MISSION

AIRCRAFT STATUS: 5 FMC, 1 NMC (AUX POWER UNIT INOPERATIVE).

7. ^U~~(C)~~ TRANSPORT STATUS: MCC VEHICLES STATUS: FOUR TOYOTAS - FMC, FOUR HMMWV - 3 FMC, 1 NMC (BLOWN ENGINE), 4 CUCV - 4 FMC

- 8. (U) PLAQUES: NTR
- 9. (U) CCMCC COMMENTS: NTR

MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RYNF~~
UNCLAS

SUBJECT: ^U/_(C) MCC ZAKHO SITREP # 103 - 13 APR 94

1. ^U/_(C) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

SUMMARY: - POWER CUT/PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY.
 - AIR/ROAD PATROL.
 - FAYDAH OVERFLIGHTS.
 - VILLAGE VISIT: ROUTINE REPORT.
 - VISIT TO ALOKA CHECKPOINT: REACTION TO FAYDAH OVERFLIGHTS, CONSCRIPTION DEFERRED, FIGHTING IN RAMADI, BENZINE AND PROPANE, DEATH OF OPPOSITION LEADER, HARASSMENT.
 - GOI ACTIVITY: NSTR.

A. (U) POWER CUT: AS OF 1900 HRS LOCAL ON 13 APR 94, THE ELECTRICITY FROM GOI HAS STILL NOT BEEN RESTORED TO THE DAHUK GOVERNORATE. IT IS NOW 253 DAYS SINCE IT WAS CUT ON 5 AUG 93. DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED. LOCAL REPORTING INDICATES PKK CUT LINES IN TURKEY.

[CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (72 WORDS)]

C. ^U/_(C) FAYDAH OVERFLIGHTS: ON 13 APR 94 MCC WAS PRESENT ON THE FAYDAH OVERLOOK DURING CTF OVERFLIGHTS OF THE FAYDAH AREA. THE ONLY OBSERVABLE REACTION TO THE COALITION AIRCRAFT FROM TROOPS IN THE FAYDAH COMPLEX WAS BY TWO MEN FROM THE MACHINE GUN POSITION AT OP11 (LF144729), WHO AFTER THE FIRST PASS APPEARED TO QUIT THEIR POST AND MOVE QUICKLY ACROSS THE FIELD ON FOOT TO THE CONCRETE BUILDING AT THE ENTRANCE TO FAYDAH CAMP (LF147736). A NUMBER OF MEN IN OTHER POSITIONS REMAINED IN FULL VIEW THROUGHOUT THE SEQUENCE OF PASSES; CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON THE MAIN NORTH/SOUTH ROAD CONTINUED NORMALLY; MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES AND PEDESTRIANS WAS SEEN ON THE GIREPAN ROAD TO SHARIYAH (LF1973).

D. ^U/_(C) VILLAGE VISIT - ZHULE (LF846812): ON 13 APR 94 MCC MADE ITS FIRST VISIT TO THE ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN VILLAGE OF ZHULE OF THE TIARI TRIBE. THE PEOPLE CAME FROM THE MARDIN AREA OF TURKEY TO SETTLE THE VILLAGE IN 1927. THE VILLAGE WAS ATTACKED AND DESTROYED FIVE TIMES IN THE PERIOD FROM THE MID 1960S TO 1985 WHEN ALL THE PEOPLE WERE FINALLY DEPORTED TO AQRAN (MF0169). AT THAT TIME THERE HAD BEEN 133 FAMILIES IN THE GROUP OF VILLAGES IN THE AREA. ZHULE ITSELF HAD CONSISTED OF 12 FAMILIES. IN 1991 6 FAMILIES HAD RETURNED TO REBUILD THE VILLAGE ON THE ORIGINAL SITE WITH THE HELP OF CARITAS. THERE WAS ONE MUKHTAR FOR THE WHOLE GROUP OF VILLAGES. THERE WAS NO CLINIC, SCHOOL, OR CHURCH IN THE VILLAGE OR IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. THE JOURNEY TO AQRAN TOOK SEVEN HOURS ON FOOT BUT THEY COULD USUALLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RYNF~~

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from MCC SITREP 103, 13 Apr 94, except for *Redacted classified portions* which is kept in my records system.

William L. Harris
 20 May 94
 Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RYNF~~ to UNCLASSIFIED.

Donald G. Norris
 20 May 94
 Date

DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-13, DAC
 Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

GET TRANSPORT (20 DINARS PER PERSON ONE WAY) FROM BAKIRMAN (LF8276) ABOUT 8 KM AWAY. THEY HAD ENOUGH LAND AND DID NOT SUFFER FROM LAND DISPUTES LIKE THE PEOPLE OF RIBATE (LF7681) (SEE SITRP # 88 DATED 29 MAR 94). THEIR MAIN CROPS WERE RICE AND SESAME. THEIR WATER CAME FROM THE NEARBY RIVER KHAZIR BUT HAD NOT BEEN TESTED. THEY SAID THAT IRRIGATION WAS A PROBLEM AND A GERMAN NGO HAD MADE AN INSPECTION OF THE SYSTEM 3 MONTHS AGO BUT HAD NOT BEEN BACK SINCE. THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN SMALL NUMBERS OF SHEEP DEPENDING ON FAMILY SIZE. NO-ONE IN ZHULE OWNED A TRACTOR AND A HIRED ONE COST 140 DINARS TO PLOUGH 1 DONUM (0.25 HECTARES). THERE WERE DIFFERENT OPINIONS OVER WHETHER THEY HAD RECEIVED SEED OR FERTILISERS. THE WHEAT HAD BEEN BADLY AFFECTED BY SUNNAPEST IN 1993 WHICH WAS ALREADY ATTACKING THIS YEAR'S CROP. THEY HAD NOT YET PRODUCED SUFFICIENT SURPLUS TO SELL ANY OF THE HARVESTS. THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM NGOS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SOME AID FROM UN AND CONTRIBUTING NATIONS WAS DIVERTED BEFORE IT REACHED THE VILLAGES IN NEED. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HIGH PRICE OF FOODSTUFFS SUCH AS 17 TO 18 DINARS FOR A KILO OF FLOUR AND 50 DINARS FOR A CAN OF COOKING OIL. THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT BEEN VISITED BY ANY OFFICIALS EXCEPT FROM THE ASSYRIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (ADM). THEIR MAIN POINT OF CONTACT FOR PROBLEMS HOWEVER

[CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (33 WORDS)]

U
D. ~~(C)~~ VISIT TO ALOKA CHECKPOINT: ON 13 APR 94 FOLLOWING THE LOW-LEVEL CTF FLIGHTS OVER FAYDAH, MCC VISITED THE ALOKA CHECKPOINT AND WERE TOLD THAT:

(1) THEY HAD NOT YET HEARD OF THE REACTION IN THE GOI AREA TO THE FLIGHTS. HOWEVER TWO TRUCK DRIVERS WHO HAD JUST COME FROM FAYDAH SAID PEOPLE WERE ASKING WHY THE AIRCRAFT WERE FLYING SO LOW. THE DRIVERS HAD SEEN TWO SOLDIERS IN A FORT HEADING FOR THEIR BOMB SHELTER.

(2) GOI HAD DEFERRED CONSCRIPTION TO THE FORCES FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN N.IRAQ BORN BETWEEN 1970 AND 1976, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOW ELIGIBLE. SUCH PEOPLE WERE THEREFORE ABLE TO TRAVEL FREELY TO THE GOI AREA. NO TIME LIMIT HAD BEEN GIVEN.

(3) A MAN FROM THE RAMADI GOVERNORATE (BASIN OF RIVER EUPHRATES, WEST OF BAGHDAD) HAD SAID THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN A VILLAGE CALLED ABUL ALGHANIM (NOT LOCATED) IN WHICH SEVEN GOI TROOPS AND TWO VILLAGERS HAD BEEN KILLED.

(4) THERE WAS STILL NO MOVEMENT OF BENZINE OR PROPANE FROM GOI AREA. THE MERCHANTS HAD BEEN PROMISED SUPPLIES ON 13 OR 14 APR 94. GOI OFFICIALS WERE APPARENTLY ASKING TRAVELLERS WHY THE ELECTRICITY IN N.IRAQ HAD BEEN CUT OFF AND WHEN IT WOULD COME BACK ON.

(5) GOI OFFICIALS WERE SAID TO BE VERY HAPPY AT THE

DEATH OF OPPOSITION LEADER GHARBI HADIDI IN QASROK (REPORTED BY MCC IN SITREP # 102 DATED 12 APR 94, IN WHICH THE NAME WAS GIVEN AS ABUL HADIDI).

(6) HARASSMENT OF TRAVELLERS AT JANBUR CHECKPOINT (LF1765) CONTINUED AS BEFORE.

E. ~~(S)~~ GOI ACTIVITIES: FOLLOW UP OF ASSASSINATION OF LISSY SCHMIDT: ON 13 APR 94 MCC RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 12 APR 94 FROM THE MAYOR OF ZAKHO: (QUOTE) SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE GERMAN JOURNALIST LISSY SCHMIDT. THE DAHUK GOVERNORATE INFORMED US THIS EVENING IN A MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THE KURDISTAN REGION THAT THREE PEOPLE PARTICIPATED IN THE INCIDENT OF THE GERMAN JOURNALIST LISSY SCHMIDT'S MARTYRDOM. TWO OF THEM WERE ARRESTED WHILE THE THIRD IS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY [MCC COMMENT: TAKEN TO IMPLY GOI]. THE TWO THAT WERE CAPTURED CONFESSED TO THE PERPETRATION OF THE KILLING. WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE DETAILS AS SOON AS THEY ARRIVE. (END QUOTE)

F. ~~(S)~~ TRUCK TRAFFIC: TRUCK TRAFFIC FOR 12 APR 94 - NOT AVAILABLE.

G. (U) VISITORS TO ZAKHO HOUSE: 9.

2. ~~(S)~~ COMMUNICATIONS: NTR

3. ~~(S)~~

[CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (73 WORDS)]

4. ~~(S)~~ LOGISTICS AS OF 13 APR 94:

JP-4 STATUS 11,863/20,000 GALLONS

MOGAS STATUS 19,240/50,000 LITRES

DIESEL STATUS 2,940/50,000 LITRES

5. PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NTR

6. ~~(S)~~ MCC HELICOPTERS MISSIONS:

14 APR 94 - 2 SHIP SUPPORT MISSION

15 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN
16 APR 94 - 3 SHIP ADMIN
17 APR 94 - DOWN DAY
18 APR 94 - 2 SHIP TAOR
19 APR 94 - 2 SHIP MCC SUPPORT MISSION
20 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN
21 APR 94 - 2 SHIP ADMIN

AIRCRAFT STATUS: 6 FMC

7. ^W(C) TRANSPORT STATUS: MCC VEHICLE STATUS: FOUR TOYOTAS -
FMC, FOUR HMMWV - 3 FMC, 1 NMC (BLOWN ENGINE), 4 CUCV - 4 FMC

8. (U) PLAQUES: NTR

9. (U) CCMCC COMMENTS: NTR

MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

TAB AC-1

UH-60 BLACK HAWK 88-26060

AC-1a Black Hawk Load Plan and Pre-mission Brief

AC-1b UH-60 Crew Member Briefing/Risk Assessment

AC-1c AE Form 1010, Army Aircraft Traffic Log

AC-1d Eagle Flight Detachment Mission Schedule

AC-1a

AC-1e MCC Situation Reports and Operations Schedule

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-1b

AC-1f Eagle Flight Following Schedule

AC-1c

AC-1d

AC-1e

AC-1f

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
EAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT, 12th AVIATION BRIGADE
PIRINCLIK, TURKEY, APO AE 09825

AETV-AVA-EAGLE


1 APR 93


MEMORANDUM FOR FLIGHT CREWS

SUBJECT: Eagle Flight Coordinates

1. The attached sheet contains the destination coordinates with coordinating letter designations. These letter designations will be used to transmit the locations and destination to AWACS (Cougar).
2. The route of flight will be straight line from point to point unless otherwise indicated. In the event of a "round robin" or to a destination that does not have a letter designation notify AWACS appropriately. i.e. "Eagle 1 will be enroute to vicinity Delta".
3. The following CFAC units should receive the coordinates and designated locations.

CFAC OPNS	Rec'd 31 Dec 92
C-3 CTF HQ'S	Rec'd 31 Dec 92
MAD DOG OPNS	Rec'd 30 Dec 92
4. If there are any questions, contact the detachment IP at DSN 676-7085


KENNETH J. KOCH
CW2, AV
Detachment IP

CERTIFICATE	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.	
<u>7 May 94</u> Date	 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

EAGLE FLIGHT CHECKPOINT DESTINATION COORDINATES

A = AL AMADIYA	N37'05.6	E043'28.8	38S	LG 6555	0645
B = BARUSHKI	N37'04.1	E043'04.5	38S	LG 2900	0410
C = BARZAN	N36'55.5	E044'02.7	38S	MF 1500	8700
D = BATUPAH	N37'10.7	E043'00.7	38S	LG 2350	1650
E = AQURAH	N36'45.5	E043'54.0	38S	MF 0145	6905
F = BASHUR AFLD	N36'32.0	E044'20.5	38S	MF 4100	4335
G = DAHUK	N36'51.5	E043'00.0	38S	LP 2220	8070
H = DIYANAH	N36'39.8	E044'32.7	38S	MF 5934	5769
I = PIDAH	N36'48.9	E042'54.6	38S	LP 1350	7650
J = QAL'AH CHIN	N36'38.6	E044'19.4	38S	MF 3920	5410
K = HARIK	N37'02.5	E043'40.1	38S	LG 8176	0041
L = IRBIL	N36'13.0	E043'58.5	38S	MF 0800	0862
M = KANI MASI	N37'13.8	E043'26.5	38S	LG 6180	2165
N = MANGESH	N37'02.5	E043'08.0	38S	LG 3096	0065
O = SALAH A DIN	N36'21.3	E043'16.0	38S	MF 3420	2350
P = SHALADIZA	N37'02.3	E043'48.1	38S	LP 9345	9995
Q = SHAQLAWA	N36'23.5	E044'19.9	38S	MF 2875	2689
R = SURI	N37'01.1	E043'49.7	38S	LP 9575	9770
S = SARSENK	N37'02.4	E043'20.7	38S	LG 5275	0065
T = SIRSENK AFLD	N37'06.0	E043'16.2	38S	LG 4636	0735
U = SPINDAR	N36'58.4	E043'19.1	38S	LP 5100	9310
V = DAM (BEKMA)	N36'40.4	E044'14.1	38S	MF 3380	6030
W = ZAKHU	N37'08.5	E042'40.7	38S	KG 9331	1353
X = ZAWITA	N36'54.2	E043'08.2	38S	LP 3394	8588

EAGLE FLIGHT INTERNAL FREQUENCIES (Secure capable UHF/PM)
 FM #1 41.45 UHF 300.000 VHF 141.800 FM #2 30.30

LLTR COORDINATES

DIYARBAKIR	N37'53.8	E040'11.6	37S	FB 0502	9518
TURN POINT # 1	N37'43.5	E041'47.5	37S	GB 4602	7918
TURN POINT # 2	N37'25.5	E041'51.8	37S	GB 5350	4600
TURN POINT # 3	N37'25.1	E041'13.1	38S	KG 5382	4498
GATE # 1	N37'12.1	E042'36.8	38S	KG 8815	1998

LTCC FREQUENCIES VHF 122.100 UHF 257.800 VOR 110.0

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

AC-2

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

AC-2

AC-3

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

AC-3a

AC-3a Extract from AWACS Log Book

AC-3b 552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet

AC-3c Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log

AC-3d AWACS In-flight Log

AC-3e 552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary

AC-3f Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information

AC-3g 28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet

AC-3h Statement on AWACS Video Camera

AC-3i AWACS Pre-mission Brief

RECORD
AWACS
LOG
BOOK

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED
Date 26 May 94
Ronald G. Norris
RONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
 I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
 SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED
 16 MAY 94
 Date
 DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
 Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1991 and that this is a true and accurate extract from the AWACS Log Book, interview for 14-15 Apr 91 which is kept in the records system.
 16 May 97
 Date
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

3
 // LRW 0814 GOOD LINK & PIC
 FOCY//

1 D/MD 0818 PUMA 44 NO COOL STAY TILL BINGO OUT BECAUSE
 NO GAS FOR YOU//

NK// D/MD 0821 1815Z BINGO FOR COUGAR/ROGER
 MD/D 0825 LOOKING FOR EVERYBODY TO BE FULL AFTER
 P94 1215Z BINGO FOR CLAW & COUGAR//

350Z MD/D 0920 CLAW ABOUT 20 MIN LATE//
 SIC 0922 ROGER WE WILL HAVE TAPES UPON RTN/TURKS
 RUNNING SPECIAL MEN/HAVE TAPES//

MD/C 0925 WHATS INFO IN PROVIDE CONFIDENT FLTS/ARE
 THEY INTERFERING, WHAT ALT, TYPE ACFT/
 NIE/R4 ELEMENTS BELOW ROT 3 STAYING
 LOW//

MD/D 0958 2 SPEC MSN JUST INSIDE TANK 1 & LIOLE ORPINDANCE
 ON BOARD

MD/D 1018 NEEDS 1315 WX OUT. BACK//
 14 APR 94 14 APR 94
 QUARTZ/32/T ETD 0450Z

MD/C 0530 JTIDS W INDIA//
 SC/SD 0540 RDOCK LC / GO MIKE 17//
 MD/SD 0741 RDOCK LC//
 C/MD/SD 0742 TIGER JUST SHOT DOWN 2 HIND
 HELICOPTERS N 36'46".9 E 44'04".3
 AT 0730Z N 36'45".1 E 44'05".2
 KING HD COPY AND V. DEO//
 C/SD 0745 WE DO HAVE HD COPY//

~~DAD~~ DMD 0745 WHAT KIND OF MUNITIONS USED/
STANDBY/TIGER IS ON TANKER
WILL BE A FEW BEFORE WE
GET INFO //

MD/D 0755 DO YOU WANT THE RECCE TO TAKE
PICTURES OF AREA / ROGER TAKE
PICTURES OF AREA AND CHK FOR
SURVIVORS //

MD/D 0907 HOW DID WE GET ID / VISUAL ID
AND AWACS ID / WAS AWACS TRACKING
PRIOR TO ENGAGEMENT? / MEG IT
HAPPENED SO QUICKLY AND THEY
WERE AT LOW ALT IN THE CLUTTERED
AREA

MD/D 0910 TIGER 1 USED A SLAMMER ~~AND~~
AIM9 MIKE # FOR TIGER 2 //

MD/D 0912 WHO'S FLYING IN RAIDER?
FALCON IS # 2 GUY / I'LL
LET HIM FLY OVER

DMD 0915 WRITE DWN THE SQNC OF EVNTS //

DMD 0917 GIVE ME A CALL WHEN YOU SEND
TIGERS HOME / ~~ETD~~ ETD 0945Z
ETA 0930Z

D/MD 0929Z THE HARRIERS SHOULD HAVE RECCE CREW

D/MD 0931 ASK AWACS WHAT KIND OF ID THEY
/ ASK AWACS WHAT KIND OF ID
THEY HAD / JUST A RADAR NO ~~SON~~ SQU
KS NO CONF BY AWACS # IF HOSTILE ORND

WERE THEY TRACKING EAGLE & FLT AT
ALL NEED POSITIVE CONF OF THEIR PSN

D/MD 0941 NO SURVIVORS / WERE THEY CARRYING
ORDINANCE / THEY WERE CARRYING
SOME KIND OF ~~ORDINAL~~ ORDINANCE ON PYLONS
BUT UNSURE OF WHAT KIND //

C/MD 0945 LIKE YOU TO EST VOX CONTACT / WE'VE
BEEN TRYING //

SO/CM 65.000 AOR OR EXTEND TO ~~45~~ 1735z - 1835z
IS OUR MAX DUTY DAY //

D/MD 0906 HAS TIGER GONE YET / NO //

D/MD 0909 HAVE THE HARRIERS FLOWN OVER TARGET /
ROGER HURRICANE JUST FLEW OVER AND
TOOK PICTURES / SPITFIRE FLYING
OVER ATT

D/MD 0914 CONFIRM GOOD RADAR ON EAGLE FLT /
FIND THEM AND ~~KEEP~~ KEEP THEM GET
GOOD COORDINATES //

D/MD 0915 AWAC GUY SAYS WHENEVER EAGLE FLY FLIES
THEY ALWAYS SQUAWK / HE SAYS THEY ARE
DOWN RIGHT NOW //

D/MD 0916 CONFIRM W/AWACS IF THEY DID HAVE
A GOOD SQUAWK BECAUSE EAGLE FLY CAME
WITHIN 10 MILES OF SHOOT DOWN //

WS11:

~~1. HAD~~ D/MD 0918 CONF IF EAGLE WAS A SINGLE OR DOUBLE //

D/MD 0921 TIGERS JUMPED //

JAN D/MD 0925 EAGLE WAS A 2 SHIP MSN //

DTA

DMD 0926 HURRICANE SAID HE FLEW OVER
BOTH CRASH SITES / SPITFIRE ONE
SITE ATT //

DMD 0929 WHAT WAS HDING OF TARGET AT
TIME OF INCIDENT / UNKNOWN //

DMD 0930 CONFIRMED A VALID SQUAWK WELL
AFTER INCIDENT WITH HINDS //

SO/CM 0931 ON TANK ATT / COPY //

D/MD 0932 ARE THEY STILL TALKING TO
TIGER / NEG WERE GETTING GAS

D/MD 0937 HAVE YOU HAD ANY LUCK REACHING
EAGLE / NEG / DID YOU COPY THAT
THEY HAVE A CONFIRMED AFTER
THE INCIDENT //

D/MD 0945 ARE YOU STILL ON TANKER ? /
JUST GOT OFF / GET BACK ON
AND GET 30000 MORE //

C/SO 0947 WHAT IS YOUR TOTAL FUEL ONLOAD /
WE'RE STILL COORDINATING THROUGH
D/MD //

MD/D 0952 GOING TO TAKE ON 30000 / GET
30000 AND TIGER GETS THE REST /
YOU GUYS MAY BE OUT AWHILE / I
GIVE TIGER THE REST BUT I MEAN
GIVE CLAW THE REST / ROGER //

MD/D 1007 WX RPT //

D/MD 1026 HAS TIGER LANDED AND HAVE
THEY LOOKED AT THE VIDEO /

1026 CONT NEG HE JUST LANDED / GET VIDEO
ASAP //

D/MO 1028 D.D THEY GET CONFIRMATION ON THE PARKING LOT/
THEY FLEW OVER BUT ARE NOT SURE
IF THEY WERE ON RIGHT VECTOR

D/MO 1045 HAVE CLAW MAKE SOME NOISE OVER THE
CRASH SITE / I DON'T THINK IT'S SMART
BUT I'LL DO IT //

MD/D 1102 CLAW SAW SITE 1, MADE NOISE, NO ONE WILL GAS
EXCEPT TIGER OFF OF PUMA 55 //

D/MO 1110 UNTIL POSITIVE ID ON EAGLE WE ARE GOING TO STAY
IN AREA UNTIL 1730Z //

S/C 1115 NEED COMSEC GUY TO COME OVER TO RADIO / ROGER /
ABOUT KICK 13

D/MO 1123 DID ANYBODY HAVE CT WITH EAGLE FLT TODAY / YES
WHEN THEY CAME INTO AOR / LAST CT WAS AT ZACKO
@ 0650Z //

S/C 1125 SINGLE CK / 4C HOW MANY / 4C ALSO //

D/MO 1129 HAS ANY ONE HAD CT WITH EAGLE FLT / APPROX
TIME WAS 0600Z WHEN ~~THEY~~ THEY WERE LEAVING
ZACKO TO POINT (D) / WAS ALO AWARE THAT
THEY WERE COMING INTO AOR / ~~AFFIRM~~ AFFIRMATIVE)
DID ALO KNOW OF THEIR TIMES TO DIFF PLACES
NEG //

S/C 1135 RAMROD VP / ROGER / COPY BINGO TIMES / FUEL BINGO
1735Z / 1810Z BINGO / WILL EXTEND DUTY DAY 2 HR /
ROGER //

D/MD 1149 SPIDER & VIKING WILL NOT MAKE IT OUT/ANY
WORD ON TIGER DEBRIEF YET/NEG//

D/MD 1232 DUKE, TIGER & PUMA 55 REMAIN ON SPIN UNTIL
1730Z/SAUY 2 TAKE OFF 1545Z/PUMA 11 T/O 1610Z/
CLAW T/O 1615Z//

S/L 1238 BTB 1730Z/SAUY 02 1530Z T/O/WHEN DO HAVE
THEM ABOUT THE WESTERN LONG @ 32,000 & WE WILL BE
@ 23,000/ROGER//

S/L 1244 ON FALY MIT & NLS/THEIR P.O. WILL BE 75/ROGER//

MD/L 1403 GHOST 31 & PONY WANTS OVERLAND REFUELING/ROGER
A.R. IS URGENT DUE TO LACK OF FUEL//

MD/L 1406 EAGLE 14 ETA 1500Z//

MD/C 1411 GHOST WANT TO AB. PONY OVER 1 AB & IN ROZ 2//

C/MD 1415 UNDER STAND THAT YOU WANT GHOST TO RE FUEL
WHEREVER EVER POSS TO ACCOMP. MSN/ROGER//

C/MD 1428 SAUY 02 UP ATT/NEED YOUR PLANE BACK ASAP//

S/CZ 1440 ADD CK/1/2 BWS//

D/MD 1932 PONY 22 ADV TRAILER JUST OUTSIDE
ZAKHU WHEN ON WAY BACK TO CRASH
SITE//

D/MD 1935 YOUR TANKER AIRBORNE//

D/MD 1940 GHOST 31 WANTS GHOST 32 TO PICK THEM
UP ON WAY TO DIX//

15 APR 94

MD/P 0032 PONY 23 ON PECK @ PIX (DIX) ATT//

MD/D 0038 PONY 21 HEADING INBOUND/PONY 22 LEFT AT
FAR SITE THEN BACK TO AB WITH LAST REMAIN
BNL//

MD/P 0046 GHOST 33 ON DECK @ PIX ATT//

1
 MD/D 0055 2 HELI LEFT FOR PIR / 1 HELI BTWN SITE 1
 & AB & 1 Q AB TOGETHER PIR //

2/ MD/D 0000 W/ UPDATE //

3/ 4/C 0101 SINGLE CK / NEG ATTY //

MD/D 0108 HEADING OUTSIDE ROZ L ATT //

MD/D 0117 PONY 22 ON DECK @ CRASH SITE ATTY //

MD/D 0119 EST FLT TIME BTWN PIR & AB 45
 MIN //

4/ MD/D 0121 PONY 21 ETA @ PIR 0230Z / COPY //

4/C 0126 OFF STN 0125Z / COPY //

MD/D 0132 PONY 22 MAY OR MAY NOT BE AIRBORNE
 (HOST 32 STILL ON DECK / GOING OFF STN ATTY //

15 APR 94 15 APR 94

1/ UNIFORM / 05 / D ETO ~~0250Z~~ 0600Z

SO/C 0617 RDO CK LC //

MD/D 0623 RDO CK / 5 BY / ALL F16'S INDEFINITE ROLEX //

SO/C 0625 RDO CK LC BWYS //

4/ C/SO 0721 JTIDS W/ INDIA AND DADDY //

SO/R/C 0 RECOMMEND KICK TO MIKE 18 //

D/M/D 1005 ANSTE ANOTHER PACKAGE ENTERING THE ROZ //

D/M/D 1025 40 MILES W ROZ L 2 IN IRAQ / A
 4TH SPECIAL MISSION OF HELI IN IRAQ

D/M/D 1034 1ST ACFT LEFT IRAQ / 2ND LEAVING / THIRD
 AB STILL IN IRAQ / FOURTH W/ HELI STILL THERE //

W/MD 1050 DO YOU WANT THIS INFO ON ACFT? / 6 PACKAGE
 OF FIGHTERS HEADED TOWARD IRQ IRAQ /
 ALREADY WITHIN 25 MILES

C/SO 1050 D: PHASE PROB / ON UHF RDO SYSTEM //

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

		AC-3a
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	

~~SECRET~~

MISSION:		CSO COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION WORKSHEET								DATE:																			
POSITION	GD	A	B	C	D	RADIO	DA	FREQ(P)	FREQ(S)	USE																			
31		2	10	17	23	21	T1R2	16																					
27	AST	2	10	05	23	21	T3R4	17																					
23	AST	2	10	05	23	21	T5R6	20																					
05	WD SD	1	22	24	23/2	21	RT7	21		TSAT																			
30	TC ^{NO GNET} ₃	1	22	04	05	17	RT8	22		ENROUTE																			
04	WD SD	1	22	24	23/2	21	RT9	23		FOR HB																			
06	DUKE	1	14/6	12/4	23/2	21	RT10	24		TANK																			
11	AAS	2	17	05	14/6	21	RT11	25		FOR																			
07	ASO	2	17	05	03	21	RT12	GD-1		GUARD																			
14	AST	2	10	05	23/2	21	R13	GD-3		ADF																			
25	CAP	1	22	24	23/2	25	TR14	03		SSAT																			
21	Check in	1	22	24	23/2	12/4	RT15	12		HB																			
02	CT						RT16	14		DUKE																			
22	CSO						RT17	05		INDIA																			
26	ART						RT18	06		OB																			
33	CDMT						RT20	N/A		HO																			
13							ERV1	04		TIMING																			
10	TANK	1	22	24	23	14/6	HF1	10																					
24	MCC	1	05	24	23	21	HF2																						
01	SD	1	22	24	23	21	HF3	71																					
FLT DECK	NET:	HF:	VHF:	UHF:	VHF-1		21																						
					VHF-2		15																						
					VHF-FM		13																						
RT08		RT09			RT10			RT11																					
CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D						
F1						F1						F1						F1						F1					
F2						F2						F2						F2						F2					
F3						F3						F3						F3						F3					
F4						F4						F4						F4						F4					
F5						F5						F5						F5						F5					
F6						F6						F6						F6						F6					
RT15		RT16			RT17			RT18																					
CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D	CN	DA	A	B	C	D						
F1						F1						F1						F1						F1					
F2						F2						F2						F2						F2					
F3						F3						F3						F3						F3					
F4						F4						F4						F4						F4					
F5						F5						F5						F5						F5					
F6						F6						F6						F6						F6					

552 ACW Form 32, Oct 92

~~SECRET~~

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

~~SECRET~~ to UNCLASSIFIED

14 May 1994
Date

Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, SAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

14 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a	
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	

~~SECRET~~

Br 10 R1 RS
R7

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR 28 AD FORMS 36, 42, 48, AND 49				
NAME	MISSION	ACFT TAIL NO.	DATE	PAGE
[REDACTED] SD			14 APR 94	1 OF
TIME (Z)	CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE / REMARKS (CONTINUED)			
0458	Wpm consoles assigned			
	area altimeter 29.75 1007			
0521	RCFMU RT7 ^{not} SATCOM RT9 RT15			
0727	Engaged 3646.9 N 3645.1 N #C157 TRO1 4404.3E 4405.2E			
0730	Splash 1 Hind ⁴⁰¹⁰⁰ Splash 2 3647 N below 500' 4407 E			
0744	passed to MD TRO1 AMRAM TRO2 AIM-9M VID			
0754	Cyrano 4 #C175 #5534 1/4200			
0812	Height Finder HE 340/20			
1013	Halo sighted by Bronco			
1026	Bronco @ site 7 ^{parking} 3623.0 4412.0			
1052	CW11 over splash site "broken-up and charred"			
1100	Cycb through PRC-112 Progr. 253.25 26430			
1259	R/D Pony ²¹ 22 on Satcom Ghost 31			
1320	Comm set ²³ for SAR			
1428	Tiger ^{at} Puma Tiger bracketed 28K alt 20K @ 1500Z			
1457	SAR package through gate			
1519				
1522	Friendly shoot down confirmed			
1523	Radios released			
1520	Off-station			

28 AD FORM 67 APR 89

(PREVIOUS EDITIONS WILL BE USED)

~~SECRET~~

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
 I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
~~SECRET~~ to UNCLASSIFIED.
 15 May 94
 Date
 Donald G. Norris
 DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
 Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.
 15 May 94
 Date
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a	
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	AC-3d
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	

~~SECRET~~

34055

AWACS MISSION SUMMARY			Tail #	Squadron	Date	Mission Number
			251	963	14 APR 94	DPC 084
TIMING	PLANNED	ACTUAL	Orbit Designator & Altitude		Departure Based	Landing Base
SHOW	Z	Z			CTAG	CTAG
TAKEOFF	0450 Z	0436 Z	Aircraft Callsign		Mission Callsign	Required Equipment (Circle)
LANDING	1430 Z	1615 Z	SAVVY 01		COUGAR 01	FFT SPEC-A JTIDS
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	9.7 HRS	11.6 HRS	Aircraft Commander		Mission Crew Commander	MRU/ARU with:
ARRIVE ORBIT	Z	Z	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	_____
ON STATION	0730 Z	0545 Z	Senior Director		Air Surveillance Officer	OPCON
OFF STATION	1330 Z	1520 Z	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	_____
LEAVE ORBIT	Z	Z	Tanker Base		Tanker Callsign	Tanker Type
1st TOTAL STATION	640 HRS	HRS			PUMA 33	
IN AR TRACK	Z	Z	Air Refuelling Track & Altitude		ARCT	Exercise Name
ON TANKER	1000 Z	0936/1009Z			1000Z	
OFF TANKER	Z	0946/1013 Z	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:			
FUEL ONLOAD	40 K	48/24 K 7L				
LEAVE AR TRACK	Z	Z				
ARRIVE 2nd ORBIT	Z	Z	MISSION TYPE: M/S/A/X/OCF/HIGH VALUE <i>(Circle all that apply)</i>			
2nd ON STATION	Z	Z	CREW TRAINING DATA <i>(REF: ACCR 51-60, VOL II)</i>		ZULU TO LOCAL CONVERSION	
2nd OFF STATION	Z	Z	POSITION		DEPARTURE BASE	LANDING BASE
LEAVE 2nd ORBIT	Z	Z	#PRESENT			
2nd TOTAL STATION	HRS	HRS	#EFFECTIVE			
ADDITIONAL EVENTS			PILOT		CURRENT OPS (552 ACW/OG/OSOS) POINT OF CONTACT/Phone #	
AOCP OPERATIONAL	Z	Z	CO-PILOT			
IFF OPERATIONAL	Z	0505 Z	NAV			
RADAR OPERATIONAL	Z	0526 Z	FE			
RADIOS AVAILABLE	Z	0521 Z	CSO			
A/C CONFIG FOR AR	Z	Z	MCC			
A/C POST AR OP	Z	Z	BDT			
OPCON CONTACT	Z	Z	SD			
START QC/PMRP	Z	Z	WD			
COMPLETE QC/PMRP	Z	Z	ASO			
MX CODES PASSED	Z	Z	AAST			
PWR DOWN	Z	Z	AST			
DUTY DAY ENDS	Z	Z	CT			
ON-STATION DEGRADATION			ART			
REASON	TIME LOST	IMPACT <small>(NONE/PARTIAL/TOTAL)</small>	CURRENT OPS REMARKS:			
E-3 EQUIPMENT	HRS	N P T				
WEATHER	HRS	N P T				
TANKER	HRS	N P T				
MAINT DELAY	HRS	N P T				
WPNS ACT DLY/CNX	HRS	N P T				
ATC	HRS	N P T				
OTHER	HRS	N P T				

552 ACW Form 49, Jul 93

(Previous Editions Obsolete)

Page 1 of 4

~~SECRET~~

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
 I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
~~SECRET~~ to UNCLASSIFIED.
 15 May 94
 Date

Donald G. Norris
 DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
 Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

15 May 94
 Date

W. L. Harris
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

WEAPONS CONTROL ACTIVITY - SCHEDULED & CONTROLLED

C/S	UNIT	BASE	TYPE A/C	NAF	TOTAL SCHED	# CNTR	MISSION TYPE	MISSION TIMES	AIRSPACE	REASONS NOT CONTROLLED

FIGHTER UNIT POC's/REMARKS	SENIOR DUTY REMARKS	WEAPONS TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS						
		WEAPONS DIRECTOR	# A-A	# A-S	# AR	INITIAL	MRL	EFF

TACTICAL DATA LINK INFORMATION				ELECTRONIC COMBAT TRAINING			
UNIT	HRS	TYPE	REMARKS	ECM/ECCM	SCHEDULED YES NO	EFFECTIVE YES NO	
				COMM JAM	SCHEDULED YES NO	EFFECTIVE YES NO	
				SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS:			

NARRATIVE - COMMENTS & PROBLEM AREAS

TACTICS LESSONS LEARNED

MCC:

SD:

ASO:

TECHS:

FAA/AIRSPACE:

ARE THERE ADDITIONAL SHEETS ATTACHED? YES/NO HOW MANY? _____

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a	
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	AC-3d
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	AC-3e
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	

Full-up / DOP - 00 R

AWACS INFLIGHT LOG		NAVIGATOR	PROT	DATE	CALL SIGN/TAIL NO.								
CLEARANCE				DESTINATION	BLOCK TIME								
CAF VFR 232.0				LTA5	1615Z								
V. 12) V101 145 40164				DEPARTURE	T.O. TIME								
ILS 05 - DH 496				LTA5	0436Z (0736L)								
				MISSION NUMBER	TOTAL TIME								
				DPC-084	11.6								
TIME	AID	R P I	POSITION		STA 1	STA 2	ALT	TAS GS	W	V	NEXT CK POINT		REMARKS
			LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	DME	DME					TEMP	TC	
0501	INS 1	18	-24.0	-50.9	412	341	32.0	375	224	28	WAU-UP	0444	
	INS 2	✓	37-24.0	035-50.9	2	2	48	5					0.109 (C.S)
0547	INS 1	40	-32.1	-03.4	842	841	✓	372	286	9	KTAWN	0525	0545 ON STATION
	INS 2	✓	37-32.4	039-03.7	2	6	49	5			JTIDS	0531	0351 (C.S)
0617	INS 1	18	-20.2	-02.0	✓	✓	✓	385	276	19	JTIDS	0531	
	INS 2	✓	37-20.5	039-01.9	✓	✓	✓	5					0.134 (C.S)
0647	INS 1	16	-32.4	-01.3	✓	✓	✓	288	184	5	ARCT	0930	
	INS 2	✓	37-32.5	039-01.5	✓	✓	✓	5			JTIDS	0930	0.049 (C.S)
0730	INS 1	20	-55.5	-02.4	841	841	✓	380	267	31	Der:K	0715	0730 - KILL 2 HIND HELOS.
	INS 2	✓	37-55.9	042-02.6	4	5	48	5			SUNP	0726	0.875 (C.S)
0810	INS 1	✓	-44.4	-24.4	✓	✓	✓	370	309	20	G FOR	0730	0.900 (C.S)
	INS 2	✓	37-44.8	043-24.3	✓	✓	✓	49					0.900 (C.S)
0900	INS 1	22	-59.2	-25.9	✓	✓	✓	376	306	26			0.886 (C.S)
	INS 2	✓	37-59.5	043-25.9	✓	✓	✓	4					0.886 (C.S)
ARR	INS 1	TK4	070	1200									
	INS 2	✓	120	1200	270								
0940	INS 1	18	-44.7	-11.1	✓	✓	✓	373	125	01	ARL		0.811 (C.S)
	INS 2	✓	37-44.9	043-11.1	✓	✓	✓	34					0.811 (C.S)
1027	INS 1	✓	-01.4	-24.4	✓	✓	✓	310	263	208	31	ROZ1	0.929 (C.S)
	INS 2	✓	38-01.6	043-24.2	✓	✓	✓	4					0.929 (C.S)
1115	INS 1	20	-06.7	-12.0	✓	✓	✓	392	246	18			1056 - TONE UNFLIGHTED
	INS 2	✓	38-06.9	043-12.0	✓	✓	✓	5					0.983 (C.S)
1200	INS 1	18	-38.2	-09.4	✓	✓	✓	384	323	13			1735 FUEL 1310 OLEW
	INS 2	✓	37-38.0	043-09.4	✓	✓	✓	4					0.996 (C.S)
1300	INS 1	✓	-42.3	-58.5	✓	✓	✓	376	328	14	OFF STATION	1730	1530 TO SAVVYZ
	INS 2	✓	37-42.5	042-58.5	✓	✓	✓	5					1.117 (C.S)
1400	INS 1	✓	-39.2	-07.8	✓	✓	✓	355	348	13			D-100000 (C.S)
	INS 2	✓	37-39.4	043-07.7	✓	✓	✓	4					1.401 (C.S)
1448	INS 1	20	-36.6	-36.0	✓	✓	✓	32.0	303	04	SUNO	1453	0 DLY NAT
	INS 2	✓	37-36.9	042-35.8	✓	✓	✓	344			Der:K	1504	1.52 (C.S)
1510	INS 1	✓	-30.7	-57.0	442	441	✓	32.0	304	14	KTAWN	1528	Vref=133 1520 CF 151
	INS 2	✓	37-30.6	037-57.5	2	1	4A	276			LUGAR	1530	1548Z 2128Z

552 ACW Form 34, Sep 92

(Previous Edition Will Be Used)

(See Reverse)

0730 - HIND (2) KILLED.
Probable IIS/UN Blackbirds.

AC = 1-605
15452 Y18.0

This Page
Reduced
with

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

037-270 037-25.5
 038-53.0 039-17.5
 CW, 6.0 Nm Rad.

TIME	AID	R P I	POSITION		STA 1	STA 2	ALT	TAS	W	V	NEXT CK POINT		REMARKS
			LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	RAD DME	RAD DME		TEMP			GS	TC	
1600	INS 1	24	20.3	-33.8	014	014	18.0	528	200	15	424.14	1532	NO VID Rad/DME Δ
	INS 2		37-20.2	03-33.1	2	014	-	5			424.14	1540	
	Δ		-19.5	-25.0		25							
1610	INS 1		LND	LTAC	202	9650							
	INS 2												
	Δ												
1615	INS 1		-00.3	-23.7									
	INS 2		-00.8	-23.0									
	Δ		37-00.0	035-29.7									
	INS 1												
	INS 2												
	Δ												
	INS 1												
	INS 2												
	Δ												
	INS 1												
	INS 2												
	Δ												
	INS 1												
	INS 2												
	Δ												
	INS 1												
	INS 2												
	Δ												

CELESTIAL HEADING FORM			DEVIATION DATA		REFUELING INFORMATION	
TIME			CEL TH	-	FINAL DISCONNECT TIME	POSITION 37-44.9
BODY			TH INS 1 P	02.0	0948	043-13.9
GHA			TH INS 2 N	093.0	INITIAL CONTACT TIME	POSITION 37-31.9
CORR			VAR	-3	0936	042-47.3
TOTAL GHA			MH	090	TOTAL TIME +10	ONLOAD 45M
LONG -W + E			DEC CORR 1	-L	CLEARANCE	
* LHA			AHRS 1 N	098	REFUELING INFORMATION	
* DEC			DEC CORR 2	30	FINAL DISCONNECT TIME	POSITION 37-43.9
* LAT			AHRS 2 P	090	1013	042-55.8
HC			DEV CORR STBY	±0	INITIAL CONTACT TIME	POSITION 37-39.2
ZN			CH STBY P	090	1009 Z	043-33.8
IRB			ZN + IRB = TH		TOTAL TIME +04	ONLOAD 24M
TH			* APPLY 15/45 RULE		CLEARANCE	

This page reduced - will

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief
	AC-3f

~~SECRET~~

RELEASABLE TO MULTINATIONAL FORCES

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

BRIEFER: MSGT Newhall

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION	
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from	
<u>SECRET</u>	to UNCLASSIFIED.
<u>26 May 94</u>	<u>Donald G. Norris</u> DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC Declassification Team Chief, IIQ USEUCOM
Date	

RELEASABLE TO MULTINATIONAL FORCES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET REL MNE~~

IRAQ AIR SUMMARY


TOTAL SORTIES: 135

FIXED WING: 132

HELICOPTER: 3

LOCAL TRACKS: 15
(PREVIOUS MISSION)

HIGHLIGHTS



Helo to BAGHDAD TO AL KUWAYR CH-53K3

UNO 700	LCA	HAB	UMQ	KWI
	0700Z	1000Z	1230Z	1250Z

UNO 566/7	BAH	HAB	BAH
	0600Z	0900Z	1130Z

~~SECRET REL MNE~~

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

SECRET REL MNE to UNCLASSIFIED

10MAR94

Date

ADONALD

ARIS, GS-15, SAC

Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

14 May 94

Date

LIAAM L. HARRIS, Capt USAF MSC

Evidence Custodian, Ineritik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a
AC-3a Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b 552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e 552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	AC-3d
AC-3g 28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h Statement on AWACS Video Camera	AC-3e
AC-3i AWACS Pre-mission Brief	
	AC-3f
	AC-3g

PU 75

3CA

M17

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR 28 AD FORMS 36, 42, 48, AND 49

NAME	Capt [REDACTED]	MISSION	DPC084	ACFT TAIL NO.	0351	DATE	14 MAR 94	PAGE	1 OF 1
------	-----------------	---------	--------	---------------	------	------	-----------	------	--------

TIME (Z)	CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE/REMARKS (CONTINUED)								
0449	IFF T.O.	Z/Z				3623N441ZE			
0452	Cleared S/A					KK466/KK777			
0456	IFF TFRD					KE056			
0503	Cleared TSat cam					6A064			
0505	IFF ops								
0512	Radar TFRD	AZ	108/104/306			BZ	109/103/311		
0513	JTIDS	↑ w/ XRAY							
0517	Radar ops	- minor ringing	AZ checked						
0520	Ops	normal							
0520	Released radios					EM25/6			
0526	Radar ops	both chains							
0527	JTIDS	↑ w/ India							
0537	JTIDS	↑ w/ Dabney							
0540	TA	ops							
0545	On	station							
0600	Z011 = spec msn	2/1661	3/3600	1/23		in Iraq	≈ 12		1500
0617	Z001 = spec msn	3722N04305E				into Iraq	1/33 2/2255		3/07 00
0633	Z063 = "	2/2255	3/1100	1/41					140000 110000 120000
0700	TA	↑ w/ RW							1200
0708	Z011	land at LTAT	3824N03806E			(ERHAC?)			
0715	Z001	"	"	"					
0730	Z063	"							
0730	Splash	Z 4 link helos	500K			1 AMKRAM	AIM 9M		
			3646N04404E			3645N04405E			
0900	AlR	↓ list							
0926	Sensors	TFRD FOR A/R				4.1 + 5.0			
1019	Sensors	TFRD back to me.							
1020	Sensors	ops normal post A/R.				CG ops normal.			
1124	Both	SATCOMs work							

EXTRACT
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from AWACS Cover Log, ASU, DPC 084, 1404194 which is kept in my records system.
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
 16 May 94
 Date

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a	
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	AC-3d
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	AC-3e
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	
		AC-3f
		AC-3g
		AC-3h

STATEMENT

7 May 94

1. A VHS video camera was purchased in early March 1994 for the purpose of video taping unusual air activity in the Operation Provide Comfort Tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). The primary reason was to document airspace conflicts between OPC missions and Turkish Air Force anti-PKK operations. By early March a significant safety and political issue had evolved that obtained higher headquarters attention. To support a tasking to record these events, I requested approval from CTF/CG (Brig Gen Pilkington) to purchase a video camera.
2. I obtained CG approval and C4 coordination on the same day. Money was authorized and Lt Col Jeffcoat (AWACS DETCO) purchased the camera at the Incirlik Base Exchange.
3. Lt Col Jeffcoat signed for the camera and assumed responsibility for deciding which crew members would store, maintain and operate the equipment. He stated he had people who were very familiar with this as the 552nd Wing at Tinker AFB, OK often tapes portions of missions for training.
4. In our discussion, I explained in detail what EUCOM and CTF was interested in, and that he should focus on Turkish activity that conflicted with OPC traffic. I concluded by stating that AWACS crews were now required to present the tapes to CTF/C3 and verbally debrief these missions only if Turkish activity conflicted with OPC operations.

James R O'Brien
JAMES R. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

18 May 94
Day


W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-3

E-3B AWACS

	AC-3a	
AC-3a	Extract from AWACS Log Book	
AC-3b	552nd ACW Form 32, CSO Communication Configuration Worksheet	AC-3b
AC-3c	Extract from AWACS Senior Director Log	
AC-3d	AWACS In-flight Log	AC-3c
AC-3e	552nd ACW Form 49, AWACS Mission Summary	
AC-3f	Intelligence Brief - UN Flight Information	AC-3d
AC-3g	28 AD Form 67, ASO Log Continuation Sheet	
AC-3h	Statement on AWACS Video Camera	AC-3e
AC-3i	AWACS Pre-mission Brief	
		AC-3f
		AC-3g
		AC-3h
		AC-3i

THIS BRIEFING IS CLASSIFIED SECRET



TIME HACK



WEATHER

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

~~SECRET~~ to UNCLASSIFIED.

10 MAY 1994
Date

Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

W. L. Harris
14 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

THIS BRIEFING IS CLASSIFIED SECRET

WEATHER:

LTAG: _____

ROZ I: _____

ALTN: _____

ON BOARD PERSONNEL

- DISTINGUISHED VISITOR(S)

- PAX

- DUKE(S)

- TURKISH CONTROLLER(S)

- TOTAL ON BOARD - _____

Aircraft Status

TAIL NUMBER: _____


STATUS:

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: _____

MISSION SYSTEMS: _____

REMARKS: _____

E-3 TIMELINE



MSN NBR: _____
TAIL NBR: _____
CALL SIGN: _____
ENGINE START: _____
FIRST ACTIVITY: _____
LAST ACTIVITY: _____



ARCT TIMING/INFORMATION

21

	<u>A/R#1</u>	<u>A/R#2</u>
ARCT:	_____	_____
TANKER C/S:	_____	_____
ONLOAD:	_____	_____

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

- * NO SMOKING ON BUS OR IN RAMP AREA**
- * REMOVE ALL RINGS PRIOR TO BOARDING BUS**
- * EAR PROTECTION REQUIRED ON FLIGHT LINE**
- * WEAR REFLECTIVE BELT ON RAMP WHEN WALKING TO/FROM AIRCRAFT IN THE DARK**
- * DO NOT CROSS RED LINE ON RAMP**
- * BOARDING STAND IS STEEP - MAXIMUM TWO PEOPLE ON STAND AT A TIME**
- * REMOVE SCARVES AFTER BOARDING AIRCRAFT**
- * EYEGLASSES (IF REQUIRED) WILL BE WORN INFLIGHT**

EMERGENCY SIGNALS

ON GROUND


ALARM BELL ON 5 TO 10
SECONDS - EVACUATE AIRCRAFT

CRASH LANDING

ANNOUNCE OVER PA & ILLUMINATE
CRASH LANDING SIGNS "PREPARE FOR
CRASH LANDING (OR DITCHING)

ALARM BELL ON 5 TO 10 SECONDS
CRASH LANDING SIGNS ILLUMINATED -
BRACE FOR CRASH LANDING OR DITCHING

GROUND EVACUATION



FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF BASIC AIRMANSHIP

- * THOROUGHLY BRIEF MISSION
- * EVALUATE FLIGHT ACTIVITY
- * CRITIQUE MISSION
- * AIRCREW DISCIPLINE
 - CREW COORDINATION - CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
 - SOUND JUDGEMENT
 - IF IT DOESN'T LOOK OR FEEL RIGHT-DCN'T DO IT!
 - ADDRESS BREACHES IMMEDIATELY
 - INFORM SUPERVISORS
- * STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH T.O.s AND DIRECTIVES
- * KNOW YOUR LIMITS

WING POLICY ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY

- * DO NOT DISCUSS DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION, WHAT EQUIPMENT WE DO IT WITH, AND HOW THAT EQUIPMENT WORKS THIS INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED AND ONLY RELEASABLE ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS
- * DO NOT JEOPARDIZE THE MISSION BY ASKING QUESTIONS SPECULATING, OR DRAWING ATTENTION TO EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES ON WHICH YOU HAVE NOT BEEN BRIEFED
- * IF QUESTIONED BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL "I'M SORRY, I CANNOT ANSWER YOUR QUESTION" IS THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. IF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSISTS, DEFER TO AC/MCC

INTEL

TECH AREAS TO EXEL

- JTIDS: DIRECT LOAD MAY FIX THE PROBLEM
 - DO NOT RUN MONITOR LOOP-BACK MESSAGE TEST - FREEZES TERMINAL
- SUPERIOR MAINTENANCE DEBRIEFS HAVE KEPT AIRCRAFT IN GREAT SHAPE
- DDs ON THE RISE: READ FORMS CAREFULLY CONTINUE WITH PROFESSIONAL DEBRIEFS

TECHS AND FE

RELEASED

WEAPONS "GAME PLAN"

- **OBJECTIVES**
- **TASKINGS**
 - **ENROUTE**
 - **TANKER**
 - **TAOR**

STANDING NOTES

*NEW LIFE SUPPORT HEADSET PROCEDURES:
MCCs ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SIGNING OUT
THE HEADSET BAG FROM OPS WITH THEIR MISSION
KITS. MCCs WILL ENSURE THEY ARE RETURNED
AT THE END OF THE MISSION WITH THE
MISSION KITS.*

*- Document Headset problems & return
broken headsets to Life Support*

DAILY NOTES

- KEEP ACCURATE LOGS OF ANY UNUSUAL ACTIVITY
 - TIME HDG ALT SPD POSITION & WHAT IT'S DOING
- Don't Forget VCR + VIDEOTAPE
 - * BRACKET ATTACHES TO BACK OF MISSION CREW SEAT!

SURVEILLANCE

"GAME PLAN"

- **OBJECTIVES**

- **TASKINGS**

- **TRACKING**

- **LOGS**

- **LINKS**

STANDING NOTES

MISSION CREW COMMANDER

- DURING SYSTEMS WAKE-UP PASS STATUS TO SAVVY OPS EVERY 15 MINUTES
- PRIOR TO HEADING EAST IN THE CORRIDOR CALL "OPS NORMAL MINUS JTIDS"
- ONCE IFF/RADAR ARE OPERATIONAL - PROCEED EAST ON COURSE TO LINK WITH DADDY AND INDIA
- IF NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH SAVVY/MADDOG - USE HF PHONE PATCH THRU INCIRLIK AIRWAYS TO SAVVY OPS ON THE HOUR +05 AND +35
- COMPLETE MISSION SYSTEMS POWER DOWN AFTER LAST FIGHTER COMES UNDER ATC CONTROL (K-TOWN)
- FILL OUT/TURN IN DAILY DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE TO INTEL

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

- AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060**
- AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000**
(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)
- AC-3 E-3B AWACS**
- AC-4 F-15C 79-0025**
- AC-5 F-15C 84-0025**
- AC-6 Command and Control**
- AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides**
- AC-8 Miscellaneous**

AC-1

AC-2

AC-3

AC-4

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

DATE OF REVIEW (Cont'd)	UNIT	GRADE	NAME (Last, First & MI)
6 APR 94			
GENERATOR FAILURE			
DOUBLE GENERATOR FAILURE			
AMAD FAILURE			
RUNAWAY TRIM			
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM MALF			
SPEED BRAKE FAILURE			
INLET LIGHT ON			
BOARDING STEPS INFLIGHT			
ATTITUDE FAILURE			
HEADING ERROR			
INS FAILURE			
CONTROLLABILITY CHECK			
FLAP MALFUNCTIONS			
BLOWN TIRE ON LANDING			
HYDRAULIC FAILURE			
LANDING GEAR UNSAFE			
LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXT			
APPROACH END ARREST			
DEPARTURE END ARREST			
AIR REFUELING MALFUNCTIONS			
RADAR MALFUNCTIONS			
CONDUCTED IN CPT OR SIM			
PILOTS CONDUCTING THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COCKPIT TRAINING ENTER LAST NAME TO THE RIGHT			

F-15 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COCKPIT TRAINING REVIEW LOG	DATE OF REVIEW	UNIT	GRADE	NAME (Last, First & MI)
INSTRUCTIONS: (X) Check block to right of emerg if reviewed during the EPCT.	6 APR 94			
AMAD FIRE/OVERHEAT - START				
JFS READY LITE - NOT ON				
JFS - ABNORMAL START				
EMERGENCY GENERATOR NOT ON				
ABNORMAL ENGINE START				
ECS LITE ON				
INS PROBLEMS				
ANTI - SKID MALFUNCTIONS				
LOSS OF BRAKES				
LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL				
GROUND EGRESS				
ABORT				
EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON				
ENGINE FAILURE ON TAKEOFF				
AFTER BURNER FAILURE				
ENGINE FIRE/OVERHEAT - TAKEOFF				
PITCH RATIO FAIL				
TIRE FAILURE - TAKEOFF				
LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT				
OUT - OF - CONTROL RECOVERY				
EJECTION				
ENGINE STALL/STAGNATION				
SINGLE ENGINE OPERATION				
DOUBLE ENGINE STALL/STAGNATION				
RESTART/JFS ASSIST				
EEC MALFUNCTIONS				
NOZZLE FAILURE				
ENGINE FIRE/OVERHEAT INFLIGHT				
AMAD FIRE/OVERHEAT INFLIGHT				
SMOKE/FUMES/FIRE - COCKPIT				
CANOPY LOSS				
EXTREME COCKPIT TEMPERATURE				
BLEED AIR MALFUNCTIONS				
ECS MALFUNCTIONS				
OIL SYSTEMS MALFUNCTIONS				
EMERG BST ON/BST SYS MALF LITE				
FUEL BOOST PUMP INOP				
FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM MALF				
UNCOMMANDED FUEL VENTING				
INFLIGHT FUEL LEAK				

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.
 11 May 94
 Date
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

Tiger 02

Upon entering AOR Tiger 1 reported radar contact at 30 miles low/slow. Cougar reported "clean there". I found contact on my scope locked it, attempted ID - Mode 1 and Mode 4 with no friendly reply. Contact was tail aspect, heading southeast (110 hdg) at 130 knots.

Tiger 1 reported "possible road traffic" I responded "Tiger 2 shows 130 knots." I broke lock and continued to sanitize the area. Tiger 1 reported the contact again to Cougar, and began to ramp down to perform VID. I performed "S Turn" behind Tiger 1 to achieve 3 NM trail position (briefed intercept option to low/slow contact).

Tiger 1 flew down valley low altitude and performed VID as "HIND". Upon repositioning in vertical he called "correction HIP; tally 2 lead/trail." I was approaching contacts from the stern offset right. I picked up the shadows of the helos against the river bed. I passed the trail helo at approx 3-4,000' lateral on the right side. The helo was camouflaged, appeared to have wings, with no fin flashes or tail markings.

As I repositioned to the North, Tiger 1 called Cougar and stated we had 2 hinds at our position, Cougar "rogered" the call. Tiger 1 called for the flight to arm hot, I acknowledged and he called in.

I watched a missile launch from his left wing, make a bee-line for the target and observed a fireball. Tiger 1 called "off, 2 you are cleared-in; lead bandit is on my nose 2 miles."


I replied "I have him on radar," closed inside 2NM, selected heat uncaged the Sidewinder and fired an AIM-9M at 9,000'. The target was banking hard left towards high terrain. The missile grabbed a large amount of lead (left turn), then corrected back to the target. The fireball engulfed the aircraft and wreckage fell along the north side of the valley.

We safed up switches, made two RECCE passes across top of wreckage site, then manned the Eastern cap.

CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, being a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Board of Inquiry, do hereby certify that the above is a true and accurate copy of the original report of the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the area of [redacted] on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the original report of the crash of the aircraft.

15 May 94
Date:


WILLIAM L. HANTES, Capt. USAF USAF
Evidence Custodian
Inch. Attn: [redacted]

Signature Musked-Wm. Hantes, 15 May 94

Signature of
Tiger 02 Deleted
to Protect Identity
by: Col AFTR lag/Alk
14 APR 94
1553L

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

GPS (DEPLOYED)
OPERATIONS PROVIDE COMFORT

Everyone must sign this form before
you are issued a gun!

WEAPON / GPS ISSUE LOG

ISSUING/RECEIVING PERSON Kenneth S. Cunn
SHIFT TRANSFERRED TO B. McDaniel

DATE 13-4-94
WEAPON/GPS ACCOUNTABILITY
BEGIN SHIFT 10 END SHIFT 6
6

WEAPON S/N	GPS S/N	ASSIGNED GPS #	RNDS	ISSUED TO / SIGNATURE	RECEIVED BY/ TIME
1072394	0010001CDH	01	30	[REDACTED]	B. McDaniel
1071500	0010001E22	02	30	[REDACTED]	B. McDaniel
1073460	0010001CE6	03	30	cap Wyrick	B. McDaniel
1071497	0010001E32	04	30	cap. Roth	J. McDaniel
1072354	0010001E37	05	30	cap. schulz	B. McDaniel
1073463	0010001E44	06	30	cap. Neuser	B. McDaniel
1073472					
1073465					
1071499					
1073464					

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

18 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-4d

CONSOLIDATED FLIGHT AUTHORIZATION/APPROVAL

52 fw [redacted] 515C [redacted] 11 APR 94 PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

AUTHORITY TO U.S.C. 8012 and E.O. 9397. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To identify crewmembers authorized/approved to perform specified duties on a specified flight. The SSN is necessary to identify the individual. ROUTINE USES: Used as a flight order to designate crewmembers for a given flight and to prepare AFTO 781, Aerospace Vehicle Flight Data Document. Information contained in this flight authorization may be disclosed to any DOD component including the Department of the Air Force, and, upon request, to other Federal, State, and local agencies in the pursuit of their official duties. It may be used for other lawful purposes including law enforcement and litigation. DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY. Failure to provide information, including the SSN, would prevent personnel from acquiring access to USAF aircraft, prevent performance of the mission, and result in administrative/disciplinary action.

CREWMEMBERS LISTED BELOW WILL DEPART FROM INCIRLIK (CT/G) ON/ABOUT 11 APR 94 IN THE AIRCRAFT INDICATED AND RETURN TO DEPARTURE BASE ON/ABOUT 11 APR 94. VARIATIONS IN ITINERARY AUTHORIZED FOR FLIGHTS TO OTHER THAN DEPARTURE BASE. USE USAF FORM 618.

LINE NO	TAIL NO	CALL SIGN	NAME OF ACFT COMMANDER (Last, first and second initials) & GRADE ¹	CREW MEMBER	SSN	CREW POSN	TYPE MSN ²	MSN SYM	ETD	ETA	ATE	ALT	E/NE	REMARKS/A/C INITIALS
									ATD	ATA				
1	4085	1	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	PI	RA	0-1	0635	0930	3.5			[redacted]
2	4085	2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	PI			1	1	3.5			[redacted]
3	4085	1	SEPP, DAVID	OT	[redacted]				0805	1240	5.1			DATA
4	4085	2	SMYK, LAINE	OT	[redacted]				0808	1313	5.1			DATA
5	4085	1	SMYK, SCOTT	OT	[redacted]				1130	1715	6.4			SEA
6	4085	2	SMYK, [redacted]	OT	[redacted]				1125	1746	6.4			William
7	4085	1	SMYK, SCOTT	OT	[redacted]				1500	1600	0.6			SEA
									1500	1535	0.6			

7/30.6

CERTIFICATE
 I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.
 18 May 94
 Date
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

¹ Designate * = Flt Lead ** = Dep Flt Lead.
² List primary and alternate mission, e.g. ACT, A/G, DACT, LLN, MAV, WW

MISSION CONTROL/MISSION CLEARANCE/APPROVAL AUTHORITY'S SIGNATURE [redacted] Turkey

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-4d

AC-4e

Control Tower Flight Data Strip

TIGER
2/F-15

2410	0635
0635	0930
	0950

R |

~~R~~ R

I	F	1000
		42

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date

W. L. Harve
WILLIAM L. HARVE, Capt. USAF MED
Evidence Custodian
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-4d

AC-4e

AC-4f

~~SECRET/RYAN~~

~~SECRET/RYAN~~

TIGER
 ARCT C/S DELD ICN ALT M2
 0755 22 11K 32/95Y 210 3502

CAP N3620 E4350
CLAW
 ARCT C/S DELD ICN ALT M2
 0835 22 10K 32/95Y 210 3502
 20 44 13K 34/97Y 210 3504

CAP N3620 E 4230
 AUTHENTICATE
 RIE = Y TIE = Z
 M.I.O. = C SIT. = I

CODEWORDS

RETRGRADE TO SECURITY ZONE
 MISSILE GUIDANCE DETECTED
 AWACS RADAR PERMANENTLY DOWN
 AWACS RADAR UP
 ON STATION
 EF-111 JAMMING ON
 SEARCH RADAR DETECTED
 WEATHER RECALL
 NO WEASEL COVER
 EXIT DRAG PERMANENTLY
 SLIP TOT MINUTES
 MISSION CANCELLED
 STRANGEO MODE SC
 OFF STATION
 GROUNDING
 HOLDING PRESENT POSITION
 URGENT
 EF-111 JAMMING OFF
 TTR DETECTED
 EXIT DRAG TEMPORARY
 NO AIR COVER
 DCA BULLSEYE
 AWACS RADAR DEGRADED
 NO TANKER AVAILABLE
 VECTOR TO TANKER
 SAR GPS BULLSEYE
 AWACS RADAR DOWN TEMPORARILY

BASE # 5

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

Date: 15 May 94

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from Secret Base to UNCLASSIFIED.

Donald G. Norris, GS-13, DAF
 Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

Date: 14 May 94

M2 SQKS 0720-0845 JUL MI = 52

DAY: THURSDAY DATE: 14 APR 94 ATOM: 1103

TIGER	CLAW	TIGER	TIGER
F-15		NO F-15E	
BRONCO		RAIDER	VIKING
VIEZEL	(M)	THUD	(M)
(M) F-18	RHINO		
ELVIS 01			
TU F-4	(4) SAHIN	(4) SAHIN	
PUMA 11		PUMA 55	
PUMA 22			
KC-135			
JAG		MUSCAT	
F-135		CANDY	MEDOC
HARRIER	SPITFIRE		
HURRICANE			
VC-10			

WORD QUARTZ 32 LETTER T

NET 301.350	00 291.950	19 254.300	18 268.700	17 255.300	16 273.200	15 389.600
15A BOOM	16A SAR DISC	17A SURV A	18A SURV B	TOD 338.025	AUTO-TOD 399.0	
1 OPS	2 GND	3 TWR	4 DER	5 AOR	6 SOP	7 MADDOG
2 DERK	3 JUMP	4 GATE 1	5 SENSEK	6 WEST	7 CAP	8 ENROUTE
9 EAST	10 WEST	11 KIRKUK	M1	12 GCA	13 GCA	14 APP
M2 BATAK	M2 DTRAB					

VUL: 0720-0845	MSN #: A1410 / A1411	BINGO (OKER + 2000)	T/O	0635	0620	0600	0540	TIGER	CLAW
START	CHECK	TAXI	T/O	0635	0620	0600	0540	TIGER	CLAW

~~SECRET/RYAN~~

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-4d

AC-4e

AC-4f

AC-4g

THE [REDACTED] "NATO TIGERS"

NAME	ACFT	LOC	CODE	BLOODCHIT	COMSEC	7SI	120	TAPE	PILOT AID	SIGNATURE
[REDACTED]	400S	5A	I	1 3.5	3109	0135	1005	1B	1	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	900S	8A	II ROR	2 3.5	3110	?	?	2B	2	[REDACTED]
RETH	401S	6	I	3 5.1	3111	0805	1310	3B	3	[Signature]
WIRICK	0012	8	II ROR	4 5.1	3112	0808	1313	6.0	4	[Signature]
RETH-(COF)	0011	6A	I	0.6		1500	1535			
SCHULE	4006	8	I	5	3113	1105	1546	9.0	5	[Signature]
NEUSER	9006	8A	II ROR INTERCOM LITE	6	3114	6	6	103	6	[Signature]

DATE: 14 APR 94


SPARE ACFT: 401S / TIGER 1st GO

SORTIES FLOWN: 7

TOTAL HOURS: 30.6

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.


 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

13 May 94
 Date

TAB AC-4

F-15C 79-0025

AC-4a F-15 Emergency Procedures, Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-4b Tiger 02 Notes, 14 April 1994

AC-4c Weapons/GPS Issued Log

AC-4a

AC-4d USAFE Form 406, Consolidated Flight Authorization

AC-4e Control Tower Flight Data Strips

AC-4b

AC-4f Tiger Flight Line Up Card, Mission Numbers 1410/1411

AC-4g Squadron Sign-out Log

AC-4c

AC-4h Squadron Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing Guide

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-4d

AC-4e

AC-4f

AC-4g

AC-4h

TIME HACK

INTEL

OBJECTIVE
WX/NOTAMS

- LTAG
- ALTERNATES
- AOR/AAR TRACK

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT / MAPS / FCIF / SIGNOUT


- SANITIZE
- GPS
- 9 MM / AMMO
- E/E KIT
- VTR TAPE
- CLASSIFIED PILOT AID
- COMBAT WALLET
- DTM


DATA CARD

- TIMES
- JOKER / BINGO
- ADMIN vs TACTICAL FUELS
- CODEWORDS

GROUND OPS

- PREFLIGHT
- S1S2 SWITCHES
- AIM-120 BIT
- START
- "ROLEX" vs "SLIP"
- RADIOS - 2 / 1 AUX
- REDBALLS ON 1 AUX

CERTIFICATE	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.	
<u>23 May 94</u> Date	 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION	
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from	
<u>SECRET</u> to UNCLASSIFIED <u>23 MAY 94</u> Date	 DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

Classified by: TAC/DO
Declassify on: OADR

DO NOT REMOVE

GO-NO-GO SYSTEMS

- RADAR
- IFF MODES
- AAI
- CC/ADC/PACS
- INS
- RWR
- AAR SYSTEM
- WEAPON MINIMUMS
- VTR DRILL
 - HUD, BOTH, VSD & VOICE TITLE
- CHECK IN
 - HQ NET / 1 AUX
 - UNABLE TOD, PASS FROM LEAD
- TAXI / RWR CHECK / ARMING FLOW
 - LANDING LIGHT ON WHEN COMPLETE
- PRIOR TO TAKEOFF
 - RADIOS - SWITCH 3 / AUTO SWITCH TIGER/CLAW AUX

DEPARTURE

- TAKEOFF (VMC/IMC)
- RADIOS - 4 / TIGER/CLAW AUX ONCE AIRBORNE
- REJOIN
- SYSTEMS CHECK
 - MSTR ARM SAFE
 - AIM-9s, RADAR, AAI, RWR
 - DESELECT COOL
 - T/A/TACAN ON = SYSTEMS CHECK COMPLETE
- ALIBIS
 - REQUEST "GREEN AUX" - GO SECURE AUX

ENROUTE

- FORMATION VMC - SPREAD = 2000-3000'; 0-30° AFT
- IMC - 2 NM TRAIL
- CONS CHECK

AOR ENTRY

- RADIOS - COLIGAR (CH8) > DUKE (CH9) > HQ NET
- 10 AUX IF GOING TO TANKER

?? QUESTIONS GOING OUT ??

~~SECRET~~

RTB

- REJOIN
- FENCE OUT
- BDA CHECK
- ENROUTE FORMATION
- K-TOWN
 - RADIOS - 14 ; 1 AUX (CALL IN CODES)
- APPROACH INTENTIONS
 - INITIAL vs STRAIGHT IN
- DE-ARM

ABNORMAL PROCEDURES / SPECIAL SUBJECTS

- ABORTS
- LANDING IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF
- RADAR / VISUAL SEARCH RESPONSIBILITIES
- MID-AIR COLLISION AVOIDANCE

TANKER OPS -

- ARCT TIMES
 - TANKER CALL SIGNS / ALTITUDES
 - OFF-LOADS
- RENDEZVOUS FORMATION
- BRITTS CHECK; GMD OFF
- REFUELING ORDER
 - "QUICK FLOW"
- POST REFUELING FLOW

?? ADMIN QUESTIONS ??

TACTICAL BRIEF



AOR FLOW (ON CARD)

FACTORS IMPACTING MISSION -

- ENVIRONMENT
 - SUN/CONS/CLOUDS/HAZE/WINDS
- AOR LAYOUT
 - OTHER FLAYER LOCATIONS




- AVIACS
- BLIND ZONES - RADAR and RADIOS
- THREATS
 - AIR-to-AIR
 - ORDNANCE
 - ECM
 - RWR
 - SAM/AAA

AVIONICS

- FENCE CHECK
 - MSTR ARM - SAFE
 - PACS
 - 
 - ICS/RWR - AUTO / COMBAT
 - MODES - 1,2,4A
 - AAI - CC/MODE 1 _____
 - RWR/SRM - VOLUME UP
 - CMD - MAN / BOTH
 - INS - PP/ STEER TO ▲ & ●
- RADAR SET-UP
 - 
 - RADAR LOOKS (ON CARD)
 - ACQ SYMBOL PLACEMENT

CAPS

- LOCATION / HEADINGS / LEGS
- ALTITUDE
- FORMATION
- AIRSPEED
- TURNS

- COUNTER-ROTATING RESPONSIBILITIES
- CAP MANNING PRIORITIES / FALLOUT
- 
- 
- 

CAP RADAR

[REDACTED]

COMM PLAN

- MAIN - HAVE QUICK PRIMARY
- UHF CLEAR BACK-UP
- PRIORITY TALKERS: PRIMARY DCA (CAP MSN CC) & AWACS
- USE: - "BIG PICTURE" IN *DIGITAL B/E*
 - CORE INFO
 - NUMBER OF GROUPS
 - LOCATION OFF B/E
 - ALTITUDES
- "HOT" & "COLD" CALLS BY CAP MSN CC
- COMMITS
- TARGETING
- INTERCEPT DIRECTIVES
- SPIKE COMM (FRIENDLY OR HOSTILE)

NOTE: MAX USE OF CODEWORDS AND MIN COMM

- AUX - TIGER AUX (19A) (F-15Es WILL MONITOR WHILE IN DCA ROLE)
- USE - INTRA DCA FREQ
 - CAP COORDINATION
 - FUELS
 - "FENCE IN/OUT" CALLS
 - SORTING
 - F-15 SPECIFIC DIRECTIVES OR FILLINS

INTERCEPT CONTINGENCIES

-- HI-FAST

[REDACTED]

-- LOW/SLOW/VID

- FORMATION
- HOT PASS / MARK / RE-ATTACK
- SAM AWARENESS

[REDACTED]

- FUEL AWARENESS

RADAR EMPLOYMENT

> MELD

[REDACTED]

MELD

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

TARGETING

PHILOSOPHY:

[REDACTED]

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

ID

- ALL IDs FROM STT
- CC / MODE 1
- AUTO for MODE 4

[REDACTED]

- AWACS "BANDIT" CALL NOT REQUIRED TO SHOOT
- CONFIRM IF FRIENDLIES IN SAME AREA
- COMM
- "PAINTS" = MODE 1 OR 4 REPLY
- "SPADES" = NO FRIENDLY AAI REPLIES
- CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE CALL
- "Xs" or "PRINT" for POSITIVE HOSTILE
- FRENCH F-1 AMBIGUITY CAVEAT

SHOTS

[REDACTED]

RADAR MISSILE DEFENSE

- WINNING / LOSING / EQUAL - DACT STANDARD
- BANDIT WEZ CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION RANGE AND MIN ABORT
- FOXBAT/FULCRUM THREAT vs F-1
- MIN NOTCH RANGE

[REDACTED]

10/11/77

MERGE CONSIDERATION:

- POWER / CMD / IRMD - DACT STANDARD
- TURN DECISION:

[REDACTED]

POST MERGE

- SHORT RANGE RADAR
- ISOLATE THREAT HIGH OR LOW
 - SAM THREAT
- FLOW POST MERGE

[REDACTED]

DEFENSIVE RESPONSE

- FRIENDLY SPIKE COMM - STANDARD
- ELEMENT REACTIONS TO HOSTILE AIR-TO-AIR SPIKES
 - NOTCH DIRECTIONS
 - CMD USE
 - SAM AVOIDANCE
- SAM REACTIONS

[REDACTED]

- VISUAL LOOKOUT & MUTUAL SUPPORT

[Handwritten signature]

CONTINGENCIES

- DEGRADED OPS
 - AAI INOP
 - INS
 - RWR
 - RADAR
 - WEAPONS
- EPs / WOUNDED BIRD
- NORDO IN AOR
- RESCAP

SECRET

21-105

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

AC-2

AC-3

AC-4

AC-5

TAB AC-5

F-15C 84-0025

AC-5a F-15 Emergency Procedures Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-5b Tiger 01 Notes, 14 April 1994

(See Classified Addendum)

(See also Tabs AC-4c thru i)

AC-5a

F-15 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COCKPIT TRAINING REVIEW LOG	DATE OF REVIEW			
	16 Dec 93	10 Jan 94	14 Mar 94	15 Apr 94
INSTRUCTIONS: (X) Check block to right of emerg if reviewed during the EPCT.				
AMAD FIRE/OVERHEAT - START *	X			
JFS READY LITE - NOT ON				
JFS - ABNORMAL START				
EMERGENCY GENERATOR NOT ON	X	X		
ABNORMAL ENGINE START	X	X		
ECS LITE ON	X	X		
INS PROBLEMS				
ANTI - SKID MALFUNCTIONS				
LOSS OF BRAKES				
LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL	X	X		
GROUND EGRESS				
ABORT	X	X		
EXTERNAL STORES JETTISON				
ENGINE FAILURE ON TAKEOFF	X	X		
AFTER BURNER FAILURE				
ENGINE FIRE/OVERHEAT - TAKEOFF	X	X		
PITCH RATIO FAIL				
TIRE FAILURE - TAKEOFF	X	X		
LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT	X	X		
OUT - OF - CONTROL RECOVERY				
EJECTION				
ENGINE STALL/STAGNATION	X	X		
SINGLE ENGINE OPERATION				
DOUBLE ENGINE STALL/STAGNATION				
START/JFS ASSIST				
ENGINE MALFUNCTIONS				
NOZZLE FAILURE				
ENGINE FIRE/OVERHEAT INFLIGHT				
AMAD FIRE/OVERHEAT INFLIGHT				
SMOKE/FUMES/FIRE - COCKPIT	X			
CANOPY LOSS				
EXTREME COCKPIT TEMPERATURE				
BLEED AIR MALFUNCTIONS				
ECS MALFUNCTIONS	X	X		
OIL SYSTEMS MALFUNCTIONS	X	X		
EMERG BST ON/BST SYS MALF LITE				
FUEL BOOST PUMP INOP				
FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM MALF	X	X		
UNCOMMANDED FUEL VENTING				
INFLIGHT FUEL LEAK	X			

UNIT: [REDACTED]

GRADE: CAPT

NAME (Last, First & MI): [REDACTED]

DATE: 16 Dec 93
10 Jan 94
14 Mar 94
15 Apr 94

AT SPARE

F15 C/D

F-15 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COCKPIT TRAINING REVIEW LOG	DATE OF REVIEW (Cont'd)			
	16 Dec 93	10 Jan 94	14 Mar 94	15 Mar 94
GENERATOR FAILURE				
DOUBLE GENERATOR FAILURE				
AMAD FAILURE				
RUNAWAY TRIM	X			
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM MALF				
SPEED BRAKE FAILURE				
INLET LIGHT ON				
BOARDING STEPS INFLIGHT	X	X		
ATTITUDE FAILURE				
HEADING ERROR				
INS FAILURE				
CONTROLLABILITY CHECK				
FLAP MALFUNCTIONS	X	X		
BLOWN TIRE ON LANDING				
HYDRAULIC FAILURE	X	X		
LANDING GEAR UNSAFE	X	X		
LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXT	X	X		
APPROACH END ARREST				
DEPARTURE END ARREST				
AIR REFUELING MALFUNCTIONS				
RADAR MALFUNCTIONS				
CONDUCTED IN CPT OR SIM				
PILOTS CONDUCTING THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COCKPIT TRAINING ENTER LAST NAME TO THE RIGHT	Neuser D	Richardson		

UNIT: [REDACTED]

GRADE: CAPT

NAME (Last, First & MI): [REDACTED]

DATE: 16 Dec 93
10 Jan 94
14 Mar 94
15 Mar 94

AT SPARE

F15 C/D

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

11 Mar 94
Date

W. L. HARRIS
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-5

F-15C 84-0025

AC-5a F-15 Emergency Procedures Cockpit Training Review Logs

AC-5b Tiger 01 Notes, 14 April 1994

(See Classified Addendum)

(See also Tabs AC-4c thru i)



*NO TAB AC-4*i**

*only thru AC-4*h**

*Jw
6/24/94 -*

AC-5a

AC-5b

TIGER 01

0720 Z TIGER 1 & 2 SWITCHED TO AOR HQ AND ENTERED GATE 1
TIGER 1 GOT LOW/SLOW HITS ON THE NOSE (ABOUT 100 DEG) FOR
40 MILES. I WAS AT FL 270

LOCKED THE HITS AND GOT A LOW/SLOW TGT
THE TGT WAS < 500 FEET, 130 KTS, HEADING 090-100 DEG
I GOT A NEG M1 INTERROGATION
POS M4 INTERROGATION
NEG [REDACTED] ALL IN STT

I BROKE LOCK AND CHECKED MY MAP. I FOUND A ROAD AT THAT
LOCATION AND INITIALLY THOUGHT IT WAS ROAD TRAFFIC.

I CONTINUED TO SWEEP, PAINTING THE TGT AND GETTING
NEG M1, NEG M4 AND NEG [REDACTED] IN SWEEP.

I RELOCKED THE TARGET AND BEGAN A DESCENT TO VID
I INTERROGATED M1, M4, AND [REDACTED] IN STT AGAIN AND GOT NO
REPLY.

I CONTINUED THE DESCENT AND AT ABOUT 10 NM THE TD BOX LEFT
ROAD. AT 5-7 NM I SAW A HELICOPTOR IN THE TD BOX AND
CALLED FOR A VID. I PASSED ON THE LEFT SIDE 1000-3000
FEET. I SAW A CAMO GREEN HIND WITH NO MARKINGS. I PULLED
OFF HIGH AND RIGHT AND SAID VID HIND. I SAID HIP ON THE
RADIO AND THEN CONFIRMED HIND AFTER CHECKING OUR VID GUIDE
WE CARRY. I ASKED 2 TO CONFIRM THIS AND AT THIS POINT
NOTICED A SECOND HELICOPTOR IN TRAIL. TIGER 2 VIDed HIND.
UP TO THIS POINT AWACS HAS ONLY SAID HIT THERE.

WE SET UP A RACETRACK PATTERN AND CAME BACK IN 3-4 MILE
LEAD TRAIL BETWEEN TIGER 1 AND 2 AND 7NM BEHIND THE HINDS.

I FIRED AN AIM-120 AT ABOUT 4 NM FOR ABOUT A 7 SEC TIME OF
FLIGHT SPLASH AT 0728. I PULLED OFF RIGHT AND CALLED
TIGER 2 IN ON THE LEAD HELICOPTER.

HE SHOT THE LEAD HELICOPTER WITH A 9000 FOOT AIM 9 AT
0729.

WE DID 2 PASSES OVER THE SIGHTS AND ONLY SAW WRECKAGE AND
THEN RESET TO THE EAST CAP.

THE HELICOPTER WAS CAMO GREEN
NO MARKINGS
5 BLADES
SPONSONS ON THE SIDE

COORD # 1 N4404.3 E3645.1
COORD # 2 N4412.0 E3646.0

Name and signature
of Tiger 01
added to protect
identity [REDACTED]
WHLK

UNCLAS

72 MAR 94
SECRET NOFORN to UNCLASSIFIED
CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from
Donald G. Norris, GS-15, DAC

CERTIFICATE
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board
convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no
fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of
the record which is kept in my records system.
20 May 94
Date
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000

(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

AC-2

AC-3

AC-4

AC-5

AC-6

TAB AC-6

COMMAND AND CONTROL

AC-6a Approval to Travel Outside the Security Zone

AC-6b Colonel G.B. Thompson, Memorandum, OPLAN 91-7

**AC-6c U.S. EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Iraq Working Group Memorandum,
Iraqi Helicopter Identification**

AC-6d Col Maher Memorandum, C2 Support to Special Investigation

AC-6a

71 112

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

100/03

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1991, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date

William L. Hamme, Capt, USAF MSC
Evidence Custodian
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

THIS REPRODUCES THE TYPED PORTIONS
OF THE ATTACHED ITEM "69b"
FOR EASE OF READING

CMCC/US

22 Apr 94

MEMORANDUM FOR CTF/CG

THRU CTF/DC

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE

1. Co-Commanders, MCC, Zakho request authorization to travel outside the security zone via MCC Helicopter on 14 Apr 94. Destination will be Irbil (MF 0709) and Salah Ad Din (MF 2826)
2. Purpose of travel is to introduce the new US CCMC to the head people of the US agencies (Irbil) and to Mr Barzani (Salah Ad Din).
3. This travel is in accordance with current CTF policy governing travel outside the security zone as outlined in Tab J, MCC SOP, your authority to approve this travel is found in DOD 4515 13R Ch 6 and ECIC 190720Z Aug 92 msg. This air travel is deemed necessary to execute the OPC mission.
4. Recommend approval

DONALD L. SANDERS
Maj
Opns Off

CTF/CG or DC Approve _____ Disapprove _____

21-114
Item 69b

TAB AC-6

COMMAND AND CONTROL

AC-6a Approval to Travel Outside the Security Zone

AC-6b Colonel G.B. Thompson, Memorandum, OPLAN 91-7

**AC-6c U.S. EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Iraq Working Group Memorandum,
Iraqi Helicopter Identification**

AC-6d Col Maher Memorandum, C2 Support to Special Investigation

AC-6a

AC-6b

08 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: OPLAN 91-7

1. During my 29 April interview with the Accident Review Board investigating the accidental shoot down of Eagle Flight on 14 April, I was asked whether I was familiar with OPLAN 91-7. I replied that I was not familiar with the plan, did not recall having been briefed on the plan and that the plan was not one of the contingency plans stored at the Military Coordination Center (MCC) in Zakho during my tenure as CCMCC/US from May-November 1993.

2. On this date, while reviewing the OPLAN files with the incoming CCMCC/US, COL Jim Williams, I found that a copy of OPLAN 91-7 is now included among the OPLANS available at MCC. The complete OPLAN files have been extensively reorganized and show evidence of having been worked with a great deal. I surmise from the presence of OPLAN 91-7 in the MCC files and the condition of the files that it is probable that COL Jerald L. Thompson, CCMCC/US at the time of the accident, was familiar with the contents of OPLAN 91-7.

3. In any case, it is clear that my response with regard to OPLAN 91-7 cannot be taken to infer that COL Jerald L. Thompson was also not familiar with the plan. The evidence here indicates the opposite to be the case.



GERALD B. THOMPSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting CCMCC/US

CERTIFICATE

I, William J. Harris, Evidence Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board, certify that I have reviewed the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the vicinity of Inceirlik Air Base, Turkey, on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the original as kept in my records system.

15 May 94
WJH

W-JH
WILLIAM J. HARRIS, Capt. USAF Ret.
Evidence Custodian
Inceirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-6

COMMAND AND CONTROL

AC-6a Approval to Travel Outside the Security Zone

AC-6b Colonel G.B. Thompson, Memorandum, OPLAN 91-7

**AC-6c U.S. EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Iraq Working Group Memorandum,
Iraqi Helicopter Identification**

AC-6d Col Maher Memorandum, C2 Support to Special Investigation

AC-6a

AC-6b

AC-6c

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Andrus

4 May 1994

FROM: U.S. EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Iraq Working Group

SUBJECT: Iraqi Helicopter Identification

SOURCE: Joint Analysis Center Iraq Working Group, Multiple Sources


1. (U) Following extensive research, the Iraq Working Group has developed the following assessments concerning the way in which the Iraqi armed forces mark their helicopters.

a. (U) The camouflage used for the Iraqi Mi-25 Hind (Export version of the Mi-24), consists of a two or possibly three-tone mottled brown color scheme. The underside of the aircraft is usually painted gray.

b. (U) The Iraqi Armed forces generally use standard utility helicopters for medical evacuation missions. Because of this, they do not have any sort of symbol which would distinguish them as medical evacuation aircraft. Additionally, there is a possibility that Iraq bought some helicopters specifically for medevac purposes. If these are marked, they would have a red crescent insignia on them, signifying the fact that they are medical aircraft.

c. (U) The current publication which addresses Iraqi aircraft recognition is DIAM 57-25-136, *Desert Shield Adversary Recognition Guide*, dated 3 December 1990. This publication does not contain information concerning aircraft color schemes, nor does it contain information about Iraqi medical aircraft markings.

2. (U) POC for this issue is Major Mark F. Supko, DSN 268-4933.




MARK F. SUPKO, MAJ, USA
Chief, Iraq Working Group

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

18 May 94
Date


WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-6

COMMAND AND CONTROL

AC-6a Approval to Travel Outside the Security Zone

AC-6b Colonel G.B. Thompson, Memorandum, OPLAN 91-7

**AC-6c U.S. EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Iraq Working Group Memorandum,
Iraqi Helicopter Identification**

AC-6d Col Maher Memorandum, C2 Support to Special Investigation

AC-6a

AC-6b

AC-6c

AC-6d

9 MAY 1994

SUBJECT: C2 Support to Special Investigation

1. The following information is provided per an 8 May request of the investigation team to forward an affidavit from the CTF/C2 Directorate regarding the availability of visual identification material at C2 prior to 14 April 1994, and subsequent to requests by the team during the course of the investigation.

2. Prior to 14 April 1994 the following material was available at CTF/C2 that could be utilized for visual recognition of HIND or BLACKHAWK helicopters:

- a. Pictures from the 1990-1991 "Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft", pages 508 and 509, and pages 266-268.
- b. DIA Fact Book, USSR and Eastern Europe Communist Forces (U), DST-2660Z-013-91(N), Feb 1991, pages 3-81 and 3-82.
- c. MCM/ACCMK/PACAFMK/USAFEM 3-1, Vol II, 9 Oct 1992, pages 8-1 to 8-4.
- d. CFE Equipment Handbook, DST-1120H-277-91, 18 Oct 1991, pages 7-1 to 7-14.
- e. OPERATION GRANBY Recognition Guide to Iraq, Kuwait Aircraft, JARIC, Dec 1990.

3. Subsequent to requests from the investigation team, the following materials were obtained via the Joint Analysis Center from CONUS sources:

- Written responses describing the color scheme of Iraqi HIND helicopters and medical markings found on Iraqi medical helicopters.

4. It is important to reiterate that all visual identification training for pilots is accomplished at squadron level. It would be standard procedure for this training to have occurred prior to deployment to OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.

5. The following information is provided per request:

- SSAN: [REDACTED]
- Home Unit: HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM, Peterson AFB CO
- Position: Dep Director of Intelligence, Plans and Programs.

If any further support is required, I can be contacted at 676-3978.

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

19 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

Roger D. Maher
COLONEL ROGER D. MAHER, USAF
Director of Intelligence

TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060

AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000
(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)

AC-3 E-3B AWACS

AC-4 F-15C 79-0025

AC-5 F-15C 84-0025

AC-6 Command and Control

AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides

AC-8 Miscellaneous

AC-1

AC-2

AC-3

AC-4

AC-5

AC-6

AC-7

TAB AC-7

VISUAL RECOGNITION GUIDES

AC-7a Extracts from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Eagle Aid 1

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-7b Hind VID Materials

AC-7c Black Hawk VID Materials

AC-7a

53 "NATO TIGERS"



OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

EAGLE AID

1

*** [REDACTED] ***

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

Eagle Aid #1

which is kept in my records system

15 May 94

Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, PAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USFICOM
Date *15 MAY 94*

21-123


PUMA




HIND



HIP




MD 500



GAZELLE



BO-105




UNITED STATES AIR FORCE




1954


BELL 214




ALLOUETTE III




UH-53
(FLOWN BY THE UN)



HOPLITE



HOOK



TAB AC-7

VISUAL RECOGNITION GUIDES

AC-7a Extracts from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Eagle Aid 1

(See also Classified Addendum)

AC-7b Hind VID Materials

AC-7c Black Hawk VID Materials

AC-7a

AC-7b

78 TRS / INTER
78 TRS / INTER
78 TRS / INTER



EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

7 THMS7-25-136, 3 Dec 90, PL 173-178
which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Inceirlik Air Base, Turkey




12/12

NAME: Mi-25 HIND (Export model of the Mi-24)

DIAM 57-25-134
3 DECEMBER 1990


MISSION: ASSAULT
ROTOR DIAMETER: 56.0 Feet -- 17.0 Meters
LENGTH: 55.6 Feet -- 16.9 Meters

ROTORS: Five-bladed main rotor. Three-bladed left-mounted tail rotor.
ENGINES: Two turboshafts mounted in fuselage.
FUSELAGE: Tapers into thick tail boom. Stub wings may be seen with stepped cockpit.
TAIL: Vertical stabilizer is swept. Horizontal stabilizer is tapered-tapered and mounted on rear of tail boom.



1.77

DIAM 57-25-136
3 December 1990



1.78

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

DHH-5725-131 / 54188
which is kept in my records system

Date 7 May 94

EXTRACT




WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

NAME: Mi-24 HIND

DIAM 57-25-131
1 JULY 1988

MISSION: ASSAULT
ROTOR DIAMETER: 56.0 Feet -- 17.0 Meters
LENGTH: 55.6 Feet -- 16.9 Meters

ROTORS: Five-bladed main rotor. Three-bladed left-mounted tail rotor.
ENGINES: Two turboshafts mounted in fuselage.
FUSELAGE: Tapers into thick tail boom. Stub wings may be seen with stepped cockpit.
TAIL: Vertical stabilizer is swept. Horizontal stabilizer is tapered-tapered and mounted on rear of tail boom.



244

DIAM 57-25-131
1 JULY 1988



21 50

AVIATOR'S RECOGNITION MANUAL

FM 1-402

~~RESTRICTION: This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to Government agencies. Requests from outside the Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651~~

RETURN TO

510



EXTRACT


I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

FM 1-402, Aug 84

which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date

W-7H
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey




AUGUST 1984

21

FM 1-402

Mi-24 HIND D and E




RECOGNITION FEATURES

- Five-bladed main rotor; three-bladed tail rotor
- Two tandem-bubble canopies
- Short, stubby weapons-carrying wings mounted at mid-fuselage
- Retractable tricycle landing gear

The HIND is a multipurpose helicopter capable of carrying eight fully equipped combat troops besides a complete external armament load. Besides the standard pylon armament, the HIND D incorporates a turret which houses a four-barrel, 12.7mm Gatling-type gun. The sensor pack under the nose of the HIND D probably carries an optical sight system. The HIND E carries four AT-6 ATGMs (radio linked) which travel at 500 meters per second. It may have a FLIR or low-light level TV sight system.

USERS

Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Libya, Peru, Syria, USSR, numerous Warsaw Pact countries



ROTARY WING

1-48

21-

WARSAW PACT

SPEED: 182 knots


RANGE: 455 km

ARMAMENT: One 12.7mm machine gun
 Four 32-shot, 57mm rocket pods
 Four AT-2 ATGMs (HIND D)
 Four AT-6 ATGMs (HIND E)
 HIND D variant carries a twin-barrel, 23mm cannon

MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE: 57mm rocket—1,500 meters
 12.7mm machine gun—1,500 meters
 AT-2 ATGM—4,000 meters
 AT-6 ATGM—5,000 meters

ORIGIN: USSR

EMPLOYMENT: Support of military units as a combat assault, scout, and armed gunship. Also used in close air support, antiarmor, and antihelicopter operations. May be found in the independent attack helicopter regiment of a frontal Tactical Air Army, Combined Arms Army, and in the helicopter squadrons of motorized rifle and tank divisions.



TAB AC-7

VISUAL RECOGNITION GUIDES

**AC-7a Extracts from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Eagle Aid 1
(See also Classified Addendum)**

AC-7b Hind VID Materials

AC-7c Black Hawk VID Materials

AC-7a

AC-7b

AC-7c



REPRODUCTION OF 35MM SLIDE FROM TIGER 01
AND TIGER 02 HOME SQUADRON VISUAL
IDENTIFICATION TRAINING SLIDES

INTELLIGENCE
MIDDLE EAST
AND AFRICA
THEATER
RECOGNITION
GUIDE

PARTIAL
AFRICA

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from DHHR-57-25-131, 1 Jul 88 to 20 Aug 92 which is kept in my records system.

2 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

NAME: S-70/UH-60 BLACKHAWK

DIAM 57-25-131
1 JULY 1988

MISSION: GENERAL PURPOSE/TRANSPORT

ROTOR DIAMETER: 53.7 Feet -- 16.4 Meters



LENGTH: 50.0 Feet -- 15.2 Meters

ROTORS: Four-bladed main rotor. Four-bladed right-mounted tail rotor.

ENGINES: Two turboshafts mounted in fuselage.




FUSELAGE: Fuselage tapers to tail. Fixed main and tail landing gear. External fuel tanks may be mounted on upper sides of fuselage.

TAIL: Vertical stabilizer is swept. Horizontal stabilizer is tapered-tapered and low-mounted on vertical stabilizer.



246

DIAM 57-25-131
1 JULY 1988



21-137
247

AVIATOR'S RECOGNITION MANUAL

M 1-4

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to US Government agencies. Requests from outside the US Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQ TRADOC, Ft Monroe, VA 23651

FM 1-402

RETURN TO

510 BUNTE



EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from


FM 1-402, Aug 84

which is kept in my records system.

7 May 94
Date


W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

AUGUST 1984



FM 1-402

UH-60A BLACK HAWK



RECOGNITION FEATURES

- Four-bladed main rotor; four-bladed tail rotor
- Twin turbine engines
- Rectangular-shaped fuselage
- Tapered horizontal stabilizer
- Swept-back vertical stabilizer
- Tricycle landing gear (one aft and two fore)
- Seating capacity of 14 to 17

USERS


United States



FM 1-402

ALLIED

SPEED: 142 knots
RANGE: 578 km
ARMAMENT: Two M60D, 7.62mm machine guns
WEAPON RANGE: 1,100 meters
ORIGIN: United States
EMPLOYMENT: Troop movement and resupply (internal and external cargo) and medical evacuation



TAB AC

OTHER DOCUMENTS

- AC-1 UH-60 Black Hawk 88-26060**
- AC-2 UH-60 Black Hawk 87-26000**
(See Tabs AC-1a thru AC-1f)
- AC-3 E-3B AWACS**
- AC-4 F-15C 79-0025**
- AC-5 F-15C 84-0025**
- AC-6 Command and Control**
- AC-7 Visual Recognition Guides**
- AC-8 Miscellaneous**

- AC-1**
- AC-2**
- AC-3**
- AC-4**
- AC-5**
- AC-6**
- AC-7**
- AC-8**

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8a

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AUTHENTICATION

I am SHEDRICK B. WILLIAMS, assigned to 53FS
(Name) (Organization)

My duty section is OPERATIONS SYS MGMT (DOTF). I am the records custodian of my duty section.

I recognize NOTM 16 KDZZ AS THE DAILY AIRCREW NOTAMS FOR
INCIRLIK AB DATED 04/14 APR 94.

(Fully describe the record collected)

Evidenced Tag Number # 92

I certify that (it is a record taken from my duty section) (~~it is a true and accurate copy of a record kept in my duty section.~~ NSW)

Shedrick B. Williams
(Signature)

SHEDRICK B. WILLIAMS
(Printed Name)

53FS / DOTF
(Organization/Duty Section)

(Date)

Subscribed to and sworn before me this 1 day of MAY 1994.

William H. [Signature]

UNKEY

LTAA ANKARA ACC

- 5) 9404110600 C) 9404201500 E) DISTANT THUNDER-94 IS SMALL SCALE NATO SOUTHERN REGION LIVE EXERCISE WITHIN ANKARA, ISTANBUL, ATHINAI FIR, S BTN 11-20 APRIL 1994 AIP SUPPLEMENT FOR THOSE EXERCISE AREAS WITHIN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL FIRS IN COURSE OF DISTRIBUTION.
- 2) 9404150001 C) 9404152359 E) TOP ATISLARI YAPILACAKTIR. SAHA:4045N4222E 4045N4250E 4033N4222E 4033N4250E AFFECTED AWY W85D, W27D F)MSL G)21000FT.
- 5) 9404110200 C) 9404141400 D) APR 11,12,13,14 0500/1000 AND 1100/1400 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE. AREA:3952N4039E 3956N4039E 3956N4046E 3952N4048E AFFECTED ERZURUM CTR AND AWY VA4. F)MSL G)19500FT
- 5) 9404100400 C) 9404201700 D) FM 10 TILL 20 APR, 0400/1700 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE. WI 4003N4126E 4002N4129E 4001N4123E 4001N4127E WITHIN ERZURUM CTR. F) MSL G) 18000FT.
- 2) 9403262201 C) 9410292200 E) AERODROME OPERATING HOURS ARE AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE UTC. BTN 27.05.1994/24.09.1994 0500/1400 MON-TUE-WED-FRI 0530/1830 THU (SAT-SUN CLOSED). BTN 25.09.1994/29.10.1994 0600/1500 MON-TUE-WED-FRI 0630/1930 THU (SAT-SUN CLOSED).

LTAC ESENBOGA

- 5) 9402240824 C) PERM E) BETWEEN ANKARA NDB AND BAKIR INTERSECTION DIST AMEND TO READ 39 NM INSTEAD OF 43 NM.
- 5) 9404121300 C) 9406302359 E) RWY 03R/21L CLOSED

LTAG INCIRLIK AB

- 5) WIE C) UFN E) 05/23 PAPI NOT AVBL
- 5) WIE C) UFN E) DISREGARD RUNWAY MARKINGS ON NORTH PARALLEL TAXIWAY, TAXIWAY IS MARKED FOR FUTURE USE AS ACTIVE RUNWAY DURING MAIN RUNWAY RECONSTRUCTION, AS OF YET IS NOT AN ACTIVE RUNWAY

LTAN KONYA

- 5) WIE C) UFN E) ALL INST APCH PROC CHANGED TO PROCEDURES AUTHORIZED FOR USAF AIRCREWS ONLY. LIMITED TO VMC ONLY.

LTBA ATATURK

- 5) 9312311500 C) 9406301500 E) RWY 06/24 CENTERLINE LIGHTS OUT OF SERVICE.

- 5) 9404011600 C) 9404221200 E) RWY 18 ILS OUT OF SERVICE.

END OF PART 07C

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Reason Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from:

Incirlik AB Daily NOTAMS for 14 Apr 94

which is kept in my records system.

W.L.H.
Date

W.L.H.
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF MEC
Evidence Custodian
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

LTSS ISTANBUL ACC

- 5) 9307151230 C) 9407152359 EST E) NEW TEMPORARY ATS ROUTE W340 BETWEEN IZMIR VOR (IMR) AND KAVAK INTERSECTION IS ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS. 1-SIGNIFICANT POINT: IZMIR VOR (IMR) :381906N 270028E KAVAK INTERSECTION :372130N 284400E 2-MAG TRACK: 125 3-01ST NM: 100 4-UPPER/LOWER LIMITS: FL460/FL235 5-MNM IFR EN-ROUTE FL (FT) : FL240 6-CRUISE LEVEL: ODD 7-REMARKS: FLIGHTS DEPARTING ANY AERODROME WITHIN IZMIR TMA DESTINED TO DALAMAN AIRPORT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO FLY VIA THIS ROUTE.
- 5) 9401280530 C) 9412311430 D) DAILY 0530/1430 E) TRAINING EXERCISE AREA AS FOLLOWS: COOR:3745N2724E 3736N2727E 3742N2733E 3746N2742E 3751N2744E 3751N2733E 3754N2730E. EFFECTED IZMIR TMA. F) MSL. G) 5000FT
- 5) 9402260500 C) 9404281500 D) FEB 28 AND MAR 01,02,03,04,07,08,09,10,29,30,31 AND APR 13,26,27,28 0500/1500 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE:4147N2634E 4147N2700E 4132N2634E 4132N2700E AFFECTED AWAY VAA F) MSL G) 15000FT
- 5) 9403220500 C) 9404292200 D) MARCH 22,23,24,25. APRIL 12,13,19,20,21,22,28,29. 0500/2200 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE: 4147N2634E 4147N2700E 4132N2634E 4132N2700E. EFFECTED AWAY VAA. F)MSL G)15000FT
- 5) 9403110630 C) 9404251530 D) FM 11 TILL 31 MAR AND FM 11 TILL 25 APR 0630/1530 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE: 3840N2647E 3840N2644E 3839N2644E 3839N2646E WITHIN IZMIR TMA F)MSL G)10.000 FT
- 5) 9404110700 C) 9404151300 D) APR 11,12,13,14,15. 0700/1500 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE:1ST AREA:3840N2634E 3840N2644E 3857N2646E 3833N2632E 2ND AREA:384030N263400E 355100N263606E 385115N264615E 384430N264530E 384000N264430E WITHIN IZMIR TMA F)MSL G)10000FT
- 5) 9404130700 C) 9404141500 D) APR 13 14,0700/1500 E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE.WI 4016N2926E 4016N2928E 4014N2926E 4014N2926E WITHIN ISTANBUL TMA. F)MSL G)6500FT.
- 5) 9404030700 C) 9405161200 D) AS ITEM E E) TURKISH NAVY AND AIRFORCE SHALL MAKE A WITHOUT FIRING TASMO CEVIK FENCE-2 EXERCISE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OF MEDITERRANEAN AND AEGEAN SEA. FIRST AREA:3652N2648E 3851N2636E 3851N2619E 3842N2619E 3840N2640E AFFECTED IZMIR TMA. DATE AND TIMES:APR 05 0700/0900 MAY 15 0600/0900 AND 1000/1200 SECOND AREA:3942N2608E 3943N2543E 3923N2513E 3915N2538E 3929N2553E 3929N2604E DATE AND TIMES:APR 06 0600/0600 AND 1200/1400 MAY 11 0800/1000 AND 1100/1400 THIRD AREA:3630N2834E 3625N2910E 3600N2919E 3621N2834E AFFECTED DALAMAN TMA DATE AND TIMES:APR 28 1000/1400) END PART 1 OF 2
- 5) 9404110400 C) 9406171600 D) AS ITEM E E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE: AREA:3630N2834E 3623N2834E 3609N2919E 3625N2919E AFFECTED DALAMAN TMA. DATE AND TIME:APR FM 11 TILL 17 AND 26,27,28. MAY 25,26,27 JUN 14,15,16,17 0400/1600 F) MSL G) 35000FT
- 5) 9404110700 C) 9404161230 D) AS ITEM E E) NAVIGATIONAL WARNING TO ALL CONCERNED REF(A)CLASS ONE NOTAM A0391/94 FROMULGATED BY GREECE ON 01 APRIL 1994 FOR NATO EXERCISE DISTANT THUNDER-94 REF(B) AIP SUPPLEMENT ISSUED BY TURKISH CAA DATED 10 APRIL 1994 NUMBER SUP 1/94 CONCERNING DISTANT THUNDER -94 1-THE PARAGRAPH 4.B(FOUR BRAVO),4.D(FOUR DELTA) OF REF (A) (ALPHA) ARE NOT VALID FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER HIGH SEAS WITHIN ATHENS FIR DUE TO THE FACT THAT THESE ITEMS ARE ARBITRARILY INJECTED TO THE ORIGINAL NOTAM TEXT. FURTNER MORE MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE HIGH SEAS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE ICAO RULES AND PROCEDURES AS DEDETAILED IN AIP GREECE. 2.DISTANT(THUNDER-94 EXERCISE AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE WITHIN THE AIRSPACE OVER THE AEGEAN HIGH SEAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 3 (THREE) OF CHICAGO

DALAMAN TMA DATE AND TIMES: APR 28 1000/1400) END PART 1 OF 2
E) 9404110400 C) 9404171600 D) AS ITEM E E) GUN FIRING WILL
TAKE PLACE: AREA: 3630N2834E 3623N2834E 3609N2919E 3623N2919E
AFFECTED DALAMAN TMA. DATE AND TIME: APR FM 11 TILL 17 AND
26, 27, 28. MAY 25, 26, 27 JUN 14, 15, 16, 17 0400/1600 F) MSL G)
35000FT

E) 9404110700 C) 9404161230 D) AS ITEM E E) NAVIGATIONAL
WARNING TO ALL CONCERNED REF(A) CLASS ONE NOTAM A0391/94
PROMULGATED BY GREECE ON 01 APRIL 1994 FOR NATO EXERCISE
DISTANT THUNDER-94 REF(B) AIP SUPPLEMENT ISSUED BY TURKISH
CAA DATED 10 APRIL 1994 NUMBER SUP 1/94 CONCERNING DISTANT
THUNDER -94 1-THE PARAGRAPH 4.B(FOUR BRAVO). 4.D(FOUR DELTA)
OF REF (A) (ALPHA) ARE NOT VALID FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT
FLYING OVER HIGH SEAS WITHIN ATHENS FIR DUE TO THE FACT THAT
THESE ITEMS ARE ARBITRARILY INSERTED TO THE ORIGINAL NOTAM
TEXT. FURTHER MORE MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE HIGH
SEAS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE ICAO RULES AND PROCEDURES AS
DETAILED IN AIP GREECE. 2. DISTANT(THUNDER-94 EXERCISE
AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE WITHIN THE AIRSPACE OVER THE AEGEAN
HIGH SEAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 3 (THREE) OF CHICAGO
CONVENTION AND PARAGRAPH 4(FOUR) OF REF B (BRAVO) AIP
SUPPLEMENT.

E) 9404140600 C) 9404221000 D) 14, 15, 22 APRIL 0500/1000 E) GUN
FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE: WI 4125N2829E 4124N2829E 4116N2834E
4116N2832E WITHIN TMA ISTANBUL. F) MSL G) 15000

E) 9404110600 C) 9404151400 E) NAVIGATIONAL WARNING TO ALL
CONCERNED 1. THIS NTM IS ISSUED TO CLARIFY THE STATEMENT
MADE CONCERNING THE WIDTH OF GREEK NATIONAL AIRSPACE IN ITEM
2 OF NTM A0429/94 DATED 07 APR 1994 ISSUED BY HELLENIC CAA.
2. THE EXTENSION OF GREEK NATIONAL AIRSPACE BEYOND SIX
NAUTICAL MILES IS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CONVENTIONS AND IS THEREFORE NOT RECOGNIZED BY TURKEY.
FIRING ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE IN WHOLE EXERCISE AREA AS
DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF GREEK NTM A0429/94.

E) 9404140600 C) 9405061000 D) APR 14, 15 AND MAY 06 0500/1000
E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE. 4125N2829E 4124N2829E
4116N2834E 4116N2832E AFFECTED ISTANBUL TMA. F) MSL
G) 15000FT.

E) 9404130735 C) 9404131400 E) NAVIGATIONAL WARNING TO ALL
CONCERNED. TURKISH NAVY FIRING EXERCISE REMAIN UNCHANGED.

LTSS DALAMAN

E) 9403262201 C) 9410292200 E) AERODROME OPERATING HOUR IS H24.

E) 9404071200 C) FERM E) TURKEY AGA 2-6-1 ITEM 7 AMEND TO READ
TRANSITION ALTITUDE 4500 FT INSTEAD OF 4600 FT.

D OF PART 07D

D OF PART 07

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

140500Z APR 94 TSGT LIDER ON DUTY

140515Z APR 94 CALLED THE FRAG SHOP, MSGT TOMLINSON (6-3938), REGARDS
PC LOG ENTRY 131130Z APR 94.

140535Z APR 94 REGARDS 132140Z APR 94 RED CROSS PC LOG ENTRY - PASSED
INFORMATION TO THE FIRST SGT. ASKED FIRST SGT TO RELAY
SAME TO COL HUNT.

140545Z APR 94 REGARDS SAT., 16 APR 94 HC-130 MISSION - PASSED INFORMATI-
ON CONTAINED IN PC LOG ENTRY 131615Z TO CAPT
LEFEBVRE.

140556Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. TOWER REPORTED IT HAD NO FLIGHT
PLAN FILED FOR ROTOR 05 (0600Z T/O). CALLED C-3 JOC/LT
ALLEN. LT ALLEN SAID HE WOULD CHECK ON IT.

140610Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. ROTOR 05 HAS MX PROBLEMS AND
WILL NOT GET OFF ON TIME. SOC3 WILL ADVISE ON OPENING
A NEW LINE. LT CRAIG REPORTED TOWER WAS INCORRECT -
FCF'S DON'T NEED TO FILE A FLIGHT PLAN.

140620Z APR 94 LTC SPENCE CALLED ASKING TO SPEAK WITH COL HUNT ASAP
ON A SECURE LINE. CAPT LEFEBVRE PASSED THIS MESSAGE TO
COL HUNT'S BEEPER NUMBER.

140650Z APR 94 SOC3/MAJ LIEBOCK CALLED. ROTOR 05 READY FOR T/O ASAP.

140651Z APR 94 CALLED C-3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS. C-3 JOC WILL TRY TO GET
ROTOR 05 T/O APPROVAL FOR 0700Z. MAJ WIGGINS BELIEVES
CALLSIGN FOR FCF CAN REMAIN ROTOR 05.

140658Z APR 94 CALLED C-3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS. 0700Z T/O APPROVAL CONFIRMED
FOR ROTOR 05. RELAYED APPROVAL TO SOC3/LT CRAIG.

140713Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/SRA WAID. ROTOR 05: ATD - 0700Z, ATA - 0710Z.

140714Z APR 94 SPEC BUDGET/J1 CALLED REGARDS A SITREP NUMBER ERROR.
SHE SAID YESTERDAY'S NUMBER WAS SHOWING 189 AND IT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN 190.

140805Z APR 94 MAJ BECKIT CALLED ASKING TO SPEAK TO COL HUNT ON A
SECURE LINE. MAJ ROSENGARD SPOKE SECURE WITH MAJ
BECKIT.

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

15 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

140806Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD AND CAPT VANDER LEY CALLED C2 RECEIVED
INITIAL INFORMATION ON HIND HELICOPTER INCIDENT

140808Z APR 94 LTC ZAHRT CALLED ASKING TO SPEAK TO COL HUNT ON A
SECURE LINE GAVE LTC ZAHRT COL HUNT'S BEEPER NUMBER

140809Z APR 94 MAJ LIEBOCK CALLED AND TALKED TO MAJ ROSENGARD

140810Z APR 94 J2 HAS ALSO BEEPED COL HUNT

140815Z APR 94 COL HUNT CALLED AND SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH MAJ ROSENGARD

140825Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. REQUEST OPEN A LINE FOR AN FCF -
ROTOR 06, T/O ASAP, MSN DUR 2 HRS., MSN #T14321.

140826Z APR 94 CALLED C-3 JOC/LT ALLEN. C-3 JOC WILL TRY TO ARRANGE FOR
A ROTOR 06 T/O TIME OF 0835Z.

140833Z APR 94 LTC ZAHRT CALLED AND SPOKE WITH COL HUNT SECURE.

140845Z APR 94 CALLED C-3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS. APPROVAL FOR ROTOR 06
CONFIRMED. ROTOR 06 WILL T/O ASAP FOR A 2 HR DURATION

140846Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. INFORMED HIM OF ROTOR 06 T/O
APPROVAL CONFIRMATION.

140853Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/SRA WAID. ROTOR 06 ATD - 0840Z. ASSUME
ROTOR 06 AC RECEIVED T/O CLEARANCE FROM TOWER
BEFORE J3 VERIFIED APPROVAL CONFIRMATION FROM C-3 JOC.

140909Z APR 94 COL HUNT HAS DIRECTED JSOTF TO MOVE THE AOB ALERT SAR
PACKAGE TO SOC3.

140914Z APR 94 SOC3/SRA WAID CALLED. ROTOR 06 ATA - 0855Z.

140930Z APR 94 PER MAJ ROSENGARD - POSSIBLE SATCOM MISSION WITH COL
HUNT. J6 INFORMED.

140933Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED AND SPOKE SECURE WITH
MAJ ROSENGARD.

141000Z APR 94 [CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (6 WORDS)]

141010Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. ALL JSOTF TRAINING LINES CNX

(SHADOW 01/02, HAWK 21/22)

141020Z APR 94 CALLED CAPT LEFEBVRE SECURE. ASKED ABOUT JSOTF LNO'S
LTC ZAHRT GOT ON THE LINE WITH CAPT LEFEBVRE AND
TOLD HIM THERE IS NO ROOM ON THE AIRCRAFT FOR LNO'S.

141025Z APR 94 INFORMED SOC3/SRA WAID NO ROOM FOR LNO'S

141027Z APR 94 CAPT VANDER LEY GIVES COL HUNT AN ISOPREP CARD
INTERVIEW

141029Z APR 94 PER MAJ ROSENGARD - "COUGAR" THE AWACS ACFT IS
AIRBORNE CTF (MAJ WIGGINS) WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS
TO KEEP AWACS AIRBORNE FOR DURATION OF MISSION.

141050Z APR 94 LT ALLEN/C-3 JOC CALLED SAID FCF APPROVED FOR ROTOR
07, T/O TIME IN APX. 5 MINUTES. RECEIVED NO PRIOR
PHONE CALL FROM SOC3.

141052Z APR 94 PERMISSION FROM CTF TO LAUNCH. IF REFUEL NECESSARY
ENROUTE TO ZAKHO MUST DO SO AT DIYARBAKIR.

141057Z APR 94 COL HUNT HAS DEPARTED THE BLDG.

141100Z APR 94 SOC3/SGT MONEY CALLED. ROTOR 07 ATD - 1055Z

141108Z APR 94 [CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (32 WORDS)]

141134Z APR 94 COL RACE - DCO SOCEUR CALLED. HE STATED GEN KELLOG
NEEDS TO KNOW IF JSOTF CC HAS A GOOD ACCOUNTABILITY
OF ALL PERSONNEL AT ZAKHO. MAJ ROSENGARD BRIEFED
COL RACE ON THIS SUBJECT.

141201Z APR 94 LT CRAIG/SOC3 CALLED.

[CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (16 WORDS)] CALLED
MAJ WIGGINS/C-3 JOC AND PASSED THIS INFO TO HIM. MAJ
WIGGINS STATED APPROVAL FOR PONY 21-23 HAD BEEN
GRANTED BUT DIFFICULTY EXISTS IN GAINING APPROVAL
FOR THE HC-130 SAR LINES.

141225Z APR 94 CAPT CLARK CALLED MAJ BETHEL, MCC REAR IN DIYARBAKIR.

REF. MH-60 REFUEL MAJ BETHEL WILL COORDINATE WITH
TURKS. NO PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED.

141230Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. ASKED FOR T/O TIMES.
PONY 21 ATD - 1200Z
PONY 22 ATD - 1208Z
PONY 23 ATD - 1210Z

141234Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. ROTOR 07 ATA - 1115Z.

141237Z APR 94 MAJ BETHEL CALLED CAPT CLARK BACK. SHE STATED THE
REFUELER WOULD BE STANDING BY.

141238Z APR 94 C-3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS CALLED. APPROVAL GRANTED FOR THE
LAUNCH OF THE [CLASSIFIED PORTION DELETED (7 WORDS)]

141250Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE'S CURRENT LOCATION IS C-1 JOC, 6-3001.

141253Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/SGT MONEY. INFORMED HIM GHOST 31/32
APPROVED FOR T/O.

141255Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD SPOKE TO CPT LITTLE AT ZAKHO. CPT KENT
WILL LEAD 8 MAN ELEMENT (6 US, 2 RCC INTERP'S) TO CRASH
SITE. WILL USE GROUND TRANSPORTATION. WILL LEAVE
WITHIN THE HOUR. WILL NEED APPROX 3-HRS TO GET THERE.
WILL LINK-UP WITH FORCE SECURING THE CRASH SITE (PESH ??)
DURING DAY-LITE HRS TO PRECLUDE FORCE TRAVELING FROM
INCIRLIK HAVING TO POTENTIALLY LINK UP WITH THIS FORCE
AT NIGHT. MAJ SANDERS IS SENIOR AMERICAN AT ZAKHO. CPT
LITTLE IS NOW SENIOR AMERICAN SF AT ZAKHO. MAJ
ROSENGARD WILL GET WORD OF ALL OF THIS COL HUNT VIA
SOCIII.

141257Z APR 94 SGM GANN (SOCEUR) CALLED FOR COORDINATES OF CRASH
SITE. SGM HALTERMAN GAVE SGM GANN THE DATA HE
NEEDED.

141259Z APR 94 COL HASSLE CALLED FOR MAJ ROSENGARD. WILL INFORM THE
MAJ TO CALL WHEN HE IS FINISHED IN J2.

141301Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD RETURNS COL HASSLE'S CALL.

141303Z APR 94 LT CRAIG/SOC3 CALLED. ASKED FOR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
PERSONNEL ON EACH OF THE PONY HELICOPTERS. THE MOST
CURRENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO MAJ ROSENGARD IS A

TOTAL BODY COUNT OF 24 (INCLUDING CREW).

141310Z APR 94 LTC RIVERA CALLED ASKING FOR INFORMATION REGARDS THE HIND HELICOPTER INCIDENT. LTC RIVERA IS THE EXEC FOR THE CC OF AMERICAN FORCES IN TURKEY, MAJ GEN STOKES. MAJ ROSENGARD TALKED TO LTC RIVERA.

141317Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. AS OF THIS TIME SOC3 HAS NO ATD FOR GHOST 31. THEY WILL CHECK AND CALL BACK.

141319Z APR 94 LT CRAIG/SOC3 CALLED. GHOST 31 ATD - 1302Z.

141331Z APR 94 MAJ SHAW CALLED FROM SOC3 REGARDS SAR HC-130 AIR REFUELING COORDINATION. HE SPOKE SECURE WITH CAPT CLARK.

141340Z APR 94 39TH WING CC, COL KULA, RELAYED A MESSAGE (TO CAPT CLARK) FROM BGEN PILKINGTON. MSG IS AS FOLLOWS:
--- NO CASUALTIES WILL BE BROUGHT BACK TO INCIRLIK AB.
--- TOMORROW, 15 APR, WILL BE A NO FLY DAY.

141341Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED FROM C-1 JOC (6-3001) AND TALKED TO CAPT CLARK. CAPT LEFEBVRE ASKED FOR A SEQUENCE OF INFORMATION:
--- TIMELINE IT WILL TAKE TO GET THE MH-60'S FROM ZAKHO TO THE SITE.
--- TIME NEEDED ON STATION.
--- TIME DATA REQUIRED FOR CAS COORDINATION.
CAPT CLARK PASSED THIS REQUEST FOR INFORMATION TO MAJ ROSENGARD.

141343Z APR 94 CAPT CLARK LEARNED AWACS WILL STAY AIRBORNE AS LONG AS THEY ARE NEEDED.

141350Z APR 94 J2 RELATES THE OFFICIAL SHOOTDOWN TIME OF HELICOPTERS WAS 0730Z. POSSIBLY EAGLE FLIGHT UH-60s vs. HINDs.

141420Z APR 94 CPT LEFEBVRE CALLED FROM WOC. WE HAVE PREMISSION TO PERFORM AERIAL REFUELING. GRID COORD OF RECEIVED IMAGERY - MF 177698. AWACS WILL STAY ON STATION. FIGHTERS WILL BE ON STRIP ALERT AT INCIRLIK. BG P SAYS NO NEED TO KEEP FIGHTERS UP, NO IRAQIS FLY AT NIGHT. MAJ ROSENGARD TOLD CPT L TO GO BACK AND ARGUE THAT AIR THREAT IS NOT OUR CONCERN, GOI GROUND THREAT IS !!! WE

STILL NEED RESCAP IN THE AIR TONIGHT FOR THE DURAITION
OF OPS AT CRASH SITE. SSG TOBIA PASSED INFO REGARDING
OUR ASSESMENT OF PROBABLE GROUND TARGETS AND ROUTES
OF MOVEMENT.

- 141425Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. ETD FOR GHOST 32 IS 1700Z. RELAYED
SAME TO MAJ WIGGINS/C-3 JOC.
- 141433Z APR 94 CAPT CLARK PASSED MH-60 FREQUENCIES TO MAJ SANDERS/
MCC.
- 141553Z APR 94 COL HUNT AND CREW CROSSED THE BORDER AT 1515Z.
- 141554Z APR 94 PER CAPT VANDER LEY - SOC3 INTEL RELATES GROUND TIME
AT THE CRASH SITE OF 1615Z.
- 141619Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED FROM THE WOC. THE FIRST HC-130
(GHOST 31) CAN ONLY TALK TO AWACS. HC-130 IS POSSIBLY
HAVING FLIGHT PROBLEMS. TENATIVE PLAN IS TO FLY TO
DIYARBAKIR, DROP OFF MEDICAL TEAM, AND RETURN TO
INCIRLIK AB. THE SECOND HC-130 WILL P/U THE MEDICAL
TEAM AT DIYARBAKIR ENROUTE TO TAOR.
- 141620Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED. SAR TEAM IS ON THE GROUND AT
THE CRASH SITE.
- 141644Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED. 2 F-15'S ARE ON-STATION OVER THE
AREA. THE F-15'S ONLY HAVE AIR-TO-AIR CAPABILITY.
- 141700Z APR 94 TSGT SMITH ON DUTY.
- 141715Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT LEFEBVRE FROM COMMUNICATIONS
WITH JSOTF COMMANDER ROUGHLY 26 BODIES/ NO SURVIVORS
TAKING BODIES TO DIYARBAKIR/ EQUIPMENT TAKING TO A
SAFE AREA. HES AT 6-3001 PASSED INFO TO MAJ ROSENGARD.
- 141730Z APR 94 CPT LEFEBVRE CALLED CRASHED HELICOPTERS ARE
CONFIRMED US UH-60'S. 26 DECEASED CONFIRMED.
- 141758Z APR 94 PONY 21/23 ENROUTE TO DIYARBAKIR WITH 26 BODIES. PONY 22
STILL AT CRASH SITE.
- 141815Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT LEFEVBRE: PONY 22 ENROUTE TO

ZAHKO WITH 9 BODIES ON BOARD. WILL THEN CONTINUE TO DIYARBAKIR. CORRECTION ON BODY COUNT IN PONY 21/23: 17 BODIES ON BOARD. PONY 21/23 HAVE FINISHED AIREAL REFUEL AND ARE CIRCLING THE CRASH SITE. THEY HAVE NOT OFF-LOADED BODIES YET.

141930Z APR 94 CPT LEFEVBRE CALLED: 1 HC-130 WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL ON BAORD HAS LOST 1 ENGINE HAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO INCIRLIK . REQUEST DENIED BY CTF. MUST LAND AT DIYARBAKIR TO OFF-LOAD MED PERSONNEL. CTF RESEARCHING WHETHER HC-130 CAN TAKEOFF FROM DIYARBAKIR WITHOUT ONE ENGINE.

141932Z APR 94 CPT LEFEBVRE CALLED PONY 22 OBSERVING TRACER FIRE NORTH OF ZAHKO NOT SURE IF DIRECTED TOWARD THEM.

142000Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT LEFEBVRE GHOST 31 LANDED AT DIYARBAKIR WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL CANNOT TAKE-OFF. NEEDS TO KNOW WHEN HELICOPTERS WILL BE OUT OF AOR. TIME CRITICAL: MAY NEED TO LAUNCH ANOTHER AWACS. WILL GET INFORMATION FROM SOC3.

142025Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD IS UPDATING SOCEUR OF AOR " STATUS".

142032Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD IS CALLING COL SPENCE AT ETTIC WITH UPDATE OF AOR.

142034A APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT LEFEBVRE GHOST 32 LANDED AT DIYARBAKIR TO PICKUP PERSONNEL AND CREW FROM GHOST31 MAINTENACE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE LOADED ON A C-141 THIS EVENING HEADED TO DIYARBAKIR SHOOTING FOR A 0200Z TAKEOFF. VERY FLEXIBLE TIME.

142110Z APR 94 PER COMMUNICATIONS FROM CPT LITTLE FROM ZAHKO THE FOLLOWING GRID COORDINATES OF CRASH SITES.
1 MF 176698
2 MF 190695

142145Z APR 94 GHOST 31 HAS 6 BODIES ON SITE 2. EIGHT BODIES ARE 50MIN. OUT OF ZAHKO. ONCE ALL BODIES ARE AT DIYARBAKIR . TERMINATION OF FLIGHT UNTIL TOMORROW, TIME UNKNOWN.

142259Z APR 94 PONY23 HAS LEFT TO DIYARBAKIR. ETA 1H15MIN.

142331Z APR 94 ALL PONYS ARE AIRBORNE HEADED TO DIYARBAKIR.

150055Z APR 94 MONITORING COMUNICATIONS ONCE ALL BODIES GET TO ZAHKO THEY WILL TRANSPORTED TO THE C-130 AND WILL FLY TO DIYARBAKIR. PERSONNEL WILL STAY AT ZAHKO.

150105Z APR 94 TEAM AT SITE IS BREAKING DOWN AWATING PICKUP IN 15MIN. PONY22 WILL DO PICK-UP.

150115Z APR 94 PONY 21 T/O HEADED TOWARD DIYARBAKIR. PONY 22 IS NOW AT SITE FOR PICK-UP SILVER BULLET TEAM.

150430Z APR 94 GHOST 32 HAS LANDED AT INCIRLICK.

150430Z APR 94 NOTIFIED BY CAPT BOLGER AT DIYARBAKIR THAT ALL HELO CREWS HAVE ENTERED CREW REST AT 0330Z. ALL HELOS ARE MISSION CAPABLE.

150500Z APR 94 TSGT LIDER ON DUTY.

150518Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. HE ASKED IF FLYING OPERATIONS WOULD COMMENCE AGAIN TOMORROW. CALLED C3 JOC/ LT ALLEN. ASKED HIM IF THAT QUESTION WAS LOW ON THE PECKING ORDER OF THINGS TO THINK ABOUT. HE CONCURRED. LT ALLEN SAID BY 1200 OR 1300L TODAY IT MIGHT BE KNOWN IF THERE WILL BE A FLYING SCHEDULE FOR SAT., 16 APR.

150553Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. INQUIRED ON THE STATUS OF THE CREWS AT DIYARBAKIR. CREW REST TIMES:
MH-060'S (PONY 21-23) - START 0330Z / STOP 1530Z
HC-130'S (GHOST 31/32) - START 0600Z / STOP 1800Z

150603Z APR 94 SGT ATKINS CALLED FROM BGEN PILKINGTON'S OFFICE. HE SAID THERE IS A PERSONAL MSG FROM BGEN P TO COL HUNT WHICH NEEDS TO BE PICKED UP. SGT PRATTIS WENT TO GO GET IT.

150607Z APR 94 LT CRAIG/SOC3 CALLED. THE CC OF THE PJ'S AT HURLBURT FIELD, FL WANTED TO KNOW IF ANY OF HIS PJ'S WERE ON THE HELICOPTERS DOWNED AT THE CRASH SITE.

150609Z APR 94 CAPT VANDER LEY TALKED TO LT CRAIG. ANSWER - NO.

150614Z APR 94 SGM HALTERMAN CALLED CTF C1 REQUESTING MEDICAL RECORDS FOR DNA IDENTIFICATION. C1 WILL CALL BACK.

TONIGHT'S FLIGHT.

- 150815Z APR 94 CAPT VANDER LEY CALLED MAJ WIGGINS C3/JOC - REF. ESCORTS FOR BODIES OF COL THOMPSON, SSG BARCLAY, AND SSG ROBINSON. MAJ WIGGINS STATED ESCORT DUTIES PROBABLY WOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE BODIES LEFT FRANKFURT. HE WOULD PASS ON THE REQUEST FOR ESCORTS TO BGEN PILKINGTON. HE WILL LET US KNOW THE TIME SCHEDULE TO ENSURE THE ESCORTS ARRIVE AT FRANKFURT ON TIME. ALSO REQ. GUIDANCE ON THE RELEASE OF MISREPS OF SOC 3 MISSIONS TO HOME STATION. CTF GUIDANCE HC-130 MISREPS CAN BE RELEASED. HELO MISREPS MUST BE IN LINE WITH CURRENT EUCOM SITREP INFORMATION. INFO PASSED TO SOC3 INTEL.
- 150816Z APR 94 AT APX. 0812Z SGM HALTERMAN WAS BEEPED REGARDS ATTENDING THE 1ST SGT'S MTG IN THE CTF CONF RM. PER HIS REQUEST AOB AND SOC3 1ST SGT'S WERE ALSO NOTIFIED.
- 150909Z APR 94 PER CAPT VANDER LEY - INITIAL TIMELINE FOR TONIGHT'S MISSIONS RECEIVED FROM LTC ZAHRT.
- 150945Z APR 94 LTC HOOVER AND SGM HITCHO WILL ACCOMPANY THE HC-130 DEPARTING DIYARBAKIR TOMORROW.
- 150946Z APR 94 CAPT CLARK ARRANGED FOR MEDICAL RECORDS AND 10TH SF ESCORT BACK TO FRANKFURT.
- 151019Z APR 94 PER CAPT LEFEBVRE - C-141 ITINERARY CHANGE. STOP AT INCIRLIK AB DELETED. DIRECT DIYARBAKIR TO FRANKFURT. REASON UNKNOWN AS OF THIS TIME.
- 151305Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD RECEIVED FROM MAJ BECKIT/C3 JOC THE DISPOSITION OF JSOTF AIR FORCES FOR THE NEXT 72 HRS.
- 151347Z APR 94 EAGLE IS STANDING DOWN FOR THE NEXT 48 HRS. JSOTF MH-60G'S WILL TAKEOVER THE EAGLE MISSION OUT OF DIYARBAKIR. JSOTF HELICOPTERS WILL RUN SHUTTLE MISSIONS BACK AND FORTH FROM ZAKHO AND THE CRASH SITE. HC-130 PRESENTLY AT DIYARBAKIR IS REPAIRED. THE HC-130 POSITIONED AT INCIRLIK WILL FLY TO DIYARBAKIR ON 16 APR TO ASSIST IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF JSOTF GROUND PERSONNEL.

COL HUNT REMAINS IN ZAKHO FOR APPROXIMATELY
2 OR 3 DAYS. WILL HAVE 1 CAPT AND 1 E-6 TBD TO
REMAIN AS S3 CELL.

- 151446Z APR 94 FIRST SGT JOSEPH CALLED REFERENCE ESCORT DETAIL WILL
COME FROM THE AOB.
- 151455Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. REQUEST OPEN A LINE FOR AN HC-130.
GHOST 31, ETD - 160600Z, INCIRLIK TO DIYARBAKIR, MSN #A1680.
GHOST 31 WILL ASSIST THE THREE PONY HELOS WITH AERIAL
REFUELING AND COMM. GHOST 31 ETD OUT OF DIYARBAKIR
IS 161345Z. GHOST 32 WILL FOLLOW GHOST 31 AND DEPART
DIYARBAKIR AT APX. THE SAME. MSN # FOR GHOST 32 IS
A1681. ETA FOR GHOST 31/32 BACK TO INCIRLIK - 161500Z.
- 151457Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER SEEKING APPROVAL FOR THE
TWO HC-130 LINES, MSN #'S: A1680/1
- 151500Z APR 94 TSGT SMITH ON DUTY.
- 151545Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM LTCOL WITCHER GHOST 31 FOR 16APR IS
APPROVED. PASSED ON TO SOC3/MAJ SHAW.
- 151555Z APR 94 RECEIVED FAX FOR SCHEDULE OF EVENTS AND FLIGHTS FROM
ZAHKO AND SHUFFLE TO AND FROM AOR AREA.
- 151610Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL LT CMDR BREMSETH WILL BE ARRIVING 1430L
NEEDS TO BRIEF C-3 AND CTF COMMANDER.
- 151625Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM MAJ LIBACK REQUESTING TO OPEN 3
LINES W/CALL SIGN EAGLE 01/02/03 FOR A 0530Z WITH A
0635Z GATE. PASSED ON TO JOC LTCOL WITCHER. HE
INSTRUCTED WE WOULD HAVE TO ACTIVATE PONY LINES.
AWAITING CONFIRMED POSSIBLE HAVE TO WAIT TILL 0700L
TURKS APPROVAL.
- 152020Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM JOC/MAJ BICKET EAGLE CALL SIGN FOR
HELOS WILL PROBABLY GO BUT NEEDS APPROVAL FROM
TURKS WILL FOLLOW IN MORNING.

160245Z APR 94 RECEIVED CALL FROM CPT BOINGER ZAKHO CONCERNING LINES FOR THIS MORNING EAGLE CALL SIGNS. RELAYED JOC WILL WORK ON THIS WITH TURKS TO GET APPROVAL. HE WILL CALL BACK LATER TO CONFIRM.

160255Z APR 94 CAPT BOINGER CALLED, STATED THEY HAD SLIP THEIR T/O TILL 1100L TALKED TO MAJ WIGGINS HE CANNOT CONFIRM SLIP T/O. ???

160300Z APR 94 TSGT LIDER ON DUTY.

160413Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. ASKED FOR COORDINATION ON LNO'S FOR GHOST 31. MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TAKE 2 LNO'S. GHOST 31 WILL HAVE 1 DEADHEAD CREW. THE DEADHEAD CREW WILL BRING GHOST 32 BACK TO INCIRLIK. MAY NEED 2ND LNO FOR GHOST 32.

160414Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS. ADVISED HIM OF THE LNO SITUATION AS RELATED BY SOC3.

160423Z APR 94 MAJ WIGGINS/C3 JOC CALLED. HAD INFORMATION ON THE 12 MEMBER INSPECTION TEAM. 6 WILL DEPART FOR DIYARBAKIR ON GHOST 31 - 0600Z ETD. THE OTHER 6 WILL DEPART ON A C-12, SPAR 51 - 0600Z ETD. MAJ WIGGINS ADVISED EAGLE 01-03 CALLSIGNS APPROVED (VICE PONY). EAGLE FLT T/O TIME WILL HAVE TO BE 0800Z. MAJ WIGGINS SAID HE NOTIFIED THE MCC ON ALL OF THE ABOVE.

160424Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. RELAYED THE MOST RECENT INFO, RECEIVED FROM C3 JOC, TO LT CRAIG. NO WORD YET FROM C3 JOC REGARDS THE LNO'S.

160440Z APR 94 MAJ WIGGINS/ C3 JOC CALLED. THE TURKS ONLY HAVE 1 LNO TO SEND. THE TURKS AGREED THAT AN LNO WILL NOT BE NEEDED ON GHOST 32. MAJ WIGGINS REQUESTS JSOTF ASCERTAIN THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE LNO FOR GHOST 31.

160444Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE ARRIVES. HE IS WORKING THE LNO ISSUE.

160528Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. SOC3 ADVISES THAT ONLY 3 VICE 6 INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS WILL BOARD GHQST 31. NO ONE FROM THE INSPECTION TEAM HAS ARRIVED AT THE AIRCRAFT AS OF THIS TIME.

160530Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/MAJ WIGGINS. MAJ WIGGINS STATES HE WILL CALL LT CRAIG/SOC3 DIRECTLY. C3 JOC HAD RECEIVED NO PRIOR WORD THAT THE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TEAM PAX FOR GHOST 31 HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM 6 TO 3. C3 JOC WILL ALSO WORK ON GAINING A TALLY ON THE INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS.

160549Z APR 94 SGT CALIBOSO, X. 3940, CALLED FOR SGM HALTERMAN. THE CHIEF OF STAFF REQUIRES JSOTF PROVIDE 1 OR 2 MEMBERS TO ACT AS ESCORTS/USHERS FOR TOMORROW'S MEMORIAL SERVICE. SHOWTIME FOR THE ESCORTS/USHERS IS 1500L AT HANGAR 3. THE MEMORIAL SERVICE STARTS AT 1600L.

160558Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT CRAIG. INQUIRED ON THE STATUS OF GHOST 31. LT CRAIG SAID ALL 4 PAX (3 INSPECT. TEAM, 1 LNO) ARE ONBOARD THE ACFT.

160610Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE RETURNS FROM THE CTF. HE STATES THAT LTC HOOVER AND SGM HITCHO HAVE ALSO BEEN MANIFESTED ON GHOST 31.

160615Z APR 94 SOC3/SRA WAID CALLED. GHOST 31 ATD - 0600Z.

160633Z APR 94 CALLED THE WOC/MAJ JAMES. SPAR 51 ATD - 0608Z.

160640Z APR 94 LTC SMITH/SOCEUR J3 CALLED. INQUIRED ON THE STATUS OF TODAY'S HC-130 AND HELO MISSIONS. MAJ ROSENGARD ALSO SPOKE WITH LTC SMITH.

160705Z APR 94 SGM HALTERMAN DIRECTED THE AOB BE INFORMED OF THE 1500Z ETA FOR GHOST 31/32 OUT OF DIYARBAKIR. NO ONE ANSWERS AT THE AOB. WILL TRY AGAIN LATER.

160712Z APR 94 COL THOMPSON AND LCDR BREMSETH (SOCEUR J3) WILL BE ARRIVING INCIRLIK AB TODAY VIA C-12. ETA - 1130Z.

160717Z APR 94 CONTACTED THE AOB/SGT ROY. NOTIFIED AOB OF THE 1500Z ETA FOR GHOST 31/32.

160730Z APR 94 CALLED THE MCC/SGT SMALLEY. ASKED HER TO PASS TO JSOTF THE ATA OF GHOST 31 AT DIYARBAKIR WHEN AVAILABLE.

160745Z APR 94 SGT SMALLEY/MCC CALLED BACK. GHOST 31 HAS ARRIVED AT DIYARBAKIR. ATA NOT AVAILABLE YET.

200

160751Z APR 94 WOC/CAPT PAULEY CALLED. GHOST 31 & SPAR 51 ARE DOWN.

160755Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED. SAID HE WILL REMAIN AT C3 JOC,
X. 3014 TO ACT AS A LIAISON BETWEEN JSOTF & CTF.

160814Z APR 94 FROM J6 - EAGLE 01 - 03 DEPARTED DIYARBAKIR AT 0812Z.

160847Z APR 94 PER CAPT LEFEBVRE:
EAGLE FLT DEPARTED DIYARBAKIR AT APX. 0842Z.
BY APX. 0837Z IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE AWACS RADAR WENT
DOWN.
AWACS IS RTB INCIRLIK.
IT WILL TAKE APX. 2 1/2 HRS. FOR THE 2ND AWACS TO BE ON
STATION.
MCC HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT EAGLE FLT WILL NOT BE
FORWARDED UNTIL THE 2ND AWACS IS ON STATION.

160848Z APR 94 ATD OF EAGLE FLT RECEIVED FROM J6 AND CAPT LEFEBVRE
DON'T MATCH (0812Z & 0842Z RESPECTIVELY). WILL ASSUME
FOR NOW J6 HAS THE MORE ACCURATE ATD.

160947Z APR 94 AWACS AIRBORNE.

161120Z APR 94 GIVEN POSSESSION OF A BROWN ENVELOPE AND A BRICK. .
HANDLED OFF BY CAPT VANDER LEY. RETURN TO LTC ZAHRT
WHEN HE RTB'S INCIRLIK TONIGHT.

161124Z APR 94 CALLED THE MCC/MAJ BETHEL. AWACS PROBLEM WILL CAUSE
SLIPPAGE IN GHOST AND EAGLE ETD'S. MAJ BETHEL WILL CALL
JSOTF WHEN THE NEW SCHEDULING IS FIRMED UP.

161145Z APR 94 CAPT LEFEBVRE CALLED FROM CTF. EAGLE FLT ATD FROM
ZAKHO - 1120Z. WILL BE LANDING AT THE CRASH SITE
SOON. THEY WILL BE SETTING UP SATCOM. MAJ ROSENGARD
AND J6 HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF SAME.

161147Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLED. THE PHONE LINES FOR SOC3 ARE ALL
DOWN. UFN ANY TELECOM WITH SOC3 - DIAL 8171.

161150Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD HAD TELECOM W/COL HUNT & LTC HOOVER.
COL HUNT VERY BUSY WITH THE INVESTIGATION TEAM. MH-60
SPACE PROBLEM WILL LIMIT ABILITY TO REDEPLOY SECURITY
TEAM. PLAN NOW IS TO SEND 4 - 6 BACK TO INCIRLIK TONIGHT.
PRIORITY IS TO PEOPLE WITH ESCORT DUTY.

161220Z APR 94 FROM SGM HALTERMAN - CALLED LTC HOOVER AT DIYARBAKIR. EXPECTING CALL BACK REGARDS LIST OF NAMES FOR PEOPLE RETURNING TO INCIRLIK TONIGHT. AWAITING INFO ON WHETHER THE EQUIPMENT PACKAGE WILL BE COMING OUT WHOLE OR PIECEMEAL.

161313Z APR 94 FINALLY GOT THROUGH TO THE MCC/SGT SMALLEY. ESTIMATES GHOST 31 T/O FROM DIYARBAKIR ON-TIME AT 1345Z. SGT SMALLEY REPORTS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING WITH HER FLIGHTLINE TO GET INFORMATION. NO PAX MANIFEST INFO AVAILABLE FOR GHOST 31.

161314Z APR 94 C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER CALLED. NEEDS TO KNOW WHO IS ON GHOST 31. WHO WILL BE ON THE EAGLE MH-60'S. WHO WILL HAVE TO RON DIYARBAKIR. WHEN AND HOW THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND WILL BE PICKED UP. CURRENTLY - NO ANSWERS TO ANY OF THOSE QUESTIONS. LTC HOOVER HASN'T RETURNED SGM HALTERMAN'S 1220Z PHONE CALL YET. SGT SMALLEY DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO REACH SGM HITCHO. MAJ BETHEL IS TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE OFFICE, ETR 20 MIN. FROM NOW.

161327Z APR 94 PER SGM HALTERMAN'S REQUEST - TRYING TO REARRANGE TMO ITINERARY FOR LTC HOOVER & SGM HITCHO. CHANGE ISTANBUL - AMSTERDAM FROM SUN. TO MON., 18 APR 94. HAD TO CALL THE WOC/SRA WILLIAMS (X. 3001). SHE WILL CALL THE WEEKEND TMO STANDBY NUMBER. EXPECTING TMO TO CALL ME IN APX. 15 MINUTES.

161347Z APR 94 MAJ BETHEL/MCC CALLS. MORE INTENSIVE COORDINATION ON GHOST 31 PAX MANIFEST LIST BEGINS. MAJ ROSENGARD TALKS TO MAJ BETHEL REGARDS BEYANAMME TRANSPORTATION. MAJ ROSENGARD IS CONNECTED TO SGM HITCHO. BRIEFS HIM ON BEYANAMME ACTION ITEMS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ON HIS END. AFTER CALL MAJ ROSENGARD BRIEFS SGM HALTERMAN.

161350Z APR 94 ADVISED BY MAJ BETHEL ETD OF GHOST 32 FROM DIYARBAKIR IS APX. 4 OR 4 1/2 HRS. FROM NOW (1800 OR 1830Z).

161400Z APR 94 AMN LOWRY FROM TMO CALLS. STATES FLIGHT RESERVATIONS FOR LTC HOOVER AND SGM HITCHO CAN'T BE CHANGED UNTIL MON., 18 APR. REASON - SINCE IT'S A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT THERE'S NO WAY TO GET IN TOUCH WITH A DELTA REP. UNTIL MONDAY.

161420Z APR 94 GHOST 31 ATD - 1400Z. ETA INCIRLIK - 1515Z. RELAYED SAME TO C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER, SOC3/LT RAMSEY, WOC/SRA WILLIAMS.

161440Z APR 94 CALLED MCC. TALKED TO SRA KINNEY WHO IS WORKING THE GHOST 31 PAX MANIFEST. TOTAL # OF PAX - 18. GAVE THIS INFO TO C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER, SOC3/LT RAMSEY. LTC WITCHER ONLY NEEDED TOTAL # OF PAX. LT RAMSEY WANTS AN ITEMIZED LIST OF NAMES. TOLD SRA KINNEY TO SECURE FAX GHOST 31 PAX MANIFEST LIST TO C3 JOC. ADVISED LT RAMSEY TO CALL C3 JOC.

161500Z APR 94 MCC/MAJ BETHEL CALLS. EAGLE FLT ETA ZAKHO - 1530Z
ETA DIYARBAKIR - 1655Z.

161503Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER, SOC3/LT RAMSEY WITH EAGLE FLT ETA'S. C3 JOC NEEDS EAGLE GATE TIME.

161508Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLS. TOWER IS SENDING GHOST 31 TO PARKING SPOT B-1. GHOST 31 NEEDS TO PARK BY THE SOC3 HARDSTAND FOR OFFLOAD. CALLED C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER TO WORK PARKING PROBLEM.

161511Z APR 94 PARKING PROBLEM RESOLVED.

161527Z APR 94 C3 JOC/LTC WITCHER. NEEDS TO KNOW TOTAL NUMBER OF PAX ON GHOST 32.

161532Z APR 94 EAGLE FLT RADIOS IN GATE TIME TO C3 JOC.

161705Z APR 94 MSGT LEE ON DUTY.

161722Z APR 94 CREWS RETURNING FROM DIYARBAKIR TONIGHT ARE: 9 ON C-12 AND 16 ON 16 HC 130.

161910Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLED. GHOST 32 AIRBORNE EXITING DIYARBAKIR.

161945Z APR 94 C-3 JOC/MAJ SHAW CALLED. HC 130 IS SCHEDULE TO LEAVE INCIRLIK 171300Z APR 94 TO DIYARBAKIR, TRANLOAD 1430Z AND RETURN 1600Z.

162007Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLED. GHOST 32 LANDED AT 2000Z. UNLOADING EQUIPMENT AT FOX RAMP.

162045Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLED. PUTTING CREWS ON CREW REST TO HANDLE AUTHORIZED PLAN THEY OUTLINE FOR 17 APR 94.

162200Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD REVIEWED AND SIGNED SITREP.

170500Z APR 94 TSGT LIDER ON DUTY.

170630Z APR 94 SRA WAID FROM SOC3 DROPS OFF THE NEW ROE FOR OPC.

170640Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/LT ALLEN. EAGLES 01 - 03 ETD
DIYARBAKIR 0700Z, ETA ZAKHO 0800Z. ONE MH-60
WILL DO AN OUT & BACK. THE OTHER TWO WILL
OFFLOAD AND GO BACK TO DIYARBAKIR. LT ALLEN
WAS TOLD BY CAPT STEIN IT'S PLANNED FOR EACH OF
THE THREE HELOS TO DO AT LEAST 2 SHUTTLES TODAY
BETWEEN DIYARBAKIR AND ZAKHO.
REGARDS THE INSPECTION TEAM - C3 JOC SHOWS THEM
ALL RETURNED TO INCIRLIK. ONLY GENERAL INFO IS
KNOWN ABOUT THEIR SCHEDULE I.E. ON MON., 18 APR
THEY WILL GO BACK TO ZAKHO FOR INTERVIEWS. WED.,
20 APR THEY PLAN TO RETURN TO THE CRASH SITE.

170645Z APR 94 IT'S UNKNOWN WHAT THE INSPECTION TEAM PLANS TO
DO TODAY.

170715Z APR 94 LT CRAIG/SOC3 VISITS JSOTF. REQUEST NEW ETD FOR
GHOST 31 - 1200Z. RELAY THIS TO C3 JOC/LT ALLEN.
LT ALLEN STRESSES GETTING PAX INFO SO NO ONE
MISSES EARLIER T/O. LT CRAIG WORKING TO GET A
PAX LIST. COL O'BRIEN NEEDS TO KNOW PAX INFO,
UNIT / QTY.

170737Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/LT ALLEN. EAGLE 01 - 03, ATD DIYARBAKIR
0720Z, ETA ZAKHO 0820Z.
LT ALLEN STATES MAJ SHAW CALLED C3 JOC FROM ZAKHO.
MAJ SHAW REQUESTS 1300Z ETA AT DIYARBAKIR FOR
GHOST 31.

170811Z APR 94 CALLED MCC REAR. LEFT MSG WITH A MR. HALUN. HAVE
MAJ BETHEL OR SHAW CALL JSOTF REGARDS PAX LIST. PLAN
IS TO HAVE MAJ SHAW SECURE FAX ZAKHO PAX LIST TO
JSOTF. MCC REAR MEMORIAL CHURCH SERVICE STARTED
AT 1030L.

170834Z APR 94 SOC3/LT CRAIG CALLED. REGARDS PAX HE STATES CTF IS
CONTROLLING TODAY'S GHOST 31 DIYARBAKIR MISSION.
SOC3 HAS ONLY BEEN TOLD WHEN TO PROVIDE THE ACFT.

171415Z APR 94 SFC PRATTIS CALLS ZAHKO VIA COMM. LANDLINE # PROVIDED BY MCC REAR/TSGT SMALLEY. HE RECEIVES A SECURE FAX OF A PAX MANIFEST LIST FOR 18 APR ZAHKO - DIYAR. PERSONNEL.

171418Z APR 94 MAJ ROSENGARD RECEIVES CALL FROM ZAKHO. ALL 3 EAGLES DEPARTED ZAKHO AT 1322Z HEADED FOR DIYARBAKIR.

171452Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/MAJ HOIDA. CHG 1 FOR 18 APR HC-130 LINE
CALLSIGN: GHOST 31 MISSION NO: A1880.
ETD INCIRLIK ----- 1100Z ETA DIYARBAKIR - 1215Z
ETD DIYARBAKIR - 1300Z ETA INCIRLIK ----- 1415Z

171453Z APR 94 SAME PHONE CALL WITH MAJ HOIDA - HE SAYS THE PLANNED ETD FOR EAGLE FLT OUT OF DIYARBAKIR ON MON., 18 APR IS 1245Z, ETA INCIRLIK - 1400Z.

171509Z APR 94 CALLED MCC REAR (DIYAR.)/TSGT SMALLEY. PASSED INFO REGARDING TOMORROW'S HC-130 MISSION. MCC REAR ADVISED ON ATD FOR GHOST 31 17/1500Z, ETA INCIRLIK - 1600Z. MCC REAR GAVE JSOTF THE FOLLOWING PAX MANIFEST LIST:

LTC ZAHRT	SFC FREEMAN
MAJ SHAW	SFC RAMSDALL
CPT KENT	SFC TRAMELL
MSG FERGUSON	SSG ELIZDALE
SFC DOLAN	SRA MCCURE
SFC FAY	

171515Z APR 94 CALLED SOC3/LT RAMSEY. NOTIFIED SOC3 OF HC-130 INBOUND AND PASSENGER LIST. LT RAMSEY'S INTEL IS THAT MAJ SHAW SHOULDN'T BE ONE OF TONIGHT'S PAX. LT RAMSEY HEARD MAJ SHAW WILL RTB INCIRLIK TOMORROW. ASKED SOC3 FOR ACFT PARKING SPOT TO EXPEDITE PAX P/U ----- HARDSTAND 5 OR 6.

171522Z APR 94 PER SGM HALTERMAN - CALLED MOTOR POOL VEHICLE DISPATCHER/MR. CENAT (X. 6756). MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A BUS TO P/U THE HC-130 PASSENGERS.

171551Z APR 94 SOC3/LT RAMSEY CALLED. REQUEST EOD MEET HC-130 AT FOX TO DOWNLOAD EXPLOSIVES.

171553Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/MAJ HOIDA. PASSED TO C3 JOC SOC3'S EOD REQUEST.

171558Z APR 94 PER SSG TOBIA/J2 - J1 REPORTS NO CHANGE IN PERSONNEL STATUS.

171602Z APR 94 AOB/SGT WALSH CALLED. REPORTS GHOST 31 HAS LANDED. A FEW MINUTES LATER SOC3/SGT FIELDS DOES SAME.

171611Z APR 94 COL HUNT CALLED. SAID HIS RUCKSACK, LB, & HELMET SHOULD BE ON THE HC-130. HE REQUESTED THOSE ITEMS BE TAKEN OFF THE ACFT AND BROUGHT TO HQ JSOTF. BEEPED THE J2 & J3 BEEPERS REGARDS SAME. BELIEVE MAJ ROSENGARD WENT TO MEET THE HC-130.

171719Z APR 94 CALLED C3 JOC/MAJ HOIDA. ASKED ABOUT APPROVAL FOR TOMORROW'S HC-130 GHOST 31 MISSION. MAJ HOIDA STATED THE TURKS SAID THEY WON'T BEGIN TO LOOK AT THAT LINE UNTIL ROUGHLY 18 APR/0800L.

171741Z APR 94 SOC3 SITREP DROPPED OFF BY 1LT RAMSEY.

171745Z APR 94 NOTE FOR NEXT DAYSHIFT CONTROLLER. CALL FRAG SHOP. WHEN THE 17 APR CFAC BSD IS RECEIVED THEY HAVE A CORRECTED PAGE TO SWAP OUT WITH US.

171800Z APR 94 MSGT LEE ON DUTY.

171825Z APR 94 HOSP/ SRA STEVENS CALLED. SPC BUDGET HAS BEEN ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL. PASSED TO CPT CLARK.

172005Z APR 94 CPT LEFEBVRE REVIEWED AND SIGNED SITREP.

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8c

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AUTHENTICATION

122 Donald L. SANDERS, MCC No. CTF OTC, ZACHA W. BRAD

My duty station is OPERATIONS

Location Home # 262, MCC operations log, Room

From 14-18 May, 21 A. N. Room KDFV

(Fully describe the record preserved)

Reference Tag Number # 262

I certify that (it is a record taken from my duty station) (it is a true and accurate copy of a record kept in my duty station).

Donald L. Sanders
(Signature)

Donald L. Sanders
(Printed Name)

MCC No. CTF, OTC, ZACHA W. BRAD
(Printed Name)

10 May 21
(Date)

Subscribed to and sworn before on this 10th day of May 1951.

John H. Brad
(Signature)

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
 For use of this form see AR 250-18; the proponent agency
 is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
36	1626		RECD TXR PAN FROM ^{(CTF) SECURITY} FOR		AB
37	1637		RECD INVENTORY FOR COMPUTERS		CB
38	1718		Eagle Ops reported that Eagle 1 & 2 landed at 1316 Z.		DCS
39	1848		RECD. SITREP FROM CTF		FB
40	1942		RECD. PIRINCIRLIK SITREP		PR
41	2210		INTRCP 889 RG'D		CB
42	2355		sent SITREP 103		
43		0024	CLOSED OPS 14 APR 93		
1	0730		OPENED OPS		DA
2	0900		RECD C-2 Highlights		DA
3		0905	SENT CALIO APP TO CTF		DA
4		0925	SENT CALIO APP TO PIRINCIRLIK		DA
5	0930		DELAYED ENTRY AWACS TOOK OFF ON TIME CALLED IN 0900		DA
6	0936		AWACS IS FLYING AND THEY HAVE GOOD J-TIDS		DA
7	0940		RECD 3 DAY FORECAST Fm CTF		DA
8	0942		EAGLES DEPARTED 0520Z Fm DIYARBIKIR		DA
9	1003		EAGLES 27 MIKES Fm TEXACO		DA
10		1050	EAGLES DEPARTED FOR MISSION		DA
11		1040	MOBILE DEPARTING FOR DL		DA

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
 15 May 1994
 Date

TYPEN NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
---	-----------

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG <small>For use of this form, see AF 220-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.</small>				PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES		
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED				
			FROM		TO		
			HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE	
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.			ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT					
12	1155		MOBILE AT CP D-9				DA
13	1207		MOBILE AT CP M-3				DA
14	1225		MOBILE AT CP V-1				DA
15	1315		DELAYED ENTRY COL HASSEL CALLED CWZ CARLSON GAVE HIM MSG ABOUT 2 HELOS. MSG CAME APPROX 1210-1215L				DA
16	1305		APPROX THIS TIME 2 AIRCRAFT FLY BY ZAKHO HOUSE FLYING EAST TO WEST DID NOT KNOW WHAT KIND				DA
17	1320		HAVE TRIED CONSTANTLY TO CONTACT MOBILE 1 & STOPPERS BUT NEG-CONTACT. HAVE BEEN TRYING SINCE APPROX 1200L.				DA
18	1325		MOBILE 2 BREAKING DOWN IN OL COMING BACK TO HOUSE				DA
19	1328		HAVE TRIED TO CONTACT EAGLES ON FRC 113 - NEG CONTACT HAVE TRIED SEVERAL TIMES				DA
20	1343		MOBILE DEPARTING V-1				DA
21	1352		MOBILE AT CP F-6				DA
22	1400		MOBILE AT CP M-3				DA
23	1409		MOBILE AT CP D-9				DA
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY					SIGNATURE		

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFI 220-14; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR DATE

HOUR DATE

HOUR DATE

HOUR DATE

ITEM NO

TIME

IN

OUT

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.

ACTION TAKEN

INITIALS

24

1415

RCUD MSG FM LOCAL ZAKHO KDP OFFICE ABOUT CHOPPERS

25

1420

SENT CTF MSG THAT WE RECEIVED FM KDP OFFICE ALSO SENT LIST OF NAMES ON UH-606

26

1525

SENT CTF UPDATED LIST FM CHOPPERS

27

1645

SENT CTF QTC SWANNS NOK

28

1650

BIRDS TO OFF FM INCIRLIK TO ZAKHO AT 1225Z

LATE 1450

UN Community notified to increase local security ALL NGO'S

29

1700

SENT CTF UPDATED PERSONNEL ROSTER FM EAGLES & ALSO MAS SHARANI NOK

30

1710

MAS SANDERS TALKED TO CG TO CONFIRM HE GAVE OK TO LAUNCH GROUND MISSION FOR LZ

31

1740

LATE ENTRY GROUND PATROL LEFT FOR LZ APPROX 1645-1650L

32

1845

Mr Mohammed Selavani representative of Prime Minister extends

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFI 210-18, the proponent agency
 in Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM
 HOUR DATE

TO
 HOUR DATE

ITEM
 NO

TIME

IN

OUT

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.

ACTION TAKEN

INL

deepest regrets. Also, stands ready
 to do anything ~~we~~ we may ask.
 The prime minister also reported
 that everything is quiet in the
 Area.

33 1900

3 MH-60's FLEW OVER HOUSE
 ON THEIR WAY TO LZ NONE
 STOPPED

DLG

34 2005

RCL (MC) ARRIVED AQRAH WITH JOSTF

35 2030

John Cooley & JSOTF PERSONNEL WERE
 NEAR VILLAGE

36 2050

MSC & JSOTF ARRIVED AT
 LOCATION.

37 2107

MADE COMMO VIA TAC SAT
 WITH JSOTF AT SITE THEY
 ARE LINKING UP W/CHOPPERS

38 2305

1 BIRD LANDED AT CP WITH
 (9) BODIES

39 2315

Pony 22 DEPARTED CP FOR CRASH
 SITE.

40 2317

PERSONNEL AT CP ARE TRYING
 TO IDENTIFY BODIES

41 2326

WAS INFORMED JOHN COOLEY

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
 For use of this form, see AFI 220-18, the proponent agency.
 In Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION ON INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
 FROM TO
 HOUR DATE HOUR DATE

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
41	2326		WAS GOING TO STAY AT THE CRASH SITE		DEA
42	2327		CTF INFORMED US NOT TO TRY AND IDENTIFY THE BODIES		DEA
43	2332		Body punch is LEAVING CRASH SITE 1 & GOING TO CRASH SITE 2		DEA
44	2355		SILVER BULLET & Body punch ARE AT 2 ND CRASH SITE. MENTIONING DIFFICULT TERRAIN		DEA
45	0010		ALL AIRCRAFT ARE NOW AT SITE 2		DEA
46	0020		SECOND CRASH SITE LOCATED AT GRID MF 1901169551		DEA
47	0040		CPL Hicks went on rest		DEA
48	0115		Relayed RFI from Silver Bullet to AF on Iraqi force movement.		SWC
49	0123		CTF reported no new movements		SWC
50	0130		JC called to say they would RON on site and they were almost finished there. Requested we inform RCC to monitor the net all night & he would use the same freq tomorrow		SWC

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFI 220-18, the proponent agency
 is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR

DATE

HOUR

DATE

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
51	0140		Silver Bullet reports 1 bird w- 8 PAX inbound ETA 50 minutes		ALSC
52	0200		Silver Bullet reports 2 hoists to complete and 26 confirmed dead	passed to CTF	GUU
53	0205		Eagle DPS called requesting call when birds are inbound to Diabakur		GUU
54	0230		ALL BODIES HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FM CRASH SITE NO ETA YET		GUU
55	0240		Pony 21 10 miles fm CP		GUU
56	0255		Pony 21 LANDED CP W/ 8 PAX		GUU
57	0300		Pony 23 DEPARTED SITE 2 & HEADING STRAIGHT TO DIARBAKUR APPROX 1 hr 50 min		GUU
58	0310		ALL US PERSONNEL ARE LINKING UP AT SITE 1		GUU
59	0320		Pony 21 CONTACTED HOUSE & HEADING STRAIGHT TO DIARBAKUR		GUU
60	0322		ONE BIRD LEFT CP TO SITE 1 TO PICK UP RESCUE PERSONNEL		GUU
61	0418		Pony 21 DEPARTED CRASH SITE 1 W/ 4 PASSENGERS FOR ZAKAO. WILL LOAD UP BODIES & FLU TO DIARBAKUR.		GUU

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFI 250-18, the proponent agency
 is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM
 HOUR DATE

TO
 HOUR DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
62	0424		Pony 22 SMIKES fm CP going to offload 7 PASSENGERS THEN DEPART BACK TO CRASH SITE.		
63	0438		Pony 22 DEPARTED BACK TO CRASH SITE 1		DA
64	0440		INFORMED SILVER BULLET PONY 22 HEADED BACK TO CRASH SITE 1		DA
65	0450		Pony 23 ARRIVED 0440Z AT DIYARBAKIR w/ 8 bodies		DA
66	0500		Pony 21 LANDED CP OFFLOADING PASSENGERS & LOADING ON CASUALTIES.		DA
67	0505		Relayed to CP GHOST 32 IS AT DIYARBAKIR & COMING TO ZAKO FOR AIR SUPPORT OF PONY 21 & PONY 22 FOR THEIR FLIGHT BACK TO DIYARBAKIR		DA
68	0515		Pony 21 DEPARTED CP TO DIYARBAKIR w/ 9 CASUALTIES		DA
69	0555		Pony 22 SMIKES fm CP WILL require fuel		DA
70	0601		Pony 22 ON FINAL APPROACH AT TEXACO		DA
71	0610		Pony 22 DEPARTED TEXACO		

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFI 220-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM TO
HOUR DATE HOUR DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
71	0610		w/ 7 CASUALTIES 4 CREW & 1 LNO INFORMED CTF OF THIS		
72	0615		INFORMED EAGLE OPS OF POUY 22 DEPARTURE		DA
			15 APR 94		DA
1	0730		GHOST 32 DEPARTED 1800Z 0320Z		OS
2	0738		1st GROUP AT PRINCLIK 2ND & 3RD GROUP DUE IN 15 MIN Received Short Wave msg to contact John C. on Channel #1 He has people at both sites and he is at Site #2	could not contact John	OS
3	0745		SITREP MCL#103 RECEIVED		OS
4	0830		PRINCLIK REPORTED 3 M160 GOLF ALL LAUNDED SAFELY, ALL FULLY SERVICEABLE AND CREW REST COMMENCED 0330Z		OS
5	0831		EAGLE OPS CONFIRMED DEPARTURE THIS LOCATION ETA 0910Z		OS
6	0930		TACFAX PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE R/C		OS
7	0930		FORECAST FOR AOR R/C		OS
8	0932		CTF REQUEST INFO REGARDING AFFILIATION OF KURDS ON DOWNED BIRDS		OS
9	1050		ROOD TGS ROSTER Am CTF		DA
10	1249		EAGLES 1+2 DEPARTED DLYARBIR 0845Z		DA

PRINTED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AA 230-18, the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR

DATE

HOUR

DATE

ITEM NO

TIME

IN

OUT

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.

ACTION TAKEN

INL

ITEM NO	TIME	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN			
11	1317	EAGLES APPROX 30 MIKES OUT		DA
12	1330	EAGLE 20 MIKES FM CP		DA
13	1350	EAGLE LANDED CP		DA
14	1435	EAGLES DEPARTED CP FOR CRASH SITE		DA
15	1440	RELAIED EAGLES DEPARTURE TO J.C. AT CRASH SITE		DA
16	1440	INFORMED EAGLES J.C. WOULD MEET THEM AT CRASH SITE 1		DA
17	1525	WAS HEARD ACROSS THE HF RADIO MR B. AGREED TO GIVE D.N. THE TAPE. THEY NEED HER TO GO TO LOCATION. THIS IS NOT CONFIRMED		DA
18	1530	MOBILE STATED 1 EAGLE AT CRASH SITE 1 & 1 EAGLE AT CRASH SITE 2		DA
19	1550	DELAYED ENTRY BODY PUNCH AT SITE 2		DA
20	1640	WAS INFORMED BY GROUND UNIT APPROX ETA 1830L		DA
21	1730	BODY PUNCH & EAGLES WILL BE LEAVING SITES APPROX 15 MINUTES		DA
		INFORMED CTF OF THIS		DA
22	1740	J. COOLEY ENROUTE BACK TO HOUSE		DA
23	1741	EAGLES DEPARTING SITES		DA

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
 For use of this form, see AN 230-18, the proponent agency
 in Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

FORM NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
 FROM HOUR DATE TO HOUR DATE

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
24		1820	REQUESTED RTN GATE 1445Z		DA
25		1825	GATE APPROVED		DA
26	1830		RCUD LEADERS Agenda for 17 APR 94		DA
27	1840		EAGLE 5 MIKES fm TEXACO		DA
28	1848		EAGLE flight LANDING AT CP THEY WERE REQUESTING RTN GATE 1500Z THROUGH COUGAR		DA
29	1855		RTN GATE 1500Z APPROVED		DA
30	1900		EAGLES DEPARTED TEXACO INFORMED EAGLE OPS & CTF		DA
31	2005		EAGLES ARRIVED Pirinlik 1600Z		DA
32	2125		RCUD Airlift Schedule fm CTF	SENT CTF SATREP 104 + 105 2330	DA
16 APR 94					
1	0730		OPENED OPS		DA
2	0930		RCUD - 3 DAY FORECAST fm CTF		DA
3	1040		RCUD SAM UPDATE fm CTF		DA
4		1105	MOBILE DEPARTING TEXACO FOR MISSION		DA
5	1123		MOBILE AT CP D-9		DA
6	1139		MOBILE AT M-3		DA
7	1149		MOBILE AT F-6		RS
8	1157		MOBILE at V-1		DA
9	1200		RCUD C-2 Highlights fm CTF		DA
10	1215		EAGLES 12+3 DEPARTED Pirinlik 0811Z		DA

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL, OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AFM 220-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR

DATE

HOUR

DATE

ITEM NO.

TIME

IN

OUT

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.

ACTION TAKEN

INITIALS

11

1220

MOBILE AT ~~ALTA~~ FAYDAH OL.

DA

12

1240

RCVD MSG FM SOC COUGAR HAD TO GO BACK TO INJIRLIK DUE TO PROBLEMS, THERE WOULD BE APPROX 2 1/2 3 HRS DELAY IN COVERAGE. BIRDS WERE NOT TO FLY FORWARD FM THIS LOCATION.

13

1310

MOBILE AT F-6

DA

14

1320

ALL 3 EAGLES INBOUND TO CP

DA

15

1325

INFORMED EAGLES 3 TO SHUT DOWN CP TOLD HIM TO RELAY TO 142

16

1335

MOBILE AT D-9

DA

17

1337

AT 1320 HRS CTF CALLED SAID AWACS WOULD POSSIBLY BE UP IN 12 MINS. WOULD CALL WHEN THEY ARE CONFIRMED AIRBORNE & OPERATIONAL

DA

18

1345

CTF CALLED INFORMED US AWACS WAS AIRBORNE AT 0930Z

DA

19

1346

MOBILE AT CP TEXACO

DA

20

1350

INFORMED CTF THAT Insp. TEAM WANTED TO TAKE COMMO ITEMS THAT WERE RECOVERED BACK TO SITES

DA

21

1355

RCVD FAX FM CTF SUMMARY COMMO CHECKLIST

DA

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AA 220-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIAL
	IN	OUT			
22	1430		CTF INFORMED US AWACS IS UP BIRDS CAN FLY		
23	1520		EAGLE 1 DEPARTING CP		DA
24	1524		ALL EAGLES HAVE DEPARTED CP		DA
25	1617		ALL 3 BIRDS ARE ON LOCATION SITE 1		DA
26	1740		FIRST SHUTTLE COMP. 2ND SHUTTLE STARTING IN 10 MIKES & DEPART LOCATION IN ONE HOUR. EAGLE 3 HAS APU PROBLEMS. HAVE TO KEEP AIRCRAFT RUNNING AT SITE 1		DA
27	1749		BOTH SHUTTLES COMPLETE TO SITE 2		DA
28	1810		RCUD INTREP 894, MCC104 & MCC105 Fm CTF		DA
29	1815	10	Body punch CALLED ARE BREAKING DOWN & DEPARTING IN 10 MIKES APPROX 1825L		DA
30	1817		SENT COL HASSEL FAX FOR CHAP BURNING		DA
31	1828		SENT CTF JOC CHIEF NAMES OF GUARDS N.O.K.		DA
32	1840		RCUD TGS ROSTER Fm CTF		DA
33	1915		EAGLES 4 MIKES Fm CP		DA
34	1922		EAGLES LANDING AT CP		DA

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
---	-----------

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
 For use of this form, see AFI 220-18, the proponent agency
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

FORM NO. NO OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION LOCATION PERIOD COVERED
 FROM TO
 HOUR DATE HOUR DATE

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
35		1931	REQUESTED RTN GATE 1600Z FOR EAGLES 1, 2 & 3		
36	1937		RCUD COALITION LEADERS AGENDA CHG 2 fm CTF		DSH
37	1957		EAGLE (PARTE)		DSH
38	2125		Eagle OPNS reported that Eagles 2, 2, & 3 arrived at 1720Z		DSH
39	2210		RCV TACFAX WITH DRAWINGS SENT SITREP 106		DSH
40					
41		2315	CLOSED OPS		DSH
17 APR 94					
1	0730		OPENED OPS		DSH
2	0833		John Cooley informed locals to keep guarding sites at 0730L		DSH
3	0910		RCUD C-2 Highlights		DSH
4	0920		RCUD 3 DAY FORECAST fm CTF		DSH
5	0925		RCUD SAM UPDATE fm CTF		DSH
6	0	0950	F2 GOING TO BORDER CROSSING		DSH
8	1148		COALITION LEADERS AGENDA		DSH
9	1200		EAGLE Flight CALLED 20 MIKES OUT		DSH
10	1222		EAGLE Flight 1 MIKE OUT		DSH
11	1254		EAGLE 03 DEPARTED CP w/0845Z GATE TO DIYARBARIR		DSH

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AIR 230-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR

DATE

HOUR

DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
12		1350	REQUESTED 1015Z RTN GATE FOR EAGLE 1 & 2		
13	1355		RTN GATE 1015Z APPROVED		
14		1422	EAGLE 1 DEPARTED CP		
15		1433	EAGLE 2 DEPARTED CP		
16	1530		GATE APPROVED FOR RETURN GATE AT 1215Z		
17			Eagle 4 DEPARTED CP		
18			EAGLE 5 15 MINS OUT		
19	1703		EAGLE 5 1 MIKE OUT		
20	1718		SENT CTF RATIONS REQUEST		
21	1720		SENT CTF Commo DESTROYED TO Col BENNET		
22	1722		EAGLES SW6 DEPARTED CP FOR DYAR		
23	1724		RCUD PROPOSED FLIGHT PLAN Am CTF		
24		1810	SENT SEOTF 3-2 COPY FAX LIST		
25	1839		FAX OF NAMES OF INVESTIGATION TM		
26	1900		RCUD INTREP 17 Am CTF		
27	2048		RCUD SITRP 107 Am Pirinichk		
28	2301		MCC EVAC CONSIDERATIONS		
29		2310	SENT CTF SITRP 107		
			CLOSED OPS		
			18 APR 94		
1	0745		OPENED OPS		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AR 230-18; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
				FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS		
	IN	OUT					
19	1410		SAID would try AND GET AN ETA				
20	1430		Requested complete inventory that we should have at Zack's MCC from C-6.				
21			Mobil will return est 1530Z Relayed to CTF				Dec
22			Mobil called again we be leaving in 5m.				
23	1654		Eagles landed MCC				Da
24	1705		Contact CTF requested 1315Z gate, relayed to Arrow 3.				Dec
25	1720						
26	1720		Eagle 1-2 depart notify CTF				Dec
27	1730		Next of Kin for Kurdish sent to JOC Chief				Dec
28	1732		Substance request list				Dec
29			Incoming personnel roster				Dec
30	1806		Commo equip list from C-6				Dec
31	1835		RCVD NEW FILL				Dec
32	2040		RCVD JINTREP 896 Sin CTF				Dec
33	2047		RCVD SATEP 108 for Pirandik				Dec
34	2145		RCVD MCC 107				Dec

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

K.D.P.
KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY / IRAQ
Public Relation Office

٣٢٢ / ١٤٤٠

بروقیه قائمقام قضاة عفره
اليوم وفي الساعة ١١:٠٠ دعتنا الخطبة
خاتمة هيليتو بتر من قبل خاتمة هيليتو
وبالصباح في مدينة (تويشكه)
التابعة لقضاة عفره واستاذنا
بالتفصيل حال ورودها اليها

With Compliments

To The MCC

Message of the Mayor of AQRAH :

At 11.45 Today two helicopters were shot down
by two Jet fighters in Twashka area which is
within AQRAH'S Territory. We will provide you
further details as soon as we get them.

P.R.O

~~TOT/25~~
~~#25/141420~~

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned, AC-8a
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident AC-8b**

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment AC-8c

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994 AC-8d

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

**HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED TASK FORCE, OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY
APO AE 09396**

14 May 94


MEMORANDUM FOR MG Andrus, Accident Investigation Board President

FROM: HQ CTF/CG

SUBJECT: Memorandum for Record


1. Reference your request of 13 May 1994 for a list of individuals on board the helicopters involved in the accident over Northern Iraq on 14 April 1994 and their reason for being aboard, the following is provided:

<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>POSITION/REASON</u>
COL JERALD L. THOMPSON	US	MCC CO-CMDR
COL HIKMET ALP	TU	MCC CO-CMDR
LT COL JONATHAN C. SWANN	UK	SENIOR UK REP
LT COL GUY DEMETZ	FR	SENIOR FRENCH REP
COL RICHARD A. MULHERN	US	NEW MCC CO-CMDR
MAJ HARRY C. SHAPLAND	UK	SECURITY OFFICER
1 LT LAURA A. PIPER	US	IRAQI AIR ANALYST (C-2)
MS BARBARA L. SCHELL	US	POLITICAL ADVISOR
MR SALID SAID	KURD	INTERPRETER
SSG RICKY L. ROBINSON	US	MEDIC
SSG PAUL N. BARCLAY	US	COMM NCO
SFC BENJAMIN T. HODGE	US	TRANSLATOR
MR. AHMAD MOHAMMAD	KURD	MISSION SECURITY
MR. BADER MIKHO	KURD	MISSION SECURITY
MR. GHANDI HUSSEIN	KURD	MISSION SECURITY
MR. ABDULSATUR ARAB	KURD	MISSION SECURITY
CAPT PATRICK M. McKENNA	US	H-60 PILOT
W01 JOHN W. GARRETT JR.	US	H-60 PILOT
W01 ERIK S. MOUNSEY	US	H-60 PILOT
CW2 MICHAEL A. HALL	US	H-60 PILOT
SPC JEFFREY C. COLBERT	US	H-60 CREW CHIEF
PFC MARK A. ELLNER	US	H-60 CREW CHIEF
SPC MICHAEL S. ROBINSON	US	H-60 CREW CHIEF
SPC CORNELIUS A. BASS	US	H-60 CREW CHIEF

CERTIFICATE	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.	
25 May 94 Date	 LAURA A. ELLIS, SFC USAF Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

<u>RANK/NAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>POSITION/REASON</u>
1LT M. BARLAS GULTEPE	TU	TU LIAISON OFFICER
1LT CEYHUN CIVAS	TU	TU LIAISON OFFICER

2. The mission was being conducted to introduce the new U.S. and Turkish MCC Co-Commanders to various dignitaries in Northern Iraq. The approved mission was conducted in the line of duty, for official purposes, and essential to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.



JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Commanding General
Combined Task Force

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8c

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

AC-8d

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AC-8e

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG				PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED	
CTF-C2		HQ OPC II Incirlik AB, TU		FROM	TO
				HOUR DATE	HOUR DATE
				0001 14 Apr 94	2400 14 Apr 94
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
01	0001		Log opened		AD
02	0030		SAM AB		AB
03	0645		CFAC Sum		AB
04	0200		Com Check		AB
05	0230		(2 Highlight)		AB
06	0400		BCC Run		AB
07	0830		Watch change		Tm
08	0942		BCC Run		Tm
09	0730Z (10:45)		2 Prob Hind Helos shot down		Tm
10	1135 L		CTF-C-3 CONTACTS EAGLE FLIGHT		Tm
11	1135 L		ALWAYS - DOES NOT HAVE A PAINT ON EAGLE FLIGHT		Tm

ENTER NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER ON OFFICIAL ON DUTY
 Todd C. Miller, 1LT USAF

SIGNATURE
 Todd Miller

DA FORM 1584

Page Reduced 32% add

NOTE: HE CHANGES TIME FROM Z TO L
 AT ENTRY #10, THEN AT #11 STARTS
 A NEW PAGE (TITLED "SPECIAL LOG")
 ON PAGE 2, HE THEN GOES BACK TO ZULU TIME
 AT ENTRY #10
 ON PAGE 3, BACK TO LOCAL TIME

CERTIFICATE	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.	
Date: 9 May 94	WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

2

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

01

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

CTF-C2

HQ OPC II
Incirlik AB, TU :

FROM
HOUR DATE

TO
HOUR DATE

1132 4-14-94

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
01	1134		SPECIAL Log OPENED	---	n
02	1134		NO MODES FROM TARGETS	---	m
03	11:36		AWACS got PAINT AFTER TIGER POINTED THEM OUT, NO IFF.	---	
04	11:46		CTF ^{ATTEMPS} CONTACTS Eagle Flight NO CONTACT ON EAGLE 1		m
05	11:47		NO SURVIVORS FOR Duke MAD dog.		
06	11:48		-ORDINANCE ON PYLONS - EAGLE 1 WAS 2 SHIP		
07			ASKED FOR EAGLE Flight PLAN.		
08			EAGLE Flight PLAN HARRIERS OVER-FLEW CRASH SITE, HURRICANE SPITEFIRE.		
09	909Z		EAGLE 1 NOT SQUAWKING ASSUMED to be landed		
10			(MAD dog)!! Confirm EAGLE 1 WAS SINGLE SHIP - (duke)	Negative 2 ship	m
11	911Z		ASKING FOR INFLIGHT REPORT FROM SPITEFIRE'S HURRICANE		m

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

(For use of this form, see AFM 230-10; the proponent agency is the Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.)

PAGE NO. 02 NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION
CTF-C2

LOCATION
HQ OPC II
Incirlik AB, TU

PERIOD COVERED
FROM
HOUR DATE
1130 414-94
TO
HOUR DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
14	1227	L	Eagle 1 - Two Ship Helos Confirmed From MAD dog		7m
15			SPIT FIRE OVER TARGET Now confirms 2 splash.		
16			"Heading OF TARGET during INCIDENT" - (NEGATIVE)		7m
17			MANIFEST FOR Eagle 2 Received.		7m
18	1242	L	"Confirmed Squawk with Eagle After Incident" (AWACS)		
19	1243	L	MANIFEST'S CREW for Both Flights Requested by C-3 From ZALIKAH or PRINCERLICH //		7m
20			1 CREW AT PRINCERLICH ready. Weather Good		7m
21	116	L	HARRIER getting GAS - TO VISUAL ID. POSSIBLE - BLACK HAWK helos on - A parking lot AT - 36 23 0 N 4412" E //		
22	126	L	"Tiger Flight Landed Reviewing video ASAP		7m

TYPER NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1594

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

U.S. GOVERNMENT GPO: 1985-421-001/12103

Page Rechecked 4/4/94

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AFM 230-10, the appropriate agency
 in Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

PAGE NO. 83

NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

CTF-C2

HQ OPC II
 Incirlik AB, TU

FROM
 HOUR DATE

TO
 HOUR DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
23	129	L	mad dog to Duke "Do we have A VISUAL OVER PARKING lot" NR. CHAVING TROUBLE with VECTOR OVER Irbil parking lot.		M
24	143	L	JSOTF MCC TEAM TO Luanch A RECCE TEAM TO CRASH SITE		
25	143	L	- HARRIS handed		
26	146	L	JSOTF HAS CLEARANCE TO LUANCH. INCAB TO TO AOR. 14.45 LUNCH		
27	320	L	- CNN REPORTS 2 IRAQI WINGLANES shoot down 2 BLACK HAWK helos		
28	0330		- PHOTOS ARRIVED - OF FIRST CRASH SITE NO POSITIVE ID.		
29	334	L	3 MA-60S AIRBORNE AT 3:15 LOCAL + 1MC130		M
30	432	L	H-60 90% PROBABLE FROM PHOTO INTEL.		M
31	506	L	CAPT VANDERWHITE CALLED - FACREC		Z

TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

page reduced 44% - call

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8c

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

AC-8d

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AC-8e

AC-8f

100-106

RECORD

#13

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION	
I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from	
SECRET <i>NSA</i> to UNCLASSIFIED	<i>Donald G. Norris</i>
24 MAY 94	DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
Date	Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM
EXTRACT	
I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from	
Doc Log ref #13 CTF/C3, DPC	<i>Donald G. Norris</i>
which is kept in my records system.	DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, USAF
24 May 94	Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey
Date	

CTF/C3

OPERATION

13 APR 1994

21-0323

-PT 50

0600 LT ALLEN ON DUTY WITH SGT HARRIS, SPEC HENRY, SRA ROBINSON

0650 INDEF HOLD, AWACS RETURNING WITH HYD LEAK.

0735 AWACS ON DECK

0743 AWACS REQ T/O 0515Z, TURKS APPROVED OVER PHONE

(0830) ROLEX 1+30

0838 #2087, #2088 ROTOR T/O + 1+30 ROLEX

0845 #2089 SAVVY T/O 0525

0911 #2090 ZUR ROLEX, DETON T/O 0700Z, DEVIL T/O 1030Z

0914 LINK WITH X-RAY MINUS RADAR

0926 AWACS TROUBLE SHOWING RADAR PROBLEM

0930 JTIDS WITH INDEF

0946 JTIDS WITH DADDY

0949 #2091 DEMON T/O 0800Z, DEVIL T/O 1100Z

0955 #2092 ROTOR 05 T/O 0715Z

CONTINUED ON LUNCH
0732Z

1048 #2093 DEMON T/O 1100Z, DEVIL T/O 1230Z

1115 TURKS CMA KAPLAN, #2094 WIKING T/O 0920Z

1132 #2095 ROTOR 06 T/O 0400Z

1136 #2096 PUMA 44 CNX

1206 #2097 CHG - DEMON 10Z

(1219) TURK A/C ON AOR -

1225 APPROX 4 A/C NO CONTACTS SO FAR STAYING LOW IN ROE 3
PASSES TO C3, C2

13 APR 94

WEDNESDAY

1238 #2098 CLAW T/O 0935Z, DEVIL T/O 1130Z

(1240) SPECIAL MISSIONS IN AOR, TNKR OBSERVED LIVE ORDNANCE ON BOARD

1302 SPECIAL MISSIONS AIRCRAFT ARE BEING RELIEVED ON STATION. INDIA SAYS ONCOMING A/C WILL REMAIN BELOW 25,000'

1310 SPECIAL MISSIONS ARE OUT OF AREA

1315 LT COL SHUK FROM ETCC CALLED WITH QUESTIONS ON THE SPECIAL MISSIONS. SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK LATER.

1321 #2099 ROTOR 06 T/O 1030Z

REFER TO 10.3

1400 (L) Bicket on duty

1425(L) SPAR 53 1100Z SLIPPING TO 1145Z BECAUSE OF TWR DELAYS

1445(L) #~~3000~~³¹⁰⁰ ROTOR 06 T/O 1245 ACTIVE

1445(L) TU AIRCRAFT IN ROR - CLOSE TO 6:00 PM SO CTF WILL RETROGRADE A/C

1452(L) #~~3000~~³¹⁰⁰ EAGLE 01/02 ROR 1215Z RETURN GATE

1504(L) Secret immediate message at com center

1505(L) Request MADDUG CALL JOE TO PASS INFO ABOUT SPECIAL AIRCRAFT IN ROR - Reported the MD is on other line - will call

ALT'S

#'S

IMPACT

Times

Did they interfere?? NO

1542(L)

1536 "FORD"

1545(L) Secret immediate com center

1610(L) ROTOR 06 CAME UP WITH CALL SIGN REPLICATION PLEASE USE ROTOR 07 TO AVOID CONFUSION PER CTTULND - LANDING TIME??

1616(L) 2102' FOR OPEN SPAR 51 0330Z to 0700Z
SPAR 53 1100Z to 1430Z

1638(L) CANX ROTOR 07 INFORMED TUB

1640 LTC WILFRED ON DUTY

1751 # 2103 Activate Route #5 FCF

1820 BIC 1513111

1838 # 2104 ^{14 APR} EAGLE 1/2 T/O 0520Z GI 0625
EAGLE 10 T/O 0630Z (LTAG)

1903 STU Keys removed from C-3; C-3DO OFFICES AND
PUT ON KEY HOOD IN JOL

1930 RECD MSG DTG 130740Z APR 94; OLIVE COMFORT
" " " 130630Z APR 94; IRISH EMERALD
" " " 130620Z APR 94; OLIVE COMFORT
" " " 131208Z APR 94; IRISH EMERALD
" " " 131239Z APR 94; IRISH EMERALD
" " " 131323Z APR 94; USECOM RECON SCHEDULE

2000 RCVD B5ID#1 Need copy to go down to
the C3 TU office

2100 Pentagon called to get a question from the fused slide
squeezed away - How come 23 scheduled and 23 flown
but 2 curx? ANSWER - One curx was an Air Abort so it
flew - It was ANAS so the spare flew (added a sortie)
that made up for the ground abort KC 135

2200 Bullet to quarter 6 3117 or page #191

14 APR

0200 RECD MSG DTG 131730Z APR 94; UNIKOM DAILY FLT SCHEDULE

0400 SWA NTR

0405 NO G/C OR O/B MISSIONS TODAY.

0600 Maj Wiggins on duty with Spl Hency, Ann Nichols & Ann Robinson
Night reports person gone when I arrived. No Chg over bnf.
UN CH-53 scheduled north of 36th parallel at 0515Z. LV
0555Z. Inform MadDog

0650 Intel informed me that Iraqi's flew many sorties last

night. It was the normal Iraqi night fly day.

0743 Rumor of a Tu F-4 and a Tu Helicopter going down yesterday P.M.

0800 AWACS off on time. Verified by radio checks.

0825 JTIDS is good.

0845 AWACS on station

0950 Chg Rotor 05 to 0700Z T/O Activate Hornet 01 for a 0730Z T/O

1000 CNX Hornet 01. Aircraft broke

1015 Chg Eagle 10's t/o to 0730Z

1045
0745 2 Hind Helicopters shot down by Tiger N3646.9
E 44° 04.3. #2 3645.1 4405.2 less than 500'
Hard copy available. 0745Z

1050 Maj Wilmet from Eucom ref Demarche to Iraq. Has not been delivered to Iraq as far as Eucom can determine.

1053 Tiger on tanker

1100 Cmd post called. Requested Col O'Brien at battle cab.

1105 Duke reported a VID, followed by AWACS ID.

Tiger one used on AMRAM, Tiger 2 used a AIM-9M.

1115 CG went to call Eucom & inform the Turks.

1128 AWACS had a rdr paint in the clutter with no squawks.

1130 Chg Claw T/O to 0815Z

Activate Rotor 06 T/O 0835Z

1135 Eagle f/t launched at 0650Z Destination Irbil

1140 Tiger saw no survivors on over f/t. AWACS reported Eagle f/t located Turk/Iraq border NE ROZ 2 at 0738Z.

1148 (?) MADDOX SAID "Do we know of anyone that has talked to Eagle Eight

? NO Have you contacted their ops center? YES - we are waiting for them to ^{fax} flight plan to us. we will pass on anything we find out.

Duke has them painted on the radar with IFF code

1205 Spitfire over splash area. Taking pictures. Tiger RTB.

1215 request Hurr & Spit give in f/t mis reps. □

1215 No outgoing phone calls. All incoming calls refer to Col O'Brien.

- 1220 Centcom called looking for details. Still armed for now.
- 1222 Hurricane photoed both sites. Spittie over sites now.
- 1228 AWACS confirmed valid squawk for Eagle FT ~~FT~~ after shutdown.
- 1236 AWACS on tanker getting gas.
- 1238 Passed Pinnacle inputs to command post.
- 1240/1316 Harrier FT flew over parking lot outside Mr Barzen's HQ's and reported 2 helicopters there. They are refueling to fly back to site to verify.
- 1320 Tiger FT is down.
- 1340 Passed coords of shoot down to MCC.
- 1345 Activated Rotor 07 for a 1050Z T/O.
- 1347 Permission to launch JSOTF for Reserve mission. ^{no AAR} over Turkey.
- 1350 Extended AWACS til 1730Z. Tiger will provide JCA. Second AWACS will launch at 1545Z along with claw.
- 1351 Activated Pony 21, 22, 23, + Ghost for 115Z for helicopters + 1145Z for Ghost.
- 1352 Nobody except Tiger getting gas from Puma 55.
- 1400 LTC WITHEER on Duty
- 1409 Intel reports 92 Harrier Recce observes 1 red car 2 white vans site MF176698 No Helix observes.
- 1436 # 2112 Activate claws/Puma 11
- 1506 PSA call CPT Peterson, EUCCOM PAT
- 1511 Passed to C3 call from EUCCOM REF
- 1515 Call from BAE CAR 12 AVAL BDE - Col Hayes
- 1534 C3 passes to MCC-7 launch program team - 6 PAX 2 vehicles to beach site.
- 1542 # 2113 Activate Eagle 17 remains to DIT # 2114 Activate Ghost 31
- 1550 Call from USADDP Cms CAR max rates
- 1552 Call from USAFE CAT - ^(detected)
- 1602 Call from CPT Kelly, EUCCOM ^{views can RPTs}
- 1612 Coll. names pilots + crews Eagle FT.
- 1619 Bound to P/U names secret specat to CAR.
- 1647 C2 Rep Reports Pentagon info release US Helos shot down - unconfirmed by whom C3 internal cc

- 1651 MSGC Camp Post 1st PW 1st all OK
Signal Fxi CX - except local & distant
Thunder
- 1701-08 MSGC Camp Post 31 to actual
Pony overland due to high density
altitude than Silver Bullet / 1758
Air detail of Soc II / MIA 106 cases EO
- 1740 # 2119 Advance Ghost 32 2nd HC120
- 1747 - Eagle 14 Arr Pirinlike
- 1805 - 3 Helos will go direct to crash site
- 1819 - C3 passes press into to Evcon of S
CBS News Release on President Press Conf
- 1820 - MLC-2 Rpt GND Team site of all
in 30 min IE 1850-1800 L
- 1850 # 2120 Ghost 32 1630E
- 1831 Pass to Camp Post - for battle staff
GND Team 5 km out; Helos circling; attempting
to communicate area back; will pass into
- 1940 Pass to Camp Post - Pony was 2 CRASH
sites in view, good views
- 1958 Call from WOC Lt Ramsey - Req
for LND Ghost 32 / Req for info SOC III
via 8177/8173 - (IN) C3 say LND not missed
- 2000
2006 PERS on ground attempting to confirm
BODIES
- Call from Camp Post - MIA News cor on ENGL
Sp for EOD mentions and d/c? ?
- 2016 - Per CG - BODIES to be recovered to
Diyarbakir - passed to ^{Ghost 31 1930E} MLC-R ^{MIA Detail 106} RECEIVE MIA Team 2 AS5
^{LTC ERVINS 238 2800 JAF}
- 2019 - MSGC Camp Post MIA Andrews to all
1620L Inca. msg given to Lt Brewster
- 2028 - Pass to Camp Post - MIA News / EOD
mentions on Eagle 142 - ^{Team MIA 100 Hares}
^{2000 CHAFF}
- survival three
- 2032 MSGC from Hospital - no special considerations
for bodies; ~~not~~ clear to move bodies
to Diyarbakir; then on to GE; 4 slots
here - Col Greeby at Diyarbakir - Col ORCES -
- 2042 MSGC from (MIA) Youngs - Evcon
initiated Notification West of Kent - Call from ^{MIA} R
- 2048 BODIES ^{Point 214 23} Evconite to Diyarbakir - ^{STAY} passed to MLC-R

EXTRACT
OF
JOC LOG #13 CTF/C3
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
5 APRIL 1994
* * *

1605 Were informed of an injured person at Erbil hospital requesting air evoc to Diyabakir. recalled Maj Bicket.

1710 Received more info. Patient at Erbil Hospital stomach wound, critical, from Denmark, Un passport [REDACTED] Neis Jensen. Evacuate to ~~Erbil~~ Diyabakir with doctor, Khatri B Chetri, Nepal, passport [REDACTED]. Tasking Eagle flight. Estimated T/O 1600Z. Arrive Erbil 1830Z.

1715 - Notified C3 (Tu) of diplomatic info.

1735 Received coordinates + conditions of landing area in Erbil.

1810 Activated 3+4 Eagle to extricate patient T/O 1515Z.

1815 notified E-TCC of operation.

1835 Recalled Eagle flight. Adm Lear at EUCom/J3. directed no nite flight to Erbil.

1915 Got a phone call from Southern Watch. UN helicopter airborne to Erbil at 1606Z. The UN is affecting the airlift.

1920 Notified MCC, Zakho, Eagle flight, + CFAcc (woc) that UN was doing the airlift. Our help is not needed at this time.

1925 Got a call from the embassy at Ankara. Called on behalf of the Danish Embassy. Passed on info about UN helicopter.

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

SECRET No FORN to UNCLASSIFIED

24 MAY 94
Date

Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, PAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USF/COM

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

JOC Log #13 UN/CF 300
which is kept in my records system.

24 May 94
Date

Laura A. Hill, PAC
Evidence Custodian, In Chrg. of the Tasking

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8c

AC-8d

AC-8e

AC-8f

AC-8g

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
COMBINED TASK FORCE PROVIDE COMFORT II
INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY
APO AE 09396

JSOTF-J3

30 April 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: CTF CG, CTF CofS, CTF C3

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - Executive Summary - After Action Report
JSOTF Participation in Recovery Operation: MCC-Eagle Flight Incident - 14 April 1994

140915Z APR 94 JSOTF Response Force at MCC prepares to launch ground team, on order.

141315Z APR 94 Ground team departs MCC Zakho for crash site.

141644Z APR 94 From JSOTF LNO at CTF: 2 F-15'S are on-station over the TAOR. The F-15's only have air-to-air capability. JSOTF restates requirement for air-to-ground capability.

141700Z APR 94 HC-130 (Ghost 32) departs Incirlik to assume Aerial Refueling mission.

141715Z APR 94 Initial report received from COMJSOTF at crash site: confirmed US helicopters, confirmed no survivors, and confirmed 26 deceased personnel. COMJSOTF received CTF/CG direction to 1) exfil bodies to Diyarbakir and 2) to exfil as much equipment as possible to a secure place. Recovery begins.

150331Z APR 94 Pony 22 arrives Diyarbakir. All JSOTF rotary wing assets now at Diyarbakir. All recovered remains at Diyarbakir; 26 sets accounted for.

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from

SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED.

Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, DAC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCOM

21 MAY 94
Date

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

JSOTF-J3 Memo, 30 Apr 94, After Action
which is kept in my records system.

21 May 94
Date

W. L. Harris
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

- AC-8a NOTAMs**
- AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994**
- AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**
- AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**
- AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**
- AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994**
- AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident**
- AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned, AC-8a
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident AC-8b**
- AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment AC-8c**
- AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994 AC-8d**
- AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee AC-8e
Request for Inquiry AC-8f
AC-8g
AC-8h**

2

18 April 1994

FROM: 39TH SPTG/CD (SAR Incident Team Chief)

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned, SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident

1. SUMMARY: I was tasked to lead two groups of mortuary search and recovery personnel into Northern Iraq on 15 April. The team consisted of 21 personnel which were split into Team 1 and Team 2 which departed Incirlik, flew to Diyarbikar on a C141, changed onto blackhawk helicopters and flew into Bazan Province (via Zakhu). The two teams searched the wreckage area and located several body items, personal effects, and weapons which were properly tagged and brought back to Diyarbikar. The teams were on the ground for approximately four hours, and were extracted via chopper to Diyarbikar Air Base. At the base the personnel then prepared remains for shipment to Frankfurt FRG on a C141, which was loaded and took off at about 2130L. I coordinated with Col Bonfiglio from Princilik and our personnel were transported to the base and remained over night in the gym (except the officers and the one female member--housed in the BOQ). We set up to keep the dining hall open and personnel did get chow--had to pay for their meals to include surcharge. On 16 April, I worked with the MCC to get transport for our personnel back to Incirlik which happened to be on a C130 and my personnel departed at about 1700L. I remained behind to meet with MGen Andres to discuss matters pertaining to the crash sites. I returned to Incirlik via C12 with MGen Andres the evening of 16 April, arriving at 2245 hours.

2. The following bullets are items of concern or "lessons learned" to be used for planning for future incidents.

- Identify now those personnel who should be on a SAR team of this sort. The initial cut should be 30 folks and the teams broken into 10 man increments. That way we could handle smaller incidents as well as be prepared for the larger ones.

- Set up training for the SAR teams. Demand that they be kept up to date and refresher training be conducted continuously. Prepare the folks for what they will see involving death and exposed human remains.

- Prepackage the equipment needed for a SAR operation and have an up-to-date inventory of the packages. Missing items could then be rapidly obtained to put in the package. Items missing in this instance were: Ice coolers, "Vicks" rub to kill smells, inventory sheets, and basic pads and pencils.

- Establish, in writing, a predeployment brief outline. Include the medics, EOD, Intel, and Chaplain, and have the brief in place so it can be given without running all over the place to get it set up properly--fill in the blanks checklist would be a good

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract from

39TH SPTG/CD, 18 Apr 94, Lessons Learned, SAR
 which is kept in my records system.
 20 May 94
 Date

W. L. Harris
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt. USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

start for the drawn of the brief.

- Limit the items to be taken to the site. Several folks showed up with extra bags, "carry on" things, etc. I had these things put in a hold area at Diyarbikar as we did not have the room to take the stuff on the choppers.


- Require Comm Sq to have a communications package readily available for deployment with the SAR team/s. It must be light weight and easy to use.

- Ensure there are always two people on the team who are trained in pallet build up. This eliminates big problems when trying to get things on airplanes--especially personal and "B" bags, plus boxes of equipment and transfer cases.

- The expectation to search and take care of the two sites in four hours or less could have been a very difficult mission because of the terrain and limited number of folks available to search. We did get, what we felt was all, of the body parts. Senior personnel need to decide when we will terminate searching as we did in this instance--I was seconded guessed by several folks who wanted total assurances we had located every piece of remains at the crash sites. Of course, this expectation is an impossibility.

- Because of the press and news personnel always attempting to get into sites and gather info from our troops, we need to ensure the SAR troops are briefed in detail about how to handle situations with folks like CNN reps. We did give a short overview brief to our team members, and they did well, but there was too much potential for our SAR people to be confronted at the scene and inadvertently make some comment or statement. I felt we were very weak in this area on this particular situation.

- Ensure there is a Lt Col or above to lead the teams into a remote place where political overtones are involved. I feel we made a very excellent decision in this case, because of the local political figures that came to express sorrow, etc., to the US and the fact the security was under the command of a Peshmerga general officer and in their culture, a senior representative was needed. A lower rank would have sent an inappropriate signal that we were not that concerned (personal opinion).


RUSSELL L. DAISLEY, Lt Col, USAF
Deputy Commander 39th Support Group

8 Attachments

1. After Actions (Capt Snyder)
2. Mortuary Affairs Log (1-6)
3. SAR Log (1-2)
4. Diyarbikar Mortuary Log (1-2)
5. Property Receipt from scene

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

AC-8a NOTAMs

AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994

**AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**

**AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**

AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994

AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident

**AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned,
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident**

AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment

AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994

**AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee
Request for Inquiry**

AC-8a

AC-8b

AC-8c

AC-8d

AC-8e

AC-8f

AC-8g

AC-8h

AC-8i

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

MEMORANDUM FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD PRESIDENT, MAJOR
GENERAL ANDRUS

FROM: MAJOR GENERAL LEE A. DOWNER
HQ USAFE/XO
UNIT 3050 BOX 15
APO AE 09094-5015

SUBJ: OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT ASSESSMENT

1. In the past sixteen months Operation PROVIDE COMFORT forces have been engaged several times both in the air and on the ground by Iraqi forces. The incidents are as follows:

- 17 Jan 93: US F-16 shot down Iraqi MiG-23 that violated the no-fly zone.
- 9 Apr 93: F-16s dropped cluster bombs after being fired at by anti-aircraft artillery.
- 18 Apr 93: F-4Gs fired HARMs after being tracked by SA-2 surface-to-air missile system radar.
- 19 Aug 93: F-16s and F-15s dropped CBUs and GBUs on SA-3 site near Mosul after F-16 pilot claimed he saw a plume of smoke, possibly indicating a shoulder-launched SAM.
- 19 Dec 93: Coalition representatives from the Military Coordination Center in Zakhu were fired on at the Faidah Camp along the security zone. Iraqi forces continued small arms fire as the convoy drove north toward Dahuk.

2. Since the incident at Faidah there have been no direct confrontations between the Iraqi military and coalition forces. This is consistent with the fact that while Iraq still maintains the capability to engage coalition aircraft both in the air and with ground based air defense assets, activity in the past four months has been relatively low.

3. Air activity remained moderately low, accented by the fact that the Iraqis have not been able to sustain the same levels of flight activity noted during this period last year, probably due to the effect sanctions have on maintenance and spare parts. Air defense assets have remained stagnant since September, with the only movement being conducted by tactical SAMs. Ground force movement activity levels have been high, with additional Republican Guard units moving into the Mosul area, and a large unit swap-out between two major divisions. Despite this activity, there is no increased threat to Kurdish populations by

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.


L. A. Ellis
Date: _____

Laura A. Ellis
LAURA A. ELLIS, SFA USAF
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

Iraqi forces; they maintain the same capability to move against Kurdish cities with little or no warning.

4. While there have been no hostile confrontations between coalition and Iraqi forces in the last four months, Husayn has continued his policy of persistent low-level harassment against the Kurdish populations in northern Iraq. These include extended power outages, security checkpoints, roadblocks, infrequent shelling of villages by both Iraqi and Iranian forces, and an occasional attack against UNGCI personnel. Bounties remained in effect for non-government organization personnel. In a similar way, Saddam Husayn continued to threaten coalition pilots. It is common knowledge that Husayn would like nothing better than to shoot down a coalition plane. Although Husayn's rhetoric became increasingly hostile in March right before the UN sanctions vote, no provocative actions occurred as a result.

5. Although there has been no evidence of an increased threat over the past year, coalition forces continue to fly daily missions in a politically and diplomatically charged environment with the potential for hostile engagement. Given the unpredictable nature of the environment, the coalition presence saves hundreds of thousands of lives. Without the security zone and the no-fly zone enforcement, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq would have no hope for a stable future.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'L. Downer', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

LEE A. DOWNER, Maj Gen, USAF
Director of Operations, Plans,
and Intelligence

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

- AC-8a** NOTAMs
- AC-8b** SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994
- AC-8c** MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party
- AC-8d** Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994
- AC-8e** Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994
- AC-8f** Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994
- AC-8g** Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident
- AC-8h** 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned, AC-8a
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident AC-8b
- AC-8i** Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment AC-8c
- AC-8j** MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994 AC-8d
- AC-8k** Senate Armed Services Committee AC-8e
Request for Inquiry AC-8f
AC-8g
AC-8h
AC-8i
AC-8j

EXTRACT

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board created to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no man's land in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate extract

MCC Zakho Sitrep
Date: 3 May 94
If kept in the records system.
LAURA A ELLIS, SFA USAF
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RMNF~~
UNCLAS

CERTIFICATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

I certify that the information contained in this document has been declassified from:

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RMNF~~ to UNCLASSIFIED
Date: 25 MAY 94
Donald G. Norris
DONALD G. NORRIS, GS-15, D-AC
Declassification Team Chief, HQ USEUCO

SUBJECT: (U) MCC ZAKHO SITREP # 093 - 03 APR 94

1. (U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

- SUMMARY: - POWER CUT/PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY.
- MAINTENANCE DAY.
- GOI ACTIVITY.

A. (U) POWER CUT: AS OF 1900 HRS LOCAL ON 03 APR 94, THE ELECTRICITY FROM GOI HAS STILL NOT BEEN RESTORED TO THE DAHUK GOVERNORATE. IT IS NOW 243 DAYS SINCE IT WAS CUT ON 5 AUG 93. WORK CONTINUES ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUPPLY FROM TURKEY.

B. (C) MAINTENANCE DAY: ON 3 APR 94 MCC HAD A MAINTENANCE DAY

C. (U) GOI ACTIVITY: ON 3 APR 94 MCC RECEIVED AN INFORMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED 31 MAR 94 FROM DAHUK ASSAYESH TO THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF ASSAYESH IN ERBIL: (QUOTE) WE HAVE RECEIVED RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCES (AND FROM SEVERAL OTHER SOURCES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME) THAT THE REGIME IS INTENT ON ATTACKING THE HQS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE UN IN THE KURDISTAN REGION. THE REGIME TOLD ITS REPRESSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENTS THAT ANYONE WHO CARRIED OUT AN ASSASSINATION OF ONE OF THE FOREIGNERS IN THE KUDISTAN REGION WOULD BE GIVEN A CASH REWARD OF ONE MILLION IRAQI DINARS. THE INFORMATION FROM THE REGIME WAS THAT THE PURPOSE OF COMMITTING THESE CRIMES WAS TO GET THE FOREIGNERS OUT OF KURDISTAN (END QUOTE).

D. (C) ASSASSINATION OF GERMAN CIVILIAN: ON 3 APR 94 MR STEVE ALLEN, SENIOR UN COORDINATOR FOR N.IRAQ, REPORTED TO MCC THAT MS LISSY SCHMIDT, A GERMAN CITIZEN AND CORRESPONDENT FOR AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, HAD BEEN SHOT DEAD WHILST TRAVELLING BY CAR FROM SAYYID SADIQ (NE7813) TO SULAYMANIYAH (NE4035). HER CAR HAD BEEN DISCOVERED ABOUT 30 KM EAST OF SULAYMANIYAH BY A WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME STAFF MEMBER AT APPROX 1400 HRS ON 3 APR 94. BOTH MS SCHMIDT AND HER DRIVER HAD APPARENTLY DIED FROM MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS TO THE HEAD. A MORE DETAILED REPORT FROM UN WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UN REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN EVACUATION OF THE BODY OF MS SCHMIDT FROM IRAQ.

D. (U) TRUCK TRAFFIC: TRUCK TRAFFIC FOR 02 APR 94 - NOT AVAILABLE.

F. (U) VISITORS TO ZAKHO HOUSE: 8.

2. (C) COMMUNICATIONS: NTR

3. (U) PERSONNEL TOTAL: 62.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/RMNF~~

UNCLAS

7

TAB AC-8

MISCELLANEOUS

- AC-8a NOTAMs**
- AC-8b SAR Daily Log, 14-17 April 1994**
- AC-8c MCC Operations Log, 14-18 April 1994 and Note from Zakhu,
Kurdistan Democratic Party**
- AC-8d Headquarters, Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,
Memorandum for Record, 14 May 1994**
- AC-8e Headquarters Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II,
Combined Task Force/C2 Log, 14 April 1994**
- AC-8f Extract of Joint Operations Center Log, 13-14 April 1994**
- AC-8g Extract from JSOTF-J3 After Action Report, Eagle Flight Incident**
- AC-8h 39 Support Group Memorandum, Lessons Learned, AC-8a
SAR Operations on Helicopter Incident AC-8b**
- AC-8i Memorandum USAFE/XO, OPC Assessment AC-8c**
- AC-8j MCC SITREP, 3 April 1994 AC-8d**
- AC-8k Senate Armed Services Committee AC-8e
Request for Inquiry AC-8f
AC-8g
AC-8h
AC-8i
AC-8j
AC-8k**

SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

J. JAMES EPHON NEBRASKA
CARL LEVIN MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY MASSACHUSETTS
JEFF PINGAMAN NEW MEXICO
JOHN GLENN OHIO
RICHARD C. SHELBY ALABAMA
ROBERT C. BYRD WEST VIRGINIA
BOB GRAHAM FLORIDA
CHARLES S. ROSS VIRGINIA
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN CONNECTICUT
RICHARD M. BRYAN NEVADA

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN W. WARNER VIRGINIA
WILLIAM S. COHEN MARYLAND
JOHN MCCAIN ARIZONA
TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
DAN COATS INDIANA
BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
DIRK KEMPTORNE, IDAHO
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH NORTH CAROLINA
KAY BAKER HUTCHISON TEXAS

United States Senate OFFICE OF THE CLERK
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 94 MAY 23 PII 1:45
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6056

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STATE DIRECTOR
RICHARD L. REYNARD, STATE DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

May 16, 1994

Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Committee has received information from an individual who wishes to remain anonymous concerning one of the pilots allegedly involved in the recent destruction of two U.S. Army helicopters by U.S. Air Force aircraft over Iraq. According to the information provided to the Committee, an Air Force colonel named Sonderheim, who is currently stationed in SOUTHCOM, has allegedly made a number of comments concerning one of the pilots:

1. Col. Sonderheim served as squadron commander of one of the pilots, and that pilot is now squadron commander of a unit in Turkey.
2. Col. Sonderheim found it necessary to rate this pilot very poorly and recommended that he be separated from the Air Force for dangerous flying and lack of judgment. This was the only time that he had ever rated a pilot so harshly.
3. The damaging OER was "pulled" because the pilot was a favorite of some senior officers. In its place, a favorable OER written by the Wing Commander was sent forward and placed in the pilot's record.
4. Col. Sonderheim characterized the pilot as "trigger happy."

The credibility of this information is unknown, and is forwarded to you for appropriate consideration in view of the ongoing investigation of the incident over Iraq.

Sincerely,



Strom Thurmond
Ranking Republican Member



Sam Nunn
Chairman